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Chapter 1
Introduction
Abstract In this introductory chapter, I preview how philosophy of signs can 
advance current debates about consciousness. Many philosophers have urged us to 
distinguish between what an experience does and what an experience feels like. 
This distinction seems sensible enough, but it renders scientific inquiry insufficient, 
insofar as experimental methods can only track an experience’s detectable effects. 
However, Charles Sanders Peirce, the polymath who coined the term “qualia,” saw 
no tension in this function/quality distinction. Peirce was the founder of American 
pragmatism and a professional scientist, so he clearly valued tangible verification. 
Still, his philosophical system countenanced intrinsic qualities under the heading of 
“Firstness.” Since qualia are usually considered to be at odds with pragmatic verifi-
cation, I set out to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both 
ways. The key, I suggest, is to see how we can sometimes insert distinctions between 
features that are always bound together. Such “prescissive” distinctions are essential 
to understanding how signs work. So, while semiotics is currently the least known 
branch of philosophy ending in –ics, a better understanding of that branch can rem-
edy much of the current puzzlement about qualia.
The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the 
gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive 
action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those 
two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason. 
Charles Sanders Peirce, “Pragmatism as the Logic of 
Abduction,” lecture delivered at Harvard on May 14, 1903 
(Reprinted in Peirce 1998, 241)
Each quale is in itself what it is for itself, without reference to 
any other.
Charles Sanders Peirce, “Quale- Consciousness,” 
unpublished notes, circa 1898 
(Reprinted in Peirce 1931–58, 6.224)
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This book engages with a philosophical worry that the qualitative or phenomenal 
dimension of consciousness may not be captured by regular scientific explanation, 
that is, by the sort of inquiry which tracks tangible effects. There is a sense in which 
I agree and disagree that phenomenal consciousness poses such a problem, so I 
draw on the semiotic ideas of Charles Sanders Peirce to articulate in what respects 
I think the worry ought and ought not to be taken seriously. I think that, if we can 
come to see how this book’s two starting quotations are consistent, we will have 
made progress in philosophy of mind.
Most aspects of human cognition are answerable to regular techniques of scien-
tific investigation. Response times, skin moisture levels, eye movements, verbal 
reports, brain scans, blood flow rates—all can be tracked in controlled experiments 
that give a robust indication of what a subject thinks. This coverage seems quite 
sufficient. After all, “[i]f an experience is reported, or accessed in some weaker 
sense, then we can explain it by reference to how the brain thinks about itself. But 
if an experience happens without being accessible, then it becomes a phantom” 
(McDermott 2007, 518). However, not everyone agrees. In his 1974 paper “What Is 
It Like to Be a Bat?,” Thomas Nagel argued that consciousness has an elusive “what 
it’s like” component that is left out by regular scientific explanation. Science does a 
great job of figuring out how sense organs work, brains operate, and organisms 
respond. But, as Nagel points out, “in discovering sound to be, in reality, a wave 
phenomenon in air or other media, we leave behind one viewpoint to take up another, 
and the auditory, human, or animal viewpoint that we leave behind remains unre-
duced” (1974, 445). His suggestion, then, was that no amount of functional input- 
output correlations will add up to a quality.
Nagel suggested this during a “wave of reductionist euphoria” (1974, 435), so it 
took a while for his arguments to persuade others. Nagel’s (2012) positive views 
never managed to attract many adherents, but as Paul Churchland writes, his early 
paper became a “prominent flag around which much antireductive opinion has ral-
lied” (1996, 196). Roughly two decades after Nagel’s piece appeared, Francisco 
Varela (1996, 331) would speak of an “outburst” of research on consciousness. A 
topic once considered taboo is now one of the most vibrant in philosophy.
Following Nagel, philosophers of mind like David Chalmers and Ned Block 
have argued (from different angles) that, even if one were to fully describe how a 
creature responds to stimuli, those input-output patterns would still leave out the 
quality of the relevant experience(s). Yet, before one can assess this claim of incom-
pleteness, one has to get clear on what aspect is supposedly left-out. In order to 
make their grievance against functionalist explanation persuasive, these philoso-
phers have introduced a distinction between “phenomenality” and “accessibility” 
(to use the jargon favoured by Block 1995). The concept of phenomenality is meant 
to capture how a conscious episode feels, whereas accessibility tracks what it does. 
Given this distinction, one needs a further step to say that an account of doing sup-
plies one with an account of feeling. Many accounts of the mind tie consciousness 
to a property that is more manageable, like attention (see Prinz 2012), but I agree 
that “[t]o analyze consciousness in terms of some functional notion is either to 
change the subject or to define away the problem” (Chalmers 1996, 105).
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This tension between experiential qualities and functional relations is not the 
traditional mind-body problem. The mind-body problem takes root in René 
Descartes. For that reason, it is, perhaps inevitably, tied to idealism and philosophi-
cal scepticism. It conceives the mind as an immaterial substance for which the only 
evidence is private introspection. To appreciate how this differs from the more 
recent philosophical problems that will concern me, consider Frank Jackson’s 
“knowledge argument”:
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from 
a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She specialises in the 
neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is 
to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 
“red,” “blue,” and so on. […] What will happen when Mary is released from her black and 
white room or is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems 
just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. 
But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. (Jackson 1982, 130)
This argument does not rely on any of the standard Cartesian themes in order to 
be gripping. Mary the neuroscientist is no sceptic, so she never doubts that there is 
an external world or that she has/is a body. In fact, in Jackson’s story, she knows all 
there is to know about both. The problem of experiential qualities arises from the 
fact that, in Mary’s case, her body and the world have not (yet) met in the right way. 
Hence, until that close encounter takes place, we can wonder whether Mary fully 
appreciates what it is like to see the colour(s) that are absent from her room. When 
she exits that room, she can point, quite publicly, to the colour(s) at hand. The ques-
tion is whether her language, scientific or vernacular, can do all the work needed to 
convey this quality. One does not become a substance dualist by suspecting that 
language somehow falls short. The task, then, is to clarify that “somehow.”
Ideally, a full account of the conscious mind should cover both qualia and their 
practical effects. Far from being a pessimist, Nagel saw this “as a challenge to form 
new concepts and devise a new method—an objective phenomenology not depen-
dent on empathy or the imagination” (Nagel 1974, 449). In this book, I want to take 
up that challenge. Whereas Nagel assumed that “such a solution, if it exists, lies in 
the distant intellectual future” (1974, 436), I want to argue that we should look to 
the past, not the future, to find the “objective phenomenology” that Nagel calls for. 
Specifically, I believe that the materials needed to assemble a robust account of 
consciousness already exist in Peircean semiotics. My book will thus be part history 
of philosophy, part current philosophy, and—hopefully—part future of philosophy 
as well.
Parties involved in the debates about consciousness know quite well that “the 
word quale and its plural qualia were introduced into philosophy as technical terms 
precisely in order to capture that aspect of an experience that escapes the scrutiny of 
any natural science” (Hattiangadi 2005, 342). Few seem aware, though, that this 
term “qualia” was introduced by the scientist and founder of pragmatism, Charles 
Sanders Peirce (1998, 272). Qualia were thus part of semiotics from the get-go. In 
fact, in some places, Peirce calls them qualisigns: “A Qualisign is a quality which is 
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a sign. It cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied; but the embodiment has 
nothing to do with its character as a sign” (Peirce 1998, 291). My book is devoted 
to unpacking all that this statement means and entails.
The core of Peirce’s arguments combines two theses: the mind is a kind of semiosis; sign 
processes are extended within the spatiotemporal dimension, so that something physical 
has to instantiate or realize them. According to the first one, the mind is the nature of the 
sign-action. The second thesis asserts that signs cannot act unless they are spatiotemporally 
realized. Thus, if a sign is to have any active mode of being, it must be materially embodied 
(or, at least, it results from a previous operation with material signs). (Queiroz and Atã 
2014, 283–284)
Sober theses like these should quell any fears that discussing phenomenal con-
sciousness will take us away from the concrete realities of empirical science and 
daily life. Nevertheless, Peirce’s philosophy reminds us that it is not mandatory to 
always have those concrete realities in view. We can forget them, deliberately, by 
focusing solely on the intrinsic character of an experience. When we do this, we 
realize why, in a qualitative sign, its “embodiment has nothing to do with its charac-
ter as a sign” (Peirce 1998, 291).
Peirce began studying Richard Whatley’s Elements of Logic when he was twelve 
years old (see Brent 1998, 48) and honed his skills for the rest of his life, inventing 
a complete system of logical graphs when he was 57 years old (Roberts 1973, 11). 
As a logician relying on symbolic and diagrammatic notation to catalog and evalu-
ate inferences, Peirce knew that signs can embody meaning. But, as a philosopher, 
he also wanted to know “what must be true of signs in order for them to embody 
meaning” (Liszka 1996, 10). It was a view of inquiry as a collective enterprise that 
“led Peirce to open the dusty folios of the medieval schoolmen” (Colapietro 1989, 
2) in order to further his study of signs. Inspired by Duns Scotus’ stance on the 
Trinity, Peirce realized that, since all signs involve a triadic relation among a sign- 
vehicle, an object, and an interpretation, we can adopt three different perspectives 
on any meaningful phenomena: we can consider (1) the phenomenon itself, (2) what 
it stands for, and (3) what it stands for to. The first perspective, which Peirce aptly 
called Firstness, is what lands contemporary philosophy of mind into trouble. 
Nevertheless, Peirce held that we can artificially isolate a qualitative character from 
whatever practical effect(s) it may have.
True, Peirce’s pragmatic maxim tells us that if the object of a given concept does 
not “conceivably have practical bearings” (Peirce 1992, 132), then we have no rea-
son to credit our concept with having an object. Interestingly though, Peirce never 
shaved-off qualia. On the contrary, as Paul Livingston explains in his historical sur-
vey of consciousness debates, “[f]or Peirce, qualia (often used as cognate to ‘quali-
ties’) were already the most basic constituents of the totality of sensory experience, 
the ground of what he called Firstness or immediacy” (Livingston 2004, 6).
As I will emphasize throughout this book, Firstness is a relation-free state 
revealed only by artificial analysis. Now, some naturalists (e.g., Ross and Spurrett 
2004) think that such analyses should carry no weight in debates about the mind. 
Peirce was conversant with—and contributed to—advances in psychology and 
 neuroscience (see Pietarinen 2006, 71–76), but he was never that kind of naturalist. 
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His reason was simple. Although our eyes can see material things like a white flag 
or vial of dilating mercury, they cannot see the relations that make those things sig-
nificant. Because “signs in their constitutive being as [triadic] relations are invisible 
to sense […]” (Deely 2009, 236), Peirce rightly saw that a study of signs cannot 
make do without abstract philosophical methods.
As to the important experimental research of semiotics, by means of questionnaires, tests, 
eye-tracking, brain-imaging and so on, all such procedures importantly add to our general 
understanding of how signs, meanings, and references are processed by human beings and 
their brains and minds, in some cases by different groups of human beings. But such results 
can never hope to reduce the generality of signs to any mere sum of such individual process-
ing. (Stjernfelt 2013, 106)
I think that, to be realistic, a theory of consciousness must begin with an experi-
ential baseline that is complex (Käufer and Chemero 2015, 80–83). I nevertheless 
think that humans are endowed with a unique ability to adulterate this baseline by 
isolating qualities. Opposing this, Cohen and Dennett (2011) have recently claimed 
that experiential qualities cannot be separated from the cognitive functions they are 
embroiled in. One immediate reaction upon hearing this is: of course they can. After 
all, when I spit out a food item because it is bitter, I can distinguish the bitterness 
from the spitting. Naturally, a lot turns on what sort of distinction we are talking 
about. One idea floating around since at least Hirst (1959) is that there may be 
respectable ways of granting that some things are the same yet different. Unless one 
wants to dismiss this suggestion altogether, one must at least explain why very 
smart thinkers constantly return, under different guises, to what David Papineau 
(2002, 6–7) calls the “intuition of mind-brain distinctness.” Peircean semiotics gives 
us a way to do justice to this intuition.
Peirce did not address the “hard problem” of consciousness as it is currently 
understood. Even so, I believe his philosophy of signs can help us achieve a more 
satisfactory theoretical account of “what it’s like” to enjoy conscious experience. 
The key, I suggest, is to see how we can sometimes insert distinctions between fea-
tures that are always bound together.
Peirce argued that, to contemplate qualia in their Firstness, one must artificially 
suppose that all causal and inferential relations are absent (as we shall see, latent 
similarity relations resist this supposition of absence). Using a medieval terminol-
ogy, Peirce called this deliberate myopia “prescission” or “prescissive abstraction” 
(like Peirce 1998, 270fn, I will use those terms interchangeably). Prescission is 
crucial in semiotic inquiry, because it allows us to evince an asymmetrical subsump-
tion in the triadic sign. We can suppose a sign-vehicle without an object, or a sign- 
vehicle- and-object link without an interpretation, but we cannot go in the opposite 
direction (Peirce 1992, 4–6). Additionally, prescission allows us to discern three 
kinds of sign-vehicles (qualities, occurrences, and regularities) and three ways that 
these sign-vehicles can be related to objects (by similarity, causation, and conven-
tion). As we shall see, the nature of a sign-vehicle constrains the sort(s) of referen-
tial relations it can have. Reference by convention needs to be conveyed by a 
regularity, reference by causation needs to be conveyed by occurrences, and refer-
ence by similarity needs to be conveyed by a quality. Each time, though, the more 
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complex relations presuppose the simpler ones, so we bottom out at ineffable expe-
riential qualities.
Because prescissive distinctions always leave their complex starting point 
untouched, there is no reason why cognitive science should do things any differ-
ently. A better understanding of prescission can nevertheless soothe the worry that 
the “intrinsic quality of experience” (Harman 1990) has somehow been “left-out” 
(Levine 1997).
Peirce died in 1914, but for decades, few knew what to make of his semiotic 
theory. As Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen writes, “Harvard University to which Peirce’s 
literary remains were eventually deposited, had in its possession a monster easier to 
lock up than harness” (2006, 46n22). At Harvard, Clarence Irving Lewis wrote a 
dissertation on “The Place of Intuition in Knowledge,” under the supervision of 
Peirce’s friend, Josiah Royce. Upon being hired at Harvard in 1920, Lewis was 
tasked with cataloging the Peirce papers. The two years spent doing this left their 
mark. “‘How could the given be intelligible to the mind if it were independent of its 
interpretive activity?’ This is a question which Lewis would not solve to his satis-
faction until much later when he read Peirce” (Dayton 2016). In addition to being 
one of the first to engage with Peirce’s work in logic (Lewis 1918, 79–106), Lewis 
was one of the first to use Peirce’s new word “qualia” (Lewis 1946, 188).
Lewis taught W. V. O. Quine in the early 1930s. Quine clearly read Peirce—he 
reviewed the second volume of Peirce’s Collected Papers soon after it appeared 
(Quine 1933)—but as a behaviourist he did little to advance our understanding of 
consciousness. Even so, Quine had fruitful discussions with his colleague, the lin-
guist Roman Jakobson, who began teaching at Harvard in 1949. Jakobson started 
publicly mentioning the ideas of Peirce as early as 1952 (see Jakobson 1971, 555–
556). In June 1974, he told participants at the first congress of the International 
Association for Semiotic Studies that engaging with the work of Peirce would bear 
dividends (see Jakobson 1979; reprinted in Jakobson 1988).
Umberto Eco was at that congress in Milan, and he took Jakobson’s advice seri-
ously (Proni 2015). Prompted by his study of Peirce, Eco was one of the first phi-
losophers to work into his theory the idea of a similarity-based signification that is 
neither symbolic nor indexical. Moving away from a purely conventional interpreta-
tion of interpretation helped to cement Eco’s (Eco 1990) growing impatience with 
the implausible relativism inadvertently supported by his earlier work (Eco 1976). 
Given Eco’s established prominence, his change of mind on the controversial topic 
of images (Eco 2000, see Polidoro 2015) invigorated Peircean scholarship. In fact, 
European scholars were (and arguably remain) the go-to people for insight into this 
American thinker (see Rydenfelt 2014). By looking at the qualitative dimension of 
consciousness from a Peircean semiotic vantage, my book is part of this ongoing 
effort to rehabilitate and apply the mature ideas of Peirce.
As it turns out, Peirce (1998, 334–335) wasn’t nitpicking when he insisted that 
his stance differed crucially from the pragmatisms of James, Dewey, and others. As 
work on the Peirce manuscripts proceeds, the full extent of this difference is dawn-
ing on scholars. A lot of the received wisdom about Peirce that one finds in main-
stream histories and textbooks is just plain wrong. Specifically, Peirce was never a 
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“verificationist.” On the contrary, he took a sophisticated stance that countenanced 
potential signification. So, whereas some scholars still try to discuss Peircean prag-
matism without discussing Peircean semiotics, such a compromise is untenable, 
since “[h]is pragmatism is a theorem of his theory of signs” (Fisch 1986, 435).
Peircean semiotics has informed cognitive science (see Steiner 2013), but many 
of the technical notions developed by Peirce remain poorly known in mainstream 
debates. For instance, in addition to the acquaintance and description identified by 
Bertrand Russell (1910–11), “[a] third kind of signification exists” that “is barely 
glimpsed in formal semantics today” (Legg 2013, 17). This third kind of significa-
tion is iconicity. If, as I suspect, icons are needed in order to successfully refer to 
qualia, then it is predictable that qualia should appear puzzling.
How do we explain the mind’s qualitative dimension? If experiential qualities 
escape functional description, how could we ever refer to them? What sort of place, 
if any, should we assign qualities in the world? I believe Peircean philosophy of 
signs can help us answer some of these questions.
Peirce developed a phenomenology independently of Husserl (Spiegelberg 1956; 
Stjernfelt 2007, 141–159). Yet, since quite a bit of doctoring needs to be done in 
order to yield the insights that are of interest to a philosophic study of signs, semi-
otic inquiry is very different from phenomenological description. In many ways, it 
is closer to logic. The foundational assumption of semiotics is that all signs, wher-
ever they are found, involve a triadic structure (Fisch 1983). In a rare pedagogic 
moment, Peirce (1998, 170–171, 425–427) likened the relation involved in the 
action of signs to “giving,” insofar as the very idea commits one to countenancing 
not only (1) that which is given, but also (2) that to which it is given and (3) that 
which gives. This example was later made popular by Russell (1998, 59), who 
picked it up from Royce—that friend of Peirce who, “[f]or some reason” that 
Russell could not discern, “always liked triadic relations” (Russell 1998, 68). As we 
will see, it is unclear whether Russell really understood the Peircean emphasis on 
triadicity. In any event, like “giving,” the passage at play in a sign cannot be reduced 
to pairs, so the point is that nothing below three places will do.
Identifying the sign with a generic triadic relation lets semiotic inquiry roam 
across many disciplinary domains. Thomas Sebeok (1979, 64) thus called ecumeni-
calism the “distinctive burden” of semiotics. Elimination is the cardinal sin of such 
a research program. Indeed, “if semiotics is the science of signs, as the etymology 
of the word suggests, then it does not exclude any sign. If, in the variety of the sys-
tems of signs, one discovers systems that differ from others by their specific proper-
ties, one can place them in a special class without removing them from the general 
science of signs” (Jakobson and Pomorska 1983; quoted in Sebeok 1991, 77). One 
is of course free to return to a local inquiry after having adopted such a wide van-
tage, but one will then do so with a renewed understanding of where the human 
mind and its products fit in the grander scheme of things.
I believe that, to make sense of qualia, what is needed is the removal of complex-
ity. In a prominent collection of essays on consciousness, James H. Fetzer claims 
that “systems are conscious when they have the ability to use signs of specific kinds 
and not incapacitated from the exercise of that ability” (Fetzer 2003, 303). The defi-
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nition of the sign Fetzer uses—which he attributes to Peirce—is “something that 
stands for something (else) in some respect or other for somebody” (Fetzer 2003, 
303; see also Fetzer 1988). This view ensures that anything lower than triadic rela-
tions cannot be regarded as telling us anything useful about consciousness. Fetzer’s 
proposal is telling, because it is the opposite of what I aim to accomplish in this 
book.
There is no denying that conceiving minds as things for which things can stand 
for other things is a good way to approach the “easy” (or, more appropriately, “eas-
ier”) problems of consciousness; like the ability to discriminate, categorize, react to 
environmental stimuli, and so on (Chalmers 1995, 200). However, philosophical 
worries about consciousness arise from the fact that such a theory of sapience or 
thinking will not amount to a theory of sentience or feeling. By dipping below the 
level that makes cognitive processing possible, I want to show how this demand for 
a theory of sentience can fit into—or, more precisely, be subsumed in—an enriched 
account of sapience.
One can prescind a simple quality amid the stream of consciousness, but one has 
to make sure that whatever one reports about those impoverished scenarios does not 
help itself to the very resources supposed absent. Unfortunately, mainstream debates 
took on selected Peircean ideas without grasping their full semiotic motivation. 
Thus, taking their lead from Russellian philosophy of language, most philosophers 
of mind assume that causal reference is our only way to get in touch with the world 
and other minds. By dipping below the level of triadic relations, I want to approach 
phenomenal consciousness from a different—and more promising—angle.
Right now, semiotics (we owe the name to Locke) is arguably the least known 
branch of philosophy ending in –ics. I think that this is about to change. Nathan 
Houser, who spent decades editing Peirce’s vast papers, surmises that, in the long 
run, “Peirce’s semiotic may prove to be his most important contribution, really the 
creation of a new science” (in Bellucci et  al. 2014, 129). Although I am unsure 
whether it should be considered a science, I am convinced that Peirce’s triadic 
account of consciousness (Houser 1983) is exactly the sort of “fundamental theory” 
that David Chalmers has been searching for since his 1996 book The Conscious 
Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Let me now share the ideas that lead me 
to this conviction.
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Chapter 2
Calling on the Helpful Resources  
of Semiotic Inquiry
Abstract The name “semiotics” comes from John Locke, but the branch of phi-
losophy that this name picks out remains mostly unknown in the mainstream litera-
ture on consciousness. This chapter will thus offer a primer on semiotics, both as an 
abstract inquiry and as an organized pursuit. The starting assumption of semiotic 
inquiry is that conventional meaning, inference from evidence, and resemblance- 
based representation all concern a single theoretical object, namely the sign. This is 
because the sign is a triadic relation that can be realized differently in different 
domains. Some of the bonds that sustain the action of signs are mind-dependent, 
whereas others are mind-independent. Although there are hints of this account in 
H.  P. Grice’s remarks about “meaning,” the ecumenical perspective taken up by 
Peirce and other philosophers of signs can be traced back to Augustine. I recount 
this history and argue that Peirce was on the right track when he decided to approach 
the mind from a semiotic perspective.
2.1  Separating Qualities from Functions
Consciousness bundles together a lot of features, not all of which will concern me 
equally. So, like David Chalmers’ book The Conscious Mind, I want to begin by 
zeroing in on a very narrow aspect:
What is central to consciousness, at least in the most interesting sense, is experience. […] 
According to the psychological concept, it matters little whether a mental state has a con-
scious quality or not. What matters is the role it plays in a cognitive economy. On the phe-
nomenal concept, mind is characterized by the way it feels; on the psychological concept, 
mind is characterized by what it does. (Chalmers 1996, 3–4, 11)
According to Chalmers, cognitive science has a lot to say about the psychologi-
cal side of the mind, but it has almost nothing to say about the phenomenal side. 
Chalmers (1996, 5) thinks it is presently hard to see what a fully developed theory 
of phenomenality would look like. Even so, he thinks that the phenomenal dimen-
sion of the mind is different enough from the psychological dimension to merit a 
distinct concept. I agree.
Unfortunately, the distinction in question has come to be associated with so- 
called “zombies.” Zombies are often said to be “behaviourally indistinguishable” 
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(see Tanney 2004), but according to the construal of phenomenality endorsed by 
Chalmers (1996, 95), they would be psychologically indistinguishable as well. It is 
not just that one can imagine a creature whose sensory input and behavioural output 
functions map onto ours despite having a different physical realization; a suffi-
ciently sophisticated robot passing the Turing test would qualify in that regard. 
Rather, the claim is stronger, since it pertains to the very information processing 
sandwiched between the inputs and outputs. It is widely understood that “[m]y zom-
bie twin, for instance, has his eyes water just as I do when he eats too much Wasabi. 
Unlike me, […] [t]here is nothing it-is-like for him to taste Wasabi” (Majeed 2013, 
252). One should keep in mind, though, that the broad notion of function also covers 
inferences. We may consider premises as input and conclusions as output. Hence, if 
a conscious person silently ponders xyz before doing P, her zombie counterpart 
would, under the same circumstances, also silently ponder xyz before doing P. So, 
as far as zombie-detection goes, Freud would be as impotent as Skinner.
Framed this way, the presence or absence of a qualitative dimension would be 
unverifiable. Philosophers like Paul Churchland have therefore argued that, if we 
want to charge a scientific account of the mind with coming up short, we should 
“endeavor to find in it some real empirical failing. Imaginary failings simply don’t 
matter” (2005, 558). Although one might have expected a pragmatist to agree, the 
founder of pragmatism actually developed a set of subtle distinctions that lend some 
support to current contentions about qualia. Indeed, the function/quality distinction 
that Chalmers appeals to is appealing because it rests on a truth which Peirce’s ordi-
nal categories make clear: the idea of a relatum without a relation makes sense, but 
the idea of a relation without relata does not. This, in turn, permits an asymmetrical 
deletion. In developing a semiotic account of consciousness, I will make a host of 
adjustments, but I will never stray from this core insight.
If we read Chalmers’ chapter on “Two Concepts of Mind” (1996, 3–31) closely, 
we notice that he first pinpoints a very narrow sense of “experience.” Only once this 
is done does he ask us to conceive experience-free zombies. This means that, what-
ever stance one takes on the traditional issue of dualism versus (materialist) monism, 
the quality/function distinction can be rendered intelligible on its own grounds. 
Chalmers and his commentators seem to consider the distinction between the two 
concepts to be mere table setting, but I think it is where all the major action tran-
spires. Chalmers insists that “[t]here should be no question of competition between 
these two notions of mind” (1996, 11). Call this the non-overlap thesis. He also 
insists that “[t]hey cover different phenomena, both of which are quite real” (ibid.). 
Call this the dual commitment thesis. The account of consciousness that I want to 
develop accepts the dual commitment thesis but rejects the non-overlap thesis.
Because “zombies” display no practical difference from regular humans, they 
violate the founding intent of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim. Still, as we have just seen, 
before one can delete qualia from zombies, one has to focus on a very narrow con-
strual that deletes all relations from a quality. As a result, prescission “becomes 
philosophically relevant when it is applied […] to disentangling the fundamental 
concepts which account for our experience and thought. In fact, it is for this purpose 
that Peirce clarified the method of prescision” (Gava 2011, 236). However, by 
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 comparison with pragmatism, Peirce’s work on prescission is virtually unknown. It 
might therefore be helpful to distinguish two versions of Peirce.
There is, on the one hand, the better-known version who founded pragmatism 
and managed to get a few key articles published at an opportune time. Here, the 
functional side of the mind is played up. Yet, there is also, on the other hand, the 
lesser-known (but increasingly appreciated) version who made unparalleled 
advances in philosophy of signs which, until recently, remained mostly unpub-
lished. Here, the non-functional side of the mind is given its due. This is a rough 
division, but it helps. The fact that the Essential Peirce collections are cut into two 
volumes renders that division even more vivid. The cover of the first volume (Peirce 
1992) shows the younger Peirce, who instructed us to focus on the practical effects 
of a concept in order to clarify its meaning; whereas the second volume (Peirce 
1998) shows the older, more heavily bearded, Peirce, who relentlessly investigated 
a neglected branch of philosophy called semiotics.
The second essay of the second Essential Peirce is entitled “What is a Sign?” 
Naturally, this will strike any newcomer as a great place to start. The essay begins 
by noting that “since all reasoning is an interpretation of signs of some kind,” its 
titular question is “most necessary” but also “very difficult” (1998, 4). A mere four 
lines in, Peirce tells us that “[i]t is necessary to recognize three different states of 
mind” (ibid.). The first state of mind that Peirce invites us to consider is that of a red 
feeling, and nothing else. The reader who, saddled with an unexamined folk semi-
otic theory, came in expecting a discussion of traffic signals, will likely wonder at 
this point whether Peirce has veered off topic. He has not. Peirce’s goal is to evince 
the conditions for the possibility of sign-action. He wants to make a point: with a 
quality like red and just red, there can be no flow of consciousness. If one finds such 
a flow, the impetus must have come from a source different from the quality itself.
Implicitly, Peirce is making an additional point, just as important, which is that 
we can follow through with his invitation to consider a quality like red in complete 
isolation from anything else. Logically, it can be done. Peirce makes sure to empha-
size that “nobody really is in a state of feeling, pure and simple” as he just described 
(1998, 4). Yet, he observes that “whenever we are awake, something is present to the 
mind, and what is present, without reference to any compulsion or reason, is feel-
ing” (ibid.).
Those who have read only the early Peirce should therefore take note: Peirce is 
not a “verificationist” who denies that we experience qualia. On the contrary, he 
begins by telling us that qualia are the most fundamental constituents of any mind. 
Phenomenal qualities thus take centre-stage, long before practical effects enter the 
scene and the drama of cognition proper begins. When Peirce asks “What is a sign?,” 
he begins by distinguishing states of mind. Applying philosophy of signs to philoso-
phy of mind is thus perfectly natural. As Thomas Short explains: “[S]ince the human 
mind, according to Peirce, is constituted by semeiotic processes of a special type, it 
should be possible to use the concept of semeiosis to analyze consciousness, and that 
precludes using the concept of consciousness to analyze semeiosis” (1986, 105).
Like cognitive science, philosophy of signs has “a very long past but a relatively 
short history” (Gardner 1985, 9). The word “semiotics” was introduced by a modern 
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philosopher, its etymology is ancient Greek, its theoretical underpinnings are medi-
eval, and the inquiry began flourishing in contemporary times. Alas, at present, most 
philosophers of mind are not well-versed in semiotics. Let me now try to rectify 
this.
2.2  Philosophy of Signs’ Long Past
John Locke introduced the word “semiotics” in the penultimate paragraph of his 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, where he surmised that semiotic inquiry 
might “afford us another sort of logic and critic, than what we have been hitherto 
acquainted with” (1825, 550). However, it was only in the twentieth century that 
this ambitious project began to be collectively realized. As Paul Bouissac writes in 
his introduction to Oxford’s Encyclopedia of Semiotics:
Semiotics represents one of the main attempts—perhaps the most enduring one—at con-
ceiving a transdisciplinary framework through which interfaces can be constructed between 
distinct domains of inquiry. Other endeavors, such as the unified science movement of the 
1930s or cybernetics and general systems theory in the 1950s and 1960s, met with only 
limited success. By contrast, semiotics remains a credible blueprint for bridging the gaps 
between disciplines and across cultures. (Bouissac 1998, ix)
In the estimate of many, no one has done more to evince that blueprint than 
Peirce. Hence, like many semioticians, I hold that, at present, “[t]here is no such 
thing as non-Peircean (or non-Sebeokian) semiotics, just as there are no non- 
Einsteinian physics or non-Darwinian biology” (Kilpinen 2008, 217).
Semiotics, however, is bigger than Peirce. Charles W. Morris was in all likeli-
hood the first to explicitly teach a university course in semiotics in Chicago in the 
1930s (Sebeok 1991a, 75, 123). The inquiry gained further institutional form at a 
1964 conference in Bloomington, Indiana, when scholars from varied fields rallied 
under a common semiotic banner (Rey 1984, 92). The International Association for 
Semiotic Studies (IASS) held its first world congress in 1974, publishing its pro-
ceedings ever since. Although one has to select them wisely, reliable encyclopaedias 
(Cobley 2010; Sebeok 1994) and textbooks (Deely 1990; Savan 1987) in semiotics 
are now available, and the inquiry attracts a growing number of scholars who pub-
lish in established peer-reviewed journals like Semiotica, Sign Systems Studies, 
Semiotic Inquiry, and The American Journal of Semiotics (see the reliable sources 
catalogued in Champagne 2014b). Training-wise, there is a belief—expressed by 
the Russian cultural theorist Juri Lotman and subsequently defended by Thomas 
Sebeok (Deely 2009, 484)—that “semiotics is a field that one should not begin 
with” (Kull et al. 2009, xi). Thus, for better or worse, academic degrees in semiotics 
are awarded mainly at the graduate level (the Ph.D. program at UQÀM is the oldest, 
having been established in 1979).
Language has been a prominent theme in contemporary philosophy. If we follow 
Richard Rorty (1979) and Robert Brandom (1994) and construe “pragmatism” as an 
account of how communities do things with language, then absorbing the ideas of 
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Peirce in the analytic canon can seem like a natural move. Unfortunately, such an 
absorption would obscure more than it would reveal. Peirce never belittled lan-
guage, but he was emphatic that human symbols are but one sort of sign among 
others. There may be legitimate reasons to limit a given philosophical inquiry to 
language. But, as Thomas Sebeok (1991b) brought out with sustained ferocity, one 
has to neglect or warp a lot of data in order to claim that language somehow marks 
a privileged boundary.
Somewhere along the way, many twentieth century thinkers took on a pair of 
alarmingly fallacious inferences (see Austin 2001, 30–31): words need not resemble 
their objects, therefore words never resemble their objects; and words (the species) 
never resemble their objects, therefore signs (the genus) never resemble their 
objects. These inferences have plagued both the analytic and continental traditions. 
Consider, for example, Ferdinand de Saussure’s claim that conventional imputation 
is the glue that holds together the parts of a sign. If the Swiss linguist is right, then 
“[s]igns that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the others the ideal of the semi-
ological processes […]” (De Saussure 2011, 68). This is a dogma. Although a study 
of linguistic symbols can definitely yield insights, such conventional signs are a 
proper subset of a much broader class of signs. Failure to recognize this leads to a 
fallacy of composition, wrongly assuming that a property of one or more of the parts 
of a whole is also true of that whole (Deely et al. 1986; Deledalle 2000, 100–113).
Because Saussure (2011, 16) saw the study of signs as a part of social psychol-
ogy, his semiology had little or nothing to say about signs outside of culture. Louis 
Hjelmslev published a formal development of Saussure’s project in 1943 (Hjelmslev 
1969). By the time Roland Barthes met with the linguist A. J. Greimas in Egypt in 
1949, Greimas informed him of (or created?) trends to come by telling him that 
“one cannot not know Saussure” (see Dosse 1997a, 68). Barthes later drew on the 
ideas of Saussure and Hjelmslev in his short “Éléments de sémiologie” (1977), 
which was widely used in literary circles. However, it was Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
who, in a prominent 1951 lecture (reprinted his 1964, 84–97), introduced Saussurean 
ideas into the philosophical mainstream. Ironically, Merleau-Ponty’s pioneering 
work in embodied cognition ensured that arbitrariness and convention would never 
be the last word on meaning. French semiologists like Greimas have reluctantly had 
to acknowledge the presence of non-symbolic meaning (see the anecdote in Broden 
2009, 577–578), but they have tended to relegate such events to phenomenologists 
(Ablali 2004). However, the add-ons came too late, as the relation-only view of 
French structuralism (Holdcroft 1991, 88–106, 119–130) eventually collapsed 
under the weight of its own internal contradictions (Dosse 1997b).
Compared with the social approach of semiology, semiotics has travelled down 
a very different path.
Instead of limiting signs to language and human customs, Thomas Sebeok 
(2001a, 10) held that “The criterial mark of all life is semiosis” and that “Semiosis 
presupposes life,” so he allowed animals, plants, and even single cells to use signs 
(see El-Hani et al. 2006). Looking at the literature, “[t]he lowering of the semiotic 
threshold in semiotics during the last decades […] went parallel with the rediscov-
ery of Peirce’s broad concept of semiosis” (Nöth 2001, 15). As Sandra Rosenthal 
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writes, Peircean semiotics “incorporates the dynamics of lived experience at its 
most rudimentary level, a dynamic that […] grounds itself in those most rudimen-
tary semiotic structures by which man experiences a world of appearing objects” 
(1979, 285). A biological turn may have recently begun in philosophy of mind (e.g., 
Thompson 2007), but it has been under way for decades in philosophy of signs 
(Sebeok 1988; Favareau 2010).
In a way, semiotic inquiry has returned to its roots, since the first signs to receive 
theoretical attention were medical symptoms (see the remarks by Marcel Danesi in 
Sebeok 2001b, xi–xvi). The following parallel can thus help to give a preliminary 
sense of semiotics’ scope. In an attempt to iron out what he took to be an ambiguity 
in our common use of the word “mean,” H. P. Grice called attention to the difference 
between sentences like “Those spots mean (meant) measles” and “Those three rings 
on the bell (of the bus) mean that the ‘bus is full’” (Grice 1957, 377). Considering 
the first sentence, one cannot say “Those spots meant measles, but he hadn’t got 
measles,” whereas for the second sentence, it would make sense for one to say “But 
it isn’t in fact full—the conductor has made a mistake” (Grice 1957, 377–378). One 
relation binds spots and measles, while another relation binds ringing bells and 
filled buses. Yet, the bell-bus relation is liable of being mistaken in a manner that the 
spot-measles relation is not, insofar as the effect that ringing bells have on people’s 
conduct “must be something within the control of the audience, or at least the sort 
of thing which is within its control” (Grice 1957, 386). This led Grice to distinguish 
between what he called “natural meaning” and “nonnatural meaning.”
Grice’s distinction reflects lay usage. Indeed, Grice remarked, quite rightly, that 
“[t]his question about the distinction between natural and nonnatural meaning is, I 
think, what people are getting at when they display an interest in a distinction 
between ‘natural’ and ‘conventional’ signs” (1957, 379). Grice’s work nevertheless 
left unanswered—or rather, unasked—a crucial question: why do we speak of 
“meaning” in both natural and nonnatural cases? One stock assumption is that this 
usage is a linguistic confusion which a more rigorous analysis could in principle 
redress. That is certainly one hypothesis. Yet, what if the kinship at hand is not a 
conflation but rather has a basis in fact? In his private lecture notes, Grice remarks 
that “Peirce uses the word ‘sign’ of a great variety of subjects” and wonders whether 
Peirce’s use “draws attention to some important common feature which a great vari-
ety of items share” (in Pietarinen and Bellucci 2016, 86).
What we have in twentieth century philosophy of language are two sorts of sig-
nificant relations, both placed under a single super-ordinate class of “meaning”—
but the revolutionary implications of recognizing this kinship are not reaped (and 
even sometimes dismissed; as in Harman 1977). Philosophy of signs, by contrast, 
strives to explore that kinship and all it implies (Sebeok 2000).
As Umberto Eco explains in his widely-read book, Semiotics and the Philosophy 
of Language (1986b, 8), the starting assumption of semiotic inquiry is that conven-
tional meaning (e.g., words), inference from evidence (e.g., symptoms), and 
resemblance- based representation (e.g., maps) all “concern a unique theoretical 
object,” namely the “sign” writ large. This perspective rests on the realization—
originating in the medieval period and later vindicated by Peirce—that all varieties 
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of sign-action exhibit a common triadic structure which can and ought to be studied 
in its own right.
Semiotic theory thus augments the Gricean division in two respects. First, it adds 
something above the Gricean division, since it regards natural meaning and non-
natural meaning as species of the genus “sign.” Second, it adds something below the 
Gricean division, since it regards “natural meaning” as a genus with two species, 
namely indices and icons. Indices are “natural” in virtue of a mind-independent link 
of causality, whereas icons are “natural” in virtue of a mind-independent link of 
similarity.
Tracing the origins of this taxonomy takes us on a whirlwind tour of Western 
philosophy. One of the most interesting findings to have emerged from the work of 
Umberto Eco and his colleagues (Eco and Marmo 1989, 4–5) is the discovery, sur-
prising at first, that Greek thought had no general notion of “sign” as we understand 
it today. In ancient Greek culture, we find on one hand the semeion, which, like a 
symptom, expresses a conditional association like “If the woman has milk, then the 
woman has given birth.” This construal, which was part of the early development of 
medical science (Baer 1983; Baer 1988), also applied to subjects like meteorology, 
and was carefully discussed by the Stoics (see Eco 1986b, 29–33, 214–215; Manetti 
1993, 97–110). The signification at play in the semeion rides on a correlation which 
would obtain with or without the inferential-like movement that finds in the mani-
fest a trace of the hidden. This is the broad class of signs that natural scientists are 
usually interested in. The feature which allows interpretation to go from a sign- 
vehicle to an object is mind-independent. We can fail in our epistemic apprehension, 
but our misattribution leaves intact the factual link that would have otherwise 
secured it.
On the other hand, we find in Greek thought the symbolon, whose signification is 
wholly conventional, like insignia or flags. Etymologically, the word “symbol” 
comes from linked coins or clay-plates that were used to publicly announce mar-
riages and contractual agreements (Eco 1986a, 153; Eco 1990, 9; Peirce 1998, 9). A 
steady correlation is involved in the symbolon, but there is nothing above and 
beyond the interpretation of a code that binds the relata. Because this imputed link 
is mind-dependent, it can “convey the nonexistent with a facility every bit equal to 
its power to convey thought about what is existent” (Deely 1990, 17). This allows 
human users to exploit channels not bound by constraints for truthfulness, going 
against a default biological hard-wiring in order to acquire a uniquely flexible cog-
nitive resource (see Donald 2001). Symbols permeate culture, so they are the signs 
that social scientists are usually interested in.
Plato had famously argued in the Cratylus (1997, 101–156) that names originally 
bore a natural bond to their objects. But, more famously still, Aristotle critiqued this 
implausible view in De Interpretatione, insisting that a “name is a spoken sound 
significant by convention […] because no name is a name naturally but only when 
it has become a symbol” (1984, 25).
In any event, what we have in Greek Antiquity is a division between nature and 
culture, reflected in the fact that there are different words for signs, not one (Manetti 
2010b). This tacit taxonomy begins to change when we come to Augustine. For 
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reasons that have nothing to do with philosophy proper, Augustine remained igno-
rant of Greek language throughout his productive life. So, when he felt the need to 
reflect on how the Christian God could speak to us through surface marks on a 
codex, he did not first verify what the Greeks had thought on the matter. Proceeding 
from his native Latin, he instead defined the signum generically as “something 
which is itself sensed and which indicates to the mind something beyond the sign 
itself” (Augustine 1975, 86; see also Perälä 2014, 362).
Whatever its shortcomings, this definition is novel, because it accommodates 
both natural and cultural correlations—the smoke that stands for fire and the white 
flag that stands for surrender (see Jackson 1969, 48–49). Thus, in the year 387, 
“Augustine unifies the two theories and the two classes of signs” (Manetti 2010a, 
25). In doing so, Augustine laid the groundwork for a genuinely semiotic inquiry 
(Todorov 1992, 56–57; see Manetti 1993, 156–168). Other divides will linger, like 
the one between “formal” and “instrumental” signs (see Maritain 1959, 119–120; 
Furton 1995, 96–97). But, henceforth, two sorts of correlations—mind-independent 
and mind-dependent—will be recognized as falling under one super-ordinate class 
as signs tout court.
It may be surprising to find Augustine credited with inaugurating a model that 
would in time blossom into a sophisticated theory of representation. We may recall, 
for example, Wittgenstein’s paragraphs at the outset of his Philosophical 
Investigations (2001, 2–3)—not exactly a work known for its historical scholar-
ship—that depict Augustine as using names to merely “label” cognitively complete 
concepts. All the same, the consensus among scholars is that Augustine “affirms 
more strongly than earlier writers have done that words are merely one type of sign; 
this affirmation, which stands out with increasing sharpness in his later writings, is 
the cornerstone of the semiotic perspective” (Todorov 1992, 36; see Eco and Marmo 
1989, 4–5; as well as Markus 1957). Recent years have thus witnessed a growing 
“body of research on the Middle Ages from the community of semioticians” that 
“now begins to amount to a subgenre of semiotic scholarship” (Evans 1987, 177). It 
is important to keep in mind, however, that “[Augustine] introduced to the Latins 
and to philosophy the sign as a theme, but he himself was never to thematize it” 
(Deely 2001, 218).
The covering model of the sign put forward by Augustine was disseminated in 
Peter Lombard’s twelfth-century anthology of authoritative tenets, Four Books of 
Sentences. That widely-read anthology presented future generations of philosophers 
with a dilemma: is the unified kind “sign” a conflation or an insight? Views on the 
matter differed, but after Augustine it became mandatory to figure out what the 
common denominator between all these different signs might be.
A comprehensive answer to that question was developed by John Poinsot, a sev-
enteenth century Spanish philosopher and theologian who left behind a difficult but 
ground-breaking Tractatus de Signis (2013). Poinsot was an heir to the long and 
intricate debate over signs that took Augustine’s definition as its starting point. 
Some denied that there is truly a feature which unites the different kinds of signs 
(Deely 2004, 107). Poinsot, by contrast, tried to vindicate the original Augustinian 
proposal on principled grounds. Indeed, “it is clear that both Augustine (b. 354; d. 
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430) and John of St. Thomas [a.k.a. Poinsot] (b. 1589; d. 1644) were engaged in the 
same intellectual program and therefore belong together” (Gracia and Noone 2006, 
1). Poinsot essentially engages with the cryptic but pregnant insight enunciated by 
his predecessor Thomas Cajetan: “A rose existing only in thought is not a rose, but 
a relation existing in thought is truly a relation” (quoted in Deely 1994, 22). In keep-
ing with this, Poinsot argued that a sign, being a relation, is indifferent to whether it 
is found in the mind or in the world. Hence, its “being consists in relating, and this 
does not depend on us” (Rasmussen 1994, 410).
I will explore Poinsot’s ideas more fully in Chap. 5. For now, it suffices to point 
out that Poinsot’s proposal took place in one of the least-known periods in the his-
tory of Western philosophy, which consists of scholastic thought after René 
Descartes (Champagne 2008–09). Because Poinsot’s theoretical contributions went 
almost unnoticed, we have to wait several centuries for late-medieval insights to be 
recovered and further articulated. The year 1690 nevertheless stands out, for this is 
when John Locke first gave “semiotics” its name at the end of his Essay. Locke, 
however, did not carry out the revolutionary promise of that project. As Peirce 
writes: “The celebrated Essay Concerning Humane Understanding contains many 
passages which […] make the first steps in profound analyses which are not further 
developed” (1931–58, 2.649). Semiotics is one of them.
2.3  Peirce’s Major Contribution
In the history of philosophy, big changes can result from little decisions. Bearing 
that in mind, it is worth noting that “the chapter proposing semiotic is commonly 
omitted from the many abridged editions of Locke’s celebrated work that appear in 
succeeding centuries” (Deely 1981, 240). Although the work of Poinsot shows that 
“the doctrine of signs proclaimed by Locke did not have to wait 200 years to rise in 
the bosom of Peirce’s complex and monumental work” (Santaella 1991, 155), phi-
losophy of signs truly came of age with the work of Peirce. Showing an unusual 
historical sensitivity, Peirce connected anew with the medieval literature on signs 
that had been forgotten in the shuffle of modernity (see Beuchot and Deely 1995; 
Tiercelin 2006).
As a logician trained in framing things in the broadest terms possible, Peirce 
showed how any sign is perforce a three-place relation where something stands for 
something to something—regardless of what might fill these three place-holders on 
a given occasion. Delete any component of a semiotic triad and representation 
becomes impossible. A sign is therefore characterized, not by its material status, but 
by its relational structure:
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a 
Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to 
assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. 
The triadic relation is genuine, that is, its three members are bound together by it in a way 
that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations. (Peirce 1998, 272–273)
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If one were to postulate that the basic categories of all things are Up, Down, Left 
and Right, this would not mean that the universe is populated with scattered ups, 
downs, lefts, and rights (that remain so irrespective of what is around them). 
Similarly, to be a First or a Third is to play a certain logical role. The roles them-
selves, moreover, can be switched around, so that when an interpretation is pro-
duced, it in turn can be interpreted. Peirce called this switching around “semiosis,” 
the action of signs. He got this name from a book on inferences by the first century 
Epicurean philosopher Philodemus (1978; see De Lacy 1938; Manetti 2002). Peirce 
encountered this book while overseeing the work of a student at Johns Hopkins 
University (Marquand 1983).
Peirce took the Latin notion of sign to a new level of theoretical sophistication. 
In the course of his studies, Peirce came to hold in high regard the medieval writings 
of John Duns Scotus (see Boler 1963). Central to Scotus’ position was a specific 
sort of separation which—as the scholastic catchphrase goes—is “more than nomi-
nal but less than real.” Peter King summarizes it as follows: “The core intuition 
behind Scotus’s formal distinction is, roughly, that existential inseparability does 
not entail identity in definition, backed up by the conviction that this is a fact about 
the way things are rather than how we conceive of them” (2003, 22; emphasis 
added). Scotus’ formal distinction was part of a concerted defence (from early- 
Christian times onward) against accusations of polytheism:
How can one reconcile the doctrine of the Trinity with a belief in the unity and simplicity 
of God? […] The problems posed by the Trinity supplied the impulse for the development 
of the distinction […]. Of course, it was not the only field of application, and the formal 
distinction came to be invoked in solving a host of purely philosophical problems. (Jordan 
1984, 1)
Peirce wrote that, if Scotus’ work was “adapted to modern culture, under con-
tinual wholesome reminders of nominalistic criticisms, I am convinced that it will 
go far toward supplying the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical 
science” (1931–58, 1.6).
As it turns out, religious controversies gave birth to a technical tool well suited 
for the study of signs. One of Peirce’s most important contributions to semiotic 
theory was his Scotus-inspired realization that, if one wants to rigorously and sys-
tematically unpack all that is implied by the misleadingly obvious notion of “sign,” 
then one must recognize that every sign manifests both an unbreakable unity (as a 
sign whose significance is transparently given in a flash, as it were) and a multiplic-
ity (as a step-by-step passage from a sign-vehicle to that which it re-presents). 
Construing any of the components that go into making representation possible as 
things somehow capable of existing without the collaboration of the others may not 
obliterate them, but it does rob them of the significance that allows them to serve 
useful cognitive functions. Thus, if we dissect a sign too crudely and start reifying 
the various parts we have uncovered, we ensure that those parts no longer have any 
representational value. Mutatis mutandis, construing the sign as some airtight atom 
which reflective thought cannot penetrate would drain all the properties that make it 
a sign.
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Peirce first shared this result with the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
in an 1867 paper titled “On a New List of Categories.” While not the most mature 
of Peirce’s papers, that curt text presented a rich but forgotten way of approaching 
perennial questions of philosophy:
The terms “prescision” [Peirce often changed the spelling] and “abstraction,” which were 
formerly applied to every kind of separation, are now limited, not merely to mental separa-
tion, but to that which arises from attention to one element and neglect of the other. 
Exclusive attention consists in a definite conception or supposition of one part of an object, 
without any supposition of the other. Abstraction or prescision ought to be carefully distin-
guished from two other modes of mental separation, which may be termed discrimination 
and dissociation. Discrimination has to do merely with the essences of terms, and only 
draws a distinction in meaning. Dissociation is that separation which, in the absence of a 
constant association, is permitted by the law of association of images. It is the conscious-
ness of one thing, without the necessary simultaneous consciousness of the other. 
Abstraction or prescision, therefore, supposes a greater separation than discrimination, but 
a less separation than dissociation. (Peirce 1992, 2–3)
Peirce probably learned about prescissive abstraction from a 1724 logic textbook 
by the English theologian Isaac Watts (see Peirce 1998, 541fn13). There may also 
be affinities with Kant (Gava 2011). In any event, Cary Spinks notes that “prescis-
sion is a difficult concept, but it is one of the most powerful developed by Peirce and 
also one of the few which he keeps throughout his life work” (1991, 23).
Prescission lets us distinguish features that are always bound (and that would 
hardly make sense without one another). A good way to explain this would be to 
liken semiotics to geometry. While one would be hard-pressed to find in the natural 
world a line with no girth or a point with no extension, we nevertheless have the 
ability to rigorously decompose any three-dimensional space and manipulate the 
dimensions it subsumes. The organization in such a case is not cardinal, but ordinal: 
nothing in a singular point entails a line or a volume, but the very notion of volume 
logically implies the line and the point. Semiotics is articulated around a similar 
insight. As Peirce showed, any representation involves a triadic relation that cannot 
be sundered; that is, one which cannot be reduced to the dyadic or the monadic on 
pain of no longer representing. To be meaningful, something (monadic quality) 
must stand for (dyadic relation) something else and be taken (triadic interpretation) 
as so standing. Nevertheless, using prescission, we can break these three dimen-
sions down and recognize the specific semiotic role of each.
Peirce’s failure to secure a place within the academic establishment effectively 
bequeathed to future generations the laborious task of understanding his unpub-
lished writings. Thus, outside of a handful of influential papers on pragmatism writ-
ten mainly in the 1870s (which he eventually repudiated), his later thought remained 
largely unknown.
As regards Peirce’s semiotic in particular, hardly anybody had paid any attention to it at 
all—it is clear from something [John] Dewey says in his correspondence with [Arthur F.] 
Bentley that, prior to the publication of [Charles W.] Morris’s article on the foundations of 
the theory of signs, not even he had previously paid any real attention to that aspect of 
Peirce’s thought […]. At most, the term “semiotic” was thought of as referring to a crackpot 
scheme for classifying things called “signs” which nobody in philosophy had any interest 
in to begin with […]. (Joseph Ransdell, quoted in Deledalle 2001, 220)
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In principle, though, Peirce’s mature ideas were available shortly after the First 
World War. His extensive letters to Victoria Lady Welby (Hardwick 1977), which 
dealt mainly with semiotics, were circulated in Europe and sent to prominent intel-
lectual figures (like Bertrand Russell). Peirce’s letters eventually reached C.  K. 
Ogden, who was employed by Welby as a research assistant. Together with his co- 
author I. A. Richards, Odgen published excerpts of Peirce’s letters in The Meaning 
of Meaning (1989, 279–290), a book which Charles Morris credits with identifying 
“the contours of a general theory of signs” (1971, 7).
The philosopher of mathematics Frank P. Ramsey, who translated Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus (2002) with Ogden, came to know of Peirce’s ideas through this connec-
tion. In 1923, we find Ramsey arguing in a review of Wittgenstein’s book that the 
Austrian genius would have benefited from “two words used by C.  S. Peirce,” 
namely “type” and “token” (Ramsey 1923, 468). Finally, after a lifetime of exclu-
sion, some of Peirce’s semiotic notions were being broadcast in a prominent forum, 
by a respected (if still emerging) Cambridge scholar, during the formative years of 
the analytic movement, in discussing what was to become one of its founding texts. 
Yet, regrettably, what could have been an occasion to connect with promising medi-
eval conceptions simply became a newfangled jargon in which to reprise stale 
schemes. By the time anybody realized that the type/token distinction was supposed 
to be threefold, the error had been broadcast.
2.4  Tone-Deaf no More
David M. Armstrong, an advocate of materialism in philosophy of mind, wrote an 
introductory textbook that begins with the type/token distinction developed by “the 
great U.S. nineteenth-century philosopher, C.  S. Peirce” (Armstrong 1989, 1). 
Armstrong produces a box with the word “the” inscribed twice in it and writes: 
“Peirce would have said that there were two tokens of the one type” (ibid., 2). This 
characterization, though not inaccurate, is incomplete, since the distinction devel-
oped by Peirce is in fact threefold. Armstrong got his “the the” example from this 
well-known passage from Peirce:
There will ordinarily be about twenty the’s on a page, and of course they count as twenty 
words. In another sense of the word “word,” however, there is but one word “the” in the 
English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard 
in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does not exist; it 
only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a 
Type. A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one 
 happening […] such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of 
a book, I will venture to call a Token. (Peirce 1931–58, vol. 4.537)
However, the passage immediately continues with this sentence: “An indefinite sig-
nificant character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token. I 
propose to call such a Sign a Tone” (ibid.).
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Many philosophers know this passage, but few cite it whole. Even Risto Hilpinen, 
in his Presidential Address to the Charles Sanders Peirce Society, truncates his 
quote (see Hiplinen 2012, 260). It is hardly surprising, then, that Linda Wetzel 
alludes to this passage in her book on types and tokens (Wetzel 2009, xi) yet com-
pletely neglects to mention the tone. The silent transformation of Peirce’s trichot-
omy into a dichotomy is now virtually ubiquitous (see Hutton 1990; Guttenplan 
1995, 596–597).
Peirce’s (1998, 364) pioneering work in topology convinced him that triads have 
a special status (see the proof in Burch 1991), so it is particularly unfortunate to see 
his ideas denatured. I have already recounted how Ramsey (1923) failed to mention 
the tone in his review of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. More knowledgeable philoso-
phers could have intervened to correct matters. John Dewey had studied briefly 
under Peirce at Johns Hopkins University in the 1880s, but it took a while before 
Dewey (1946) divulged in print what he had learned. So, apart from a few timid 
interventions (e.g., Williams 1936, 702), the propagation of Peirce’s ideas was far 
from optimal. In a 1949 article, Arthur Burks—the editor of Peirce’s Collected 
Papers—reassured the philosophical public at large that the full type/token/tone dis-
tinction was articulated by Peirce “in a way which is too bound up with his system 
of categories to be of use outside his philosophy […]” (Burks 1949, 673). I want to 
change all that. John Boler notes that quality is “certainly the least clear of the cat-
egories, and the one that receives the least attention” (1963, 123). I think the latter 
part of this statement accounts for the former.
Although he misappropriates the type/token/tone distinction, Armstrong cor-
rectly remarks that it is “a perfectly general distinction applicable to any subject 
whatever” (1989, 1; for more on Armstrong and Peirce, see Legg 2001). Like many, 
however, Armstrong uses “type” and “token” as synonyms for “universal” and “par-
ticular.” That is not correct. “How far are the basic categories of Peirce’s phenome-
nology either particulars or universals? In describing Firstnesses as qualities of 
feeling Peirce never makes their status plain in terms of this disjunction. All he 
requests is the disregard of the question of reality and of connections with other 
phenomena” (Spiegelberg 1956, 174). The type/token/tone distinction thus belongs 
to semiotics, not metaphysics (not the metaphysics of Plato, at any rate). The dis-
tinction is instead “based on the idea that a given entity, assumed to be a sign, can 
be regarded in respect to any or all of three types of properties it has—monadic, 
dyadic, triadic (i.e., one-term, two-term, three-term)—depending upon the analyti-
cal needs in some concrete semiotic inquiry” (Sebeok 1994, 1130).
Signs, as we saw, are individuated by their triadic structure. If what we have in 
view is the whole triad, then we are at the level of what Peirce called Thirdness. In 
such a case, we have a relation between two relata grasped as a relation by some 
third thing beyond it. This is usually the level of interest, especially when one is 
studying some particular cultural or natural instance of sign-use. But, if our goal is 
a philosophical analysis of the representational structure itself, we may want to go 
further. If we suppose this relation between two relata as it would be without any 
further recognition of it as a relation, we are dealing with Secondness. Two and only 
two things are now involved, so we have effectively left the realm of intelligibility 
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and entered that of brute contiguity (see Champagne 2014a). Prescinding still fur-
ther, we may also want to suppose one of the relata without it entering into any 
relation with another. Peirce writes: “[T]he idea of a quality is the idea of a phenom-
enon or partial phenomenon considered as a monad, without reference to its parts or 
components and without reference to anything else” (1931–58, 1.424). If we do this, 
we eliminate whatever alterity allowed that relatum (the term now becomes a mis-
nomer) to have a “contour.” Thus, when we prescind relation away so as to consider 
only that which is related, we may no longer think of the resultant tone as we do a 
token, since doing so would require us to delimit it in some fashion and ascend back 
to Secondness. The prescissive analysis leaves its initial object of study untouched. 
But, if we choose to prescind all the way, Firstness is as far as we can go, and we 
obtain a quality that could be actualized but isn’t.
Although the declarative intelligibility expected of introspective reports is pos-
sible solely by recourse to triadic representation, this appeal does not preclude but 
in fact presupposes simpler dyadic and monadic ones which are patently not 
beholden to any form of mediation (see Peirce 1992, 257–262). The more elemen-
tary states of Firstness and Secondness require the addition of a third term in order 
to be interpreted, but we can discern their ordinal priority.
To better appreciate these prescissive distinctions, we can look at the following 
example (taken from Sebeok 1994, 1130; adapted from Peirce 1931–58, 2.230):
Because of his long fast, he was too weak to stand fast or hold fast or even to 
run fast.
The truncated type/token dichotomy would tell us that there are four tokens and one 
type of “fast,” but the correct Peircean verdict is that “fast” appears three times as 
type, four times as token, and once as tone. Hence, the Peircean perspective I cham-
pion doesn’t just name things differently, it counts things differently. If one were to 
prefer saying “twelve eggs” instead of “a dozen eggs,” this change would be merely 
terminological. If, however, one were to prefer saying “a score of eggs” instead of 
“a dozen eggs,” this change would carve the world differently. Adopting the 
type/token/tone distinction thus results in a difference that makes a difference, at 
least as far as our taxonomies are concerned.
The idea of token is perhaps the easiest to compass. To be a token is to be an 
occurrence, something that has a discrete spatial and temporal location. In contrast, 
neither the type nor the tone is bound by such immanence. The tone is a quality—
considered prior to its occurrence as token. If we prescind, we can isolate the quali-
tative feature that is common to the tokens “fast” and “fast.” To be sure, this 
quality—in this case a configuration of marks—is very much there as constitutive 
of each token, and there is no way for us to get to “suchness” except through a “this-
ness.” But, the tone itself enjoys a priority which enables us to logically isolate it 
while disregarding its numerically distinct manifestations. As an ordinal First, the 
tone “fast” is merely a potentiality, a “something” that could be employed to stand 
for something else (but doesn’t have to be). If and when such a quality occurs, “fast” 
is a Second. It can now be used to indicate a specific spot on a page. To the extent 
that such an occurrence is not a singleton but appears repeatedly in a way that is not 
merely haphazard (e.g., a habit), “fast” is a Third.
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It is important to stress that “[a] class, of course, is neither a tone nor a type in 
Peirce’s sense” (Willard 1983, 284), because a class can have random members 
whereas a type generates tokens according to a repeatable rationale. This recurrence 
is what allows a type to sustain a conventional association. Children learning a natu-
ral language may be adept at inducing meanings from a poverty of stimulus 
(Chomsky 1980), but they still need a minimum of two examples plus an open- 
ended possibility of implementing a learned rule again. There is no such thing, for 
example, as a word that can be used only once. Of course, as a token, a word can 
(only) be used once. However, what makes a brute event like a noise capable of 
bearing conventional meaning is that it can be re-cognized and re-employed. Even 
so, the first time one hears a spoken word, that sound has a distinctive tone (as 
would pure gibberish). There is thus a tremendous difference between a type that 
does occur repeatedly and a tone that could occur repeatedly. In order not to miss 
this crucial nuance, Peirce saw fit to use different names.
Although the notion of “tone seems very close to what many subsequent writers 
have meant by ‘type’” (Willard 1983, 284), the type/token/tone distinction tracks an 
important nuance that the coarser-grained type/token distinction misses. Consider 
the following situation. A set of things—orange traffic cones, say—are placed 
before a knowing subject. The subject, noticing that there is some feature(s) in com-
mon, then proceeds to tease out that common feature(s). A story can thus be told 
about how the shared colour or shape of the traffic cones was “abstracted away” 
from those immanent particulars. Yet, whatever its merit, solubility, or outcome, this 
set-up has already skipped over what interests me. Indeed, nothing prevents one’s 
investigation from starting with a single item instead of a group of items. After all, 
a single traffic cone will have a quality (colour, shape, etc.) even if no other cones 
like it exist. It may therefore be helpful to replace our earlier sentential example 
with the following:
fast
Looking at this single token, the two theses I am concerned with are that 1) the 
here-and-now “thisness” of the singular occurrence can be prescinded from its qual-
itative “suchness,” and 2) the “suchness” or tone one arrives at by prescission deter-
mines what similar tokens would be like without indicating whether such other 
tokens in fact exist. Going from a plurality of tokens to unencountered tokens may 
be a (risky) induction, but going from a single token to unencountered tokens is an 
abduction—a (riskier) surmise that other tokens with this tone might exist. Umberto 
Eco is philosophically impressed by the fact that, in perceptual judgement, “that 
yellow is like all the yellows I have seen” (2000, 115). But, to my mind, we should 
be more impressed by the fact that, even on the first occasion (Mary exiting the 
cave, say), that yellow will be like all the yellows one will ever see. One will skip 
right over this nuance if one begins with a collection of tokens.
In keeping with this, Peirce warned that, when we talk of abstracting out a com-
mon feature, we often clump together two logically distinct moments. To abstract a 
common feature, one must first pull out that feature from each individual and then 
treat what one has pulled out as if it could exist in this detached form. The first step 
2.4 Tone-Deaf no More
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is prescission and the second step is a reification Peirce called “hypostatic abstrac-
tion.” Because these are different mental operations, Peirce urges us to “relieve the 
stem ‘abstract’ from staggering under the double burden of conveying the idea of 
prescission as well as the unrelated and very important idea of the creation of an ens 
rationis […]” (1998, 352). Hypostatic abstraction “furnishes us the means of turn-
ing predicates from being signs that we think or think through, into being subjects 
thought of” (Peirce 1931–58, 4.549). Peirce is right that this can be a crucial step. 
However, I argue that, in philosophy of mind, it is crucial that one not perform this 
additional step, otherwise one will be left with a thing-like quale that empirical 
evidence will seek but never find.
A colour like orange may be prescinded, but orange does not exist apart from 
orange things. Peircean semiotics thus sits token occurrences in the middle of all of 
its systematic classifications, because “if a sign is to have any active mode of being, 
it must be materially embodied” (Queiroz and Atã 2014, 284). As David Savan 
explains, a tone “can not be encountered as such in experience […]. What this 
means is that the empirical student of semiotics must use Peirce’s trichotomy (if he 
uses it at all) as an analytical tool, by means of which to distinguish three different 
aspects of semiosis […]. Empirically, no sign belongs exclusively to one of these 
classes” (1987, 23–24). Like a Russian doll, a type always presupposes tokens, and 
a token always presupposes a tone. Even if it makes little sense to think of “fast” as 
existing in only one of these respects, be it a quality that never occurs or a regularity 
that never manifests itself, prescission allows us to carefully peel off these three 
layers.
Like semiotic inquiry itself, the type/token/tone distinction employed by Peirce 
has a long history. For instance, “what distinguishes Avicenna’s treatment of essence 
is the way he distinguishes three ways of taking it: as existing in individual things 
and so determining their kind, as understood to be shared by many such things, and 
as it is in itself” (Gracia and Noone 2006, 199). Avicenna’s analysis influenced 
Scotus. According to Scotus,
The first act of the intellect is the immediate and simple apprehension of an individual in so 
far as it is present and existing, and, as such, the first act of the intellect is opposed to the 
second or abstractive act of the intellect which reaches the object in its essence. […] This 
second act of the intellect gives us knowledge of the essence of an object considered in 
abstraction from existence, whereas the former act gives us knowledge of an object as exis-
tent and actually present. (Almeder 1973, 4–5)
Talk of priority can engender confusions, so I want to reiterate that, in ordinary 
lived experience, the token comes first. It is only afterward that prescissive thought 
can decide to disregard what gives a token its contrast/outline. Hence, the simple 
qualities countenanced by Peircean philosophy of signs “are the artificial product of 
a highly sophisticated analysis, and not genuine existents revealed to ordinary, 
everyday scrutiny” (Goudge 1935, 536). So, it becomes a fallacy of sorts to take a 
doctored product of our thinking to be a discovered fact independent of that inter-
vention. This, on my diagnosis, is the root cause of the “hard problem” of 
consciousness.
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Peirce was a student of history. But, in its aspiration to reinvent all wheels, 
twentieth- century philosophy butchered his type/token/tone distinction, because it 
could not recognize that distinction’s pre-modern rationale. Indeed, the vocabulary 
of the parties to the present controversy over qualia and Peirce’s triadic vocabulary 
do not easily match up. A crucial question for the former debate is: should we quan-
tify over qualia? Nagel, Block, and Chalmers think that we should; whereas Dennett, 
Churchland, and others think that we should not. Yet, if most of our philosophical 
theories have until now been unable to adequately fathom the qualitative dimension 
of conscious life without running into all sorts of implausible consequences, per-
haps this is because those theories have been trying to capture that object of study 
with dichotomies ill-suited to the task. This, at any rate, is the hypothesis I would 
now like to explore.
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Chapter 3
Using Prescission and the Type/Token/Tone 
Distinction
Abstract In the previous chapter, I argued that Peirce was on the right track when 
he approached the mind from a semiotic perspective. Having offered a primer on 
semiotics, I now want to use some of those helpful resources. Ned Block distin-
guishes access-consciousness and phenomenal-consciousness. Convinced that his 
distinction is a real one, Block posits a module in the brain responsible for phenom-
enal experiences. However, I argue that we can make better sense of Block’s distinc-
tion if we regard it as a prescissive one. In order to clarify this stance, I examine 
experiments conducted by George Sperling. Sperling designed tasks that let test 
subjects access visual experiences that they previously could not act upon. Block 
thinks that Sperling’s results vindicate his claims, but strictly speaking Sperling’s 
experiments tracked only access-consciousness. I thus conclude that, to establish 
that phenomenal experiences were present prior to being accessed, we must prescis-
sively suppose the subjects’ tasks absent.
3.1  Block’s Real Separation of Phenomenon and Access
Those who think conscious life has a qualitative dimension usually gloss the situa-
tion in the following terms: there are token brain states on one side, there are token 
qualitative states on another side, and this results in a gap (Farrell 1950; Levine 
1983). Early theorists like U. T. Place (1956) assumed that the sides in want of a 
union should be grouped into types. When Donald Davidson (1970) explicitly 
focused on tokens instead of types, philosophers were given a new option. Jerry 
Fodor (1974, 100) was one of the first to use the type/token distinction to describe 
this new position in philosophy of mind. In his first critique of the functionalist 
program, Ned Block (1978, 261) followed Fodor and took the type/token distinction 
for granted.
The type/token distinction has since become the unquestioned starting point for 
work in philosophy of mind (see for example Gozzano and Hill 2015, 1). Given the 
historical omission I outlined in Chap. 2, the idea of tone—construed as something 
irreducible to tokens or types—simply never comes up. I want to use this missing 
notion to open up an overlooked stance.
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The philosopher of mind working with a dichotomous palette of types and tokens 
is forced to conclude that if phenomenal qualities are real enough to be discerned, 
they must exist as something genuinely distinct. Block (1995a), for example, urges 
philosophers of mind to countenance a qualitative “phenomenal-consciousness” 
which exists apart from a functional “access-consciousness.” Of course, once this 
much has been granted, the need to relate the disparate sides (with “bridge laws,” 
“neural correlates,” and the like) surfaces with particular inevitability. Peirce’s com-
plete type/token/tone distinction allows one to bypass this. If it is true that “we find 
in Peirce no traditional philosophical arrangement that creates a mind-body prob-
lem” (Pietarinen 2006, 76), then we can use Peircean ideas to recuperate in a more 
plausible way the intuitions that Block appeals to.
Here is how Block motivates his distinction. The psychology literature often 
describes cases where a person is missing one or more of the aspect(s) and/or 
faculty(ies) we typically expect consciousness to have. The stock assumption is that 
understanding these abnormal cases can better our understanding of consciousness 
in its normal state. John Searle (1992, 107–108), for instance, argues that if epilep-
tics in the grip of a seizure do not display any flexibility and creativity in their 
behaviour, then we can conclude that flexibility and creativity are important traits of 
consciousness. Block contends that “[a]lthough some variants of this sort of reason-
ing have some merit, they are often given more weight than they deserve, because 
of a persistent fallacy involving a conflation of two very different concepts of con-
sciousness” (Block 1995a, 228). In order to put an end to this conflation (or at least 
ensure that it no longer goes unnoticed), Block introduces a distinction.
Block calls the functional side of the mind “access-consciousness” and the quali-
tative side “phenomenal-consciousness.” Supposedly, there can be access without 
phenomenon (Block 1995a, 243–245) and phenomenon without access (ibid., 239–
243). Block thus inserts a “real” distinction (in Scotus’ sense). If Block’s mutual- 
independence holds, then a missing functional response is not sufficient grounds to 
infer that a phenomenal aspect is also missing. Likewise, enjoying a phenomenal 
experience is not sufficient grounds to infer that the experience in question is being 
cognitively accessed. I do not endorse Block’s mutual-independence, but since it 
gets many things right, it can act as a useful foil.
Let us consider the first situation, where agents presumably process information 
without actually enjoying any phenomenality. Block believes that there is support 
for this in the case of “blindsighted” persons. People who are blindsighted report 
being blind, yet they have reliable functional responses to stimuli when pressed to 
venture an answer (see Bornstein and Pittman 1992; Milner and Rugg 1992; Nelkin 
1996). Referring to the information-processing model developed by Daniel Schacter 
(1989), Block (1995a, 229) suggests that these generally correct judgements (about 
unseen things) are made possible because the patients somehow bypass a hypotheti-
cal “phenomenal-consciousness module” and proceed straight to the executive sys-
tem whose end-product is overt behaviour (e.g., decisions, actions, and utterances). 
That, as it stands, is a provocative suggestion. As Chalmers explains, “Block’s idea 
suggests an implausible epiphenomenalism within the information-processing story. 
Indeed, if the module has no effect on other processes, then we could lesion it with 
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no external change (same reports, even), and no empirical evidence could support 
the hypothesis” (1997, 149). As if this wasn’t inflammatory enough, Block enjoins 
us to fathom a “super-blindsighted” person who would declare that “Now I know 
that there is a horizontal line in my blind field even though I don’t actually see it” 
and for whom visual information “simply pops into his thoughts in the way that 
solutions to problems we’ve been worrying about pop into our thoughts” (1995a, 
233).
Something is wrong here. Blindsighted persons are supposed to be a) able to see, 
in the sense of being capable of having the proper responses to visual stimuli put 
before them; and b) unable to see, in the sense that there is nothing “it is like” for 
them to perform (a). For that conjunction as a whole to obtain, one has to determine 
whether both conjuncts obtain. Yet, when we go back to the original clinical obser-
vations, we find that the only way (b) is ascertained is by asking the patients if they 
experience anything during the relevant acts, to which they answer in the negative. 
Unlike everywhere else in psychology, the introspective reports of blindsight 
patients get a free pass.
For example, a patient (called G. Y.) reported that his visual experiences were 
“like black on black.” Black on black is not nothing—it even suggests a dim outline. 
Professional phenomenologists have rightly warned that untrained introspection 
produces skewed results (Zahavi 2007, 27–32). Despite this, researchers preferred 
to credit the patient with a complete lack of phenomenal content. Their only reason 
was that the patient “still insists that the use of visual terms is for lack of a better 
alternative because in fact he does not see the stimulus” (Stoerig and Cowey 1997, 
554–555). All that underwrites the “in fact” is the patient’s insistence. In another 
case, a patient (called D. B.) was asked whether a stick was horizontal or vertical. 
Following a forced-choice guessing paradigm, this patient was informed that he 
scored above chance and was asked: “Did you know how well you had done?” to 
which he replied “I didn’t—because I couldn’t see a darn thing” (exchange quoted 
in Weiskrantz 1986, 24). This informal conversation was deemed sufficient to estab-
lish that the subject’s experiential lights were off. One wonders to what extent the 
follow-up query alleviated the methodological challenge at hand: “‘So you really 
did not know you were getting them right?’ ‘No,’ he replied, still with something of 
an air of incredulity” (Weiskrantz 1986, 24; emphasis added).
Discussing the alleged blindness of a patient who can spatially track any X 
shown to it, Block writes: “Temporarily taking his word for it, I am assuming that 
he has no P-consciousness of the X” (1995a, 233). It is unclear, though, whether 
Block’s temporary assumption is ever replaced by anything more tangible. After all, 
success at tracking tasks suggests sight, not blindness. So, the only thing leading 
researchers to posit blindness is an introspective report, nothing more. Well, if sim-
ply taking a person’s claims at face value is all there is to establishing the absence 
or presence of qualia, then I too can insist with great vigour that all is dark inside. If 
a researcher is prepared to record my statements, I could parallel park a car and we 
could publish those revolutionary findings. So, either blindsight is legitimate and 
the hard problem is not, or the hard problem is legitimate and blindsight is not.
3.1 Block’s Real Separation of Phenomenon and Access
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Now, it has been suggested by Block (1995a, 233) that “blindsight” can also 
occur in monkeys. However, because a monkey cannot verbalize what it experi-
ences, it is even more questionable to ascribe “blindsight” to such an animal. If an 
animal bumps into things, its failure to perform regular motor functions in response 
to visual inputs can be a solid indicator of blindness. The problem, though, is that 
the monkeys in question don’t bump into things (see Stoerig and Cowey 1997, 549). 
In fact, “blindsighted” creatures (human or monkey) are supposed to function quite 
well. Therefore, to describe them as blind is to abandon the simplest explanation.
It is not as if other explanations are unavailable. In primates, stimulation of the 
eyes triggers optic nerves that then activate a portion in the back of the brain called 
the striate cortex. Researchers thus reason that a monkey lacking a striate cortex is 
a blind monkey. This seems like a plausible inference. Yet, in reality, total eradica-
tion of a given brain region is very difficult to achieve. “For example, there might be 
diffusion of light within the eye so that some of it spreads into the intact field and 
provides a kind of subtle cue about the presence of a visual event” (Weiskrantz 
1986, 11). Philosophers of mind eager to get mileage out of such cases might want 
to gloss over the fact that, in the most famous case (the monkey Helen), “almost the 
entire visual cortex of the monkey’s brain” (Humphrey 1992, 88; emphasis added) 
was surgically removed, but the question of residual tissue matters. By analogy, 
philosophers of biology would hardly declare kidneys unnecessary solely on 
account that, once, a patient had almost all of her kidney tissue removed yet still 
managed to filter some blood.
Even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that complete removal of a 
monkey’s striate cortex has been histologically verified, our sense of amazement 
would stem from a contrast. If we believe that the striate cortex is needed for vision, 
we will understandably be surprised when the relevant input-output functions sur-
vive its removal. Monkey “blindsight” thus trades on sustaining a joint endorsement 
of two contradictory claims, namely that “Cortical activation is needed for vision” 
and “Cortical activation is not needed for vision.” Which is it? If a brain region is 
considered necessary for the performance of a function, and that function is shown 
to occur even in the absence of the brain region, then the brain region can no longer 
be considered necessary for the performance of the function in question. The situa-
tion is analogous to removing a cornerstone crucial to holding a building erect and 
then finding out that the building does not collapse. We could either say that 1) the 
building can mysteriously stand in spite of the cornerstone’s absence, or we could 
say that 2) the stone was not a cornerstone after all. Clearly, option (2), which says 
that it was not a cornerstone, is the best explanation.
Lawrence Weiskrantz, the neuroscientist who coined the term “blind + sight,” 
remarks that his oxymoron quickly caught on (1986, v). In philosophy of mind, 
enthusiasm for these cases has been fueled in part by their resemblance to “zom-
bies,” those hypothetical creatures that perform all humans can without enjoying 
any of the qualitative experiences (Kirk 1974; Kirk 2005; Chalmers 1996, 94–105). 
To his credit, Block (1995a, 233) prudently states that he “doesn’t know whether 
there are any actual cases of A-consciousness without P-consciousness.” Owen 
Flanagan, however, believes that “the case of blindsight shows its actuality” (1992, 
149). As we have just seen, there are good reasons to doubt such a claim.
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Block’s mutual-independence of access and phenomenon entails another possi-
bility that is more plausible—as in the case of a busy person who “hears” but does 
not “notice” the loud drilling noise that has been present near her during an engag-
ing conversation (Block 1995a, 234). In terms of Schacter’s model, this would mean 
that the hypothetical phenomenal consciousness module would be activated yet 
have no repercussion on an executive system that could trigger reactionary behav-
ioural outputs, like covering one’s ears, moving the conversation to another loca-
tion, or uttering “Wow, that noise is really bothersome.” Note, however, that “access” 
in Block’s sense does not have to manifest itself as a verbal report. “Reportability is 
a legacy of behaviorism that is less interesting than it has seemed. The more inter-
esting issue in the vicinity is not the relation between the phenomenal and the 
reportable, but rather the relation between the phenomenal and the cognitively 
accessible” (Block 2007, 484). So, presumably, one could have access and still not 
be able to express this in any overt act of communication. Hence, “if Block is right, 
then there is not only a large part of our mental life that is inaccessible to us, namely 
the unconscious part; in addition, even a large part of our conscious mental life will 
then be inaccessible to us, since he argues that there are phenomenal yet inaccessi-
ble experiences” (Schlicht 2012, 310).
It is usually sound methodology to think that, if a posited object does not mani-
fest itself in any overt way, the object in question does not in fact exist. Cryptozoology 
notwithstanding, a rare beast cannot be so rare that no one ever witnesses it. This, 
however, is the (purportedly hasty) reasoning that Block seeks to assail. Although 
one typically determines the absence of an aspect and/or faculty of consciousness 
by way of a contrast with its manifest presence in healthy persons, Block claims that 
such a move is inconclusive, since it does not fully exclude the possibility that the 
aspect and/or faculty in question might still lurk in an afflicted patient’s mind. In 
fact, Block (1992) has explicitly accused functionalists of begging the question 
against phenomenal-consciousness (for a discussion of Block’s stance, see Tye 
1996, 291–295).
Exasperated by the elusive nature of these arguments, Daniel Dennett (1988) has 
claimed that talk of qualia is just a massive social delusion. We may all agree about 
what we are talking about, but there may be nothing more to this than our agree-
ment. Block, by contrast, thinks that “it is obvious that P-consciousness is not a 
cultural construction” (1995a, 238; see also Block 1999). Although Block’s distinc-
tion is still debated, most would agree with Chalmers that, at the very least, “[t]here 
is clearly a conceptual distinction here” (1997, 148). The question, then, is how best 
to handle this “conceptual” distinction. Addressing this, Güven Güzeldere writes:
[C]ould it be that the particular way Block’s distinction carves out phenomenal conscious-
ness, separating it completely from its causal and functional aspects in accord with the 
“segregationist intuition,” renders its investigation by means of scientific methods theoreti-
cally impossible? Put differently, could we be painting ourselves into a corner by a concep-
tual commitment to Block’s distinction such that we end up with a number of straightforward 
problems about A-consciousness and a conjured-up “hard problem” of P-consciousness 
that in principle admits no solution? (Güzeldere 1997, 29)
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Since too strong a reading of Block’s distinction risks “segregating” the mind’s 
qualitative dimension, I want to call on a conceptual distinction that is explicitly less 
than real yet more than nominal.
3.2  Prescission in Theory
The idea of representation figures prominently in philosophy of mind and the cogni-
tive sciences, but there is a growing sense that it cannot do all the work we want it 
to. As Denise Gamble writes, “[a]n ontology of representations is a powerful tool 
for explaining some types of content. But not every internal stimulation or activa-
tion in mentality need be a representation. Is there no other conceptual framework 
for understanding phenomenology?” (1997, 150). There is indeed.
One of the central tenets of Peircean semiotics is that the very idea of representa-
tion, carefully unpacked, presupposes a three-place relation that cannot be sun-
dered; that is, one which cannot be reduced to the dyadic or the monadic on pain of 
no longer representing (see Peirce 1998, 411). This does not, however, mean that 
qualia are representational. Semiotics does not say that a quale represents, but rather 
that representation involves a quale—there is no reciprocity (i.e., no monad is a 
triad).
Some (e.g., Colapietro 1989, 18) think that the term “representation” has suf-
fered too much harm at the hands of sceptically-minded philosophers, but I am not 
prepared to give it up. Representations, from a semiotic point of view, are not a 
special class of objects such that certain (typically mental) things inherently have to 
represent while others can never do so. Much the opposite: the tone emphatically 
does not have to be the ground upon which interpretation pole-vaults to an object. If 
and when a tone has enabled semiosis (by being an icon), then there is no question 
of denying its all-important service. But, the whole point of prescission is that we 
can recognize quality as an ordinal First in such a relation, thereby incorporating 
into our theoretical picture the idea that a tone can stand for something else but need 
not do so. Thus, despite the unbreakable triadic bond which characterizes any rep-
resentation, whatever is burdened with the logical duty of standing for something 
else—no matter what it may consist in—can be prescinded in such a way as to dis-
regard its employment in that capacity.
This means that, following Block (1995b, 33–34), orgasms don’t have to be 
“about” anything. But it also means that if one is led to infer from this “that some-
thing very pleasing is happening down there” (Tye 1995, 269), then, to that extent, 
the orgasm is acting as a sign (in this case, an index). From a semiotic standpoint, 
however, there is nothing about bodily feelings or sensations that make them more 
apt to serve as bearers of meaning, nor is there anything that bars a particular class 
from doing so. Block’s talk of “mental paint” (1995b, 27–29; 2003), though couched 
in a mentalistic idiom, comes very close to the notion of tone. Even so, Block’s 
proposal is less desirable because it implies (by its very name) that the issue of 
whether something is or is not a vehicle of representation—of whether it stands for 
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something else to something—can somehow be answered by studying the nature of 
the candidate in question. According to the view I recommend, that is a misguided 
endeavour:
[T]he being of the sign is the triadic relation itself, not the elements related or structured 
according to their respective roles [...]. The representative element within this triadic struc-
ture, which we loosely call a “sign,” “in itself” is not a sign at all, but one of the three ele-
ments necessary to the being of a sign, one of the three legs on which the sign walks in 
working its way through the world, and, indeed, the “foremost” leg, insofar as it is the leg 
which takes the direct representative step in carrying a semiosis. (Deely 2005, 176, 178)
Block states that he does “not want to claim that there are non-representational 
phenomenal features of every experience or that when there are, these non- 
representational features form support [for] the representational features in the man-
ner of a ‘base’” (1995b, 28). That is exactly what Peircean semiotics claims, the 
tone being the ultimate ground one can reach. Having said this, one must keep in 
mind that “[w]hat is sign-vehicle one time can be significate [i.e., object] another 
time; and what is interpretant one time can be sign-vehicle the next time; and so on, 
in an unending spiral […]” (Deely 2005, 178).
We cannot extract a quale and put it in a test-tube like we would a sample of red 
blood. We can certainly stare at the colour of blood, but considering that red tone 
apart from the token liquid requires a prescissive separation that no machine can 
(and will ever) provide. Prescission is “the act which our mind does when it sepa-
rates by means of thought things that are in point of fact inseparable” (Foulquié and 
Saint-Jean 1962, 562; my translation). Block, in contrast, suggests that the fact that 
we can conceive of a quality not accessed in any overt state of consciousness is 
evidence that a distinct phenomenal-consciousness module truly exists. Here is how 
he describes qualia:
[W]e have P-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste, and have pains […]. Here is 
another reason to believe in P-consciousness without A-consciousness: Suppose that you 
are engaged in intense conversation when suddenly at noon you realize that right outside 
your window, there is—and has been for some time—a pneumatic drill digging up the 
street. You were aware of the noise all along, one might say, but only at noon are you con-
sciously aware of it. That is, you were P-conscious of the noise all along, but at noon you 
are both P-conscious and A-conscious of it […]. Only at noon is the content of your repre-
sentation of the drill poised for use in rational control of action and speech [...]. The exam-
ple shows the conceptual distinctness of P-consciousness from A-consciousness and it also 
puts the burden of proof on anyone who would argue that as a matter of empirical fact they 
come to the same thing. (Block 1997, 380, 386–387; in the original 1995 article, Block 
speaks of a “deafening” drill)
Stripped to its essentials, Block’s argument can be summarized as follows: 1) 
Phenomenal-consciousness is conceivable without access-consciousness (i.e., the 
passage above). 2) Access-consciousness is conceivable without phenomenal- 
consciousness (i.e., the projected case of “super-blindsight”). Therefore: 3) We are 
entitled to distinguish phenomenal-consciousness from access-consciousness. The 
theorist working with the incomplete type/token distinction needs both premises to 
proceed to the conclusion—which is then glossed as proof that qualia exist as 
tokens. Indeed, Block has made his ontological commitments in this regard crystal 
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clear: “Whether we use ‘consciousness’ or ‘phenomenal consciousness,’ ‘aware-
ness’ or ‘access-consciousness,’ the point is that there are two different concepts of 
the phenomenon or phenomena of interest. We have to acknowledge the possibility 
in principle that these two concepts pick out different phenomena. Two vs. one: that 
is not a verbal issue” (2000, 133; emphasis added).
If we heed the insight that triadic relations can be decomposed without their 
involving a multiplicity of distinct objects, we can proceed straight to the conclu-
sion after the first premise. Compare Block’s remarks with the following passage by 
Peirce:
Among phanerons [Peirce’s name for phenomena] there are certain qualities of feeling, 
such as the color of magenta, the odor of attar, the sound of a railway whistle, the taste of 
quinine […] I do not mean the sense of actually experiencing these feelings, whether pri-
marily or in any memory or imagination. That is something that involves these qualities as 
an element of it. But I mean the qualities themselves which, in themselves, are mere may- 
bes, not necessarily realized […]. A quality of feeling can be imagined to be without any 
occurrence, as it seems to me. Its mere may-being gets along without any realization at all. 
[…] I suppose you will tell me that no such thing could be alone in the universe […]. But I 
point out to you that these things are only known to us by extraneous experience; none of 
them are either seen in the color, heard in the sound, or felt in the visceral sensation. 
Consequently, there can be no logical difficulty in supposing them to be absent, and for my 
part, I encounter not the slightest psychological difficulty in doing so, either. (Peirce 1931–
58, 1.304–305; emphasis added)
The similarity between Block’s illustrations and Peirce’s analysis is striking. 
With these two accounts now in plain sight, would it not be preferable to keep intact 
their common contention that a legitimate distinction is at play—while recognizing 
that it owes to our ability to “peel off” occurrences and glance in an abstract fashion 
at the qualities they presuppose? As I said in Chap. 2, my account of consciousness 
accepts a dual commitment but rejects a non-overlap. This lets one buy into Block’s 
distinction without endorsing his claim of mutual independence.
The debt to Duns Scotus is apparent: existential inseparability indeed does not 
entail identity in definition. Of course, Scotus and Peirce were not the only philoso-
phers to have grasped this. As Joseph Levine writes in discussing the problematic 
entanglements that accompany arguments for qualia: “One cannot infer from a vari-
ety of modes of access to a variety of facts being accessed” (1997, 546). Likewise, 
“[t]he identity theorist can admit a duality, or even a plurality, of different types of 
knowledge without thereby committing himself to a duality of types of things 
known” (Churchland 1988, 34). The fact that we can prescind a tone from a token is 
not a sufficient reason to think that a tone exists apart from its functional role(s). 
Semiotic theory can thus lend support to Block’s insightful but embattled 
suggestions.
Prescission teaches us that underneath all the hubbub of thought, discourse, and 
that general “action of signs” which Peirce called semiosis, there is the tone: a 
monadic dimension that has the power to be the qualitative vehicle of representation 
but which in virtue of its ordinal primacy remains serenely ignorant of whether it is 
actually employed in so raucous an activity (see Peirce 1931–58, 1.422–426). By 
refusing to reify the features it prescinds, such an approach allows us to respect the 
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distinct character of phenomenal experience without turning it into a chimera. It is 
not that access-consciousness and phenomenal-consciousness are tokens of differ-
ent types; rather, the latter is the tone of the former’s tokens.
This key claim (which cannot be expressed using the more limited vocabulary of 
types and tokens) explains why “A-consciousness and P-consciousness are almost 
always present or absent together” (Block 1995a, 242). Given that tones are not 
themselves occurrences, the steadfast accompaniment in no way means that the 
qualities at hand somehow “supervene” on their corresponding tokens (Chalmers 
1996, 32–89; Kim 1990). Instead, the situation involves a species of subsumption.
Tim Bayne and David Chalmers write that “[t]he paradigm case of subsumption 
is the relation between a complex phenomenal state and a simpler state that is intui-
tively one of its ‘components’” (2003, 40). I agree. But, whereas Bayne and 
Chalmers describe subsumption as “a relation among token phenomenal states” 
(2003, 40), my account takes the subsumption to extend farther, since it regards any 
token as subsuming a tone. Despite Bayne’s endorsement of a mereological model 
(2010, 20–46), it never occurs to him to also sunder tokens. It can be done.
As we saw in Chap. 2, the type/token/tone distinction doesn’t just names things 
differently, it counts things differently. Adopting the original Peircean trichotomy 
thus reshapes the debates. Chalmers summarizes Block’s distinction in three points: 
“(1) one can imagine access without experience and vice versa; (2) access can be 
observed straightforwardly, whereas experience cannot; and, most important, (3) 
access consciousness seems clearly amenable to cognitive explanation, whereas 
phenomenal consciousness is quite perplexing in this regard” (Chalmers 1997, 
148). To layer a summary of my own, the outlook I advocate gives good grounds to 
be wary of the symmetrical “vice versa” of (1), agrees with the gist of (2), and mar-
shals semiotic tools which—when properly understood—allow (3) to appear less 
foreign from the standpoint of explicit understanding.
Centuries of semiotic inquiry have produced some hard-earned results which we 
can now distil to a handful of tenets (a store of achievements nicely summarized in 
the otherwise eclectic Nöth 1995, 79–80). Using the terminology employed by 
Armstrong (1989), philosophers of signs have learned that representations necessar-
ily have to be “layer-cakes” (and cannot be unitary “blobs”) on pain of no longer 
representing, and that this irreducible complexity in turn allows us to distinguish 
without extinguishing the constituents that make up a whole greater than its parts. 
Moreover—and this is of special importance to the “extended mind” conception in 
cognitive science (compare Clark and Chalmers 1998 with Skagestad 1999)—the 
previous holds true regardless of whether the triadic representation that pole-vaults 
on a qualitative vehicle to reach its object does so on the basis of a correlation that 
is subjective or objective, conventionally recognized or truly bound to its object.
Prescissive abstraction is a form of explanation that we can explain. Alluding to 
this subtle mode of distinction, Peirce wrote: “It may be noticed that, throughout 
this process, introspection is not resorted to. Nothing is assumed respecting the 
subjective elements of consciousness which cannot be securely inferred from the 
objective elements” (1992, 3–4; compare this with Heil 1988). The semiotic account 
of phenomenal qualia I have tendered would thus seem to meet the desideratum laid 
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down by Dennett, who encouragingly stressed that “[t]he third-person approach is 
not antithetical to, or eager to ignore, the subjective nuances of experience; it simply 
insists on anchoring those subjective nuances to something—anything, really—that 
can be detected and confirmed in replicable experiments” (2001, 231). Let me now 
show how this perfectly sensible demand can be met.
3.3  Prescission in Practice
Block (1995a, 234) thinks that if one hears a nearby drilling noise and only later 
comes to notice it, there is a sense in which one was aware of the noise all along. On 
this view, one’s phenomenal consciousness of the noise does not begin with one’s 
noticing it. It would, of course, be difficult to tell how long the noise went on in 
one’s head since, prior to becoming access-conscious, that qualitative experience 
was not involved in any detectable function(s). Were one to insist after the fact that 
one had heard it all along, one’s insistence would come too late. The contentious 
philosophic issue concerns what, if anything, one’s mental life was like apart from 
any explicit grasp.
Block crafts inventive thought-experiments to motivate his view, but he also calls 
on results obtained by the psychologist George Sperling. Sperling presented sub-
jects with visual displays lasting 50 ms. The stimulus materials used by Sperling 




Subjects were presented with a blank screen immediately afterward. They were then 
asked how many letters they could identify (in the event of ignorance, subjects were 
instructed to venture a guess, so they always provided complete answers). Under 
these conditions, results showed a discrepancy between what subjects said they saw 
and what subjects could prove they saw. While subjects reported having seen all the 
letters, they could identify only a subset (usually a third or less) of these. Even so, 
subjects insisted on having been conscious, however briefly, of the whole visual 
display.
One quick explanation of this discrepancy between function and phenomenon is 
that subjects are simply confabulating when they report seeing all the letters. Recent 
experiments conducted by De Gardelle and his colleagues (2009) show that subjects 
will believe that letters were present in a display even when pseudo-letters are used. 
However, the question that interests me is whether, when genuine letters are used, 
subjects really did see them all—in spite of their inability to tangibly prove this. 
Block believes “that although one can distinctly see all or almost all of the 9–12 
objects in an array, the processes that allow one to conceptualize and identify the 
specific shapes are limited by the capacity of ‘working memory,’ allowing reports of 
only about 4 of them” (2007, 487). Block’s interpretation is controversial, because 
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it states that subjects saw “all or almost all” the items shown, and moreover saw 
them “distinctly.”
Commenting on Block’s interpretation, David Papineau (2007, 521) thinks it is 
more parsimonious to see Sperling’s results as motivating a distinction between an 
indistinct “scene” phenomenology and a more distinct “item” phenomenology. 
Presumably, only some items in an experienced scene receive cognitive attention. 
Indeed,
Consciousness is the subject of many metaphors, and one of the most hardy perennials 
compares consciousness to a spotlight, illuminating certain mental goings-on, while leav-
ing others to do their work in the dark. One way of elaborating the spotlight metaphor is 
this: mental events are loaded on to one end of a conveyer belt by the senses, and move with 
the belt—perhaps changing as they go—towards a fixed circle of light, which does not 
completely cover the width of the belt. Some mental goings-on fail to pass through the 
illumination, in which case they never become conscious. But others are illuminated, and 
thereby enter one’s consciousness. Beyond the spotlight, at the other end of the conveyer 
belt, lies the filing cabinet of memory, into which some of the more garish or lurid of the 
belt’s contents fall. (Byrne 1997, 103)
This metaphor informs a lot of work in neuroscience (see Crick 1993, 62). 
Looking at this generic picture of the mind, one might ask: what is the point of (or 
warrant for) countenancing unlit portions? Essentially, what Block is saying is that 
the portions that do not receive the spotlight of attention are nevertheless, in their 
own way, distinctly present to consciousness. At first blush, Block’s stance seems 
unverifiable.
In keeping with Peirce’s pragmatist maxim (1992, 132), I accept that, if “the 
object of our conception” does not “conceivably have practical bearings,” then we 
have no basis to credit our concept with having an object. Or, to put that maxim in 
terms that speak directly to the current worries about consciousness: “Every form of 
thinking must betray itself in some form of expression or go undiscovered” (Peirce 
1998, 18). The phenomenal-consciousness espoused by Block seems to violate this 
maxim, since it could never be detected. Yet, on reflection, I do not think Block’s 
view necessarily fails to meet the demand for tangible effects. If we read the Peircean 
maxim carefully, it requires only that an object “conceivably” have practical bear-
ings. So, unlike Jesse Prinz, who holds that “[a]vailability is not mere disposition” 
(2012, 105), I am willing to admit un-accessed contents, provided they support a 
power to be acted upon. Unnoticed drilling noises are thus admissible because, 
eventually, they are noticed.
Interestingly, by altering his initial experimental design, Sperling provided evi-
dence that supports Block’s claims:
Sperling’s clever idea was to test whether people really did see all or almost all of the char-
acters and whether the phenomenology persists after the stimulus was turned off by playing 
a tone soon after the array was replaced by a blank. Subjects were to report the top row if 
the tone was high, the bottom row if the tone was low, and the middle row in case of an 
intermediate tone. The result was that subjects could report all or almost all the characters 
in any given row. (Block 2007, 487)
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In the first round of tests, subjects had a bunch of letters flashed before them but 
performed poorly when asked to identify the items that they glimpsed. However, in 
a second round of testing, subjects were shown the same number of letters but were 
also given an auditory “retro-cue” that directed their mental focus to a given row. 
This allowed them to perform much better at the identification tasks. In both ver-
sions of the test, subjects reported seeing the whole visual display. However, it 
clearly became less risky (and even justified) to believe those introspective reports 
once the subjects made good on their claims in a practical way.
Subjects in Sperling’s experiment were presented with a blank screen immedi-
ately after being shown the flashed image. Because the chemistry and physics of 
vision allow information to be available for longer than the strict emission of pho-
tons off a screen, impingement on sense organs can give rise to signs that persist 
once the causal exposure proper has ended. Block (2007, 487) quotes William 
James’ Principles of Psychology on this lag time: “If we open our eyes instanta-
neously upon a scene, and then shroud them in complete darkness, it will be as if we 
saw the scene in ghostly light throught [sic] the dark screen” (James 2007, 645). 
Sperling readily granted the presence of such phenomenological afterimages. In his 
view, “[t]he question is not whether the observer continues to see the stimulus after 
the illumination is turned off, but for how long he continues to see the stimulus” 
(Sperling 1960, 20). Admittedly, a 50 ms stimulus does not last very long. Still, to 
the extent that an afterimage qualifies as an image, it can manifest enough determi-
nacy to permit subsequent interpretations, enabling us to “read off details in it which 
were unnoticed whilst the eyes were open” (James 2007, 645).
The afterimage (partially) resembles the image initially flashed, so it counts as an 
iconic sign of that image. I will introduce iconicity more fully in the next chapter. 
For now, we need only point out that iconicity is at work in signs like diagrams. 
Diagrams are signs “which represent the relations […] of the parts of one thing by 
analogous relations in their own parts” (Peirce 1998, 273). For example, four suit-
ably placed bottles of ketchup can show where four world leaders were sitting at a 
table (without suggesting that those leaders look like ketchup bottles). The grid of 
letters used by Sperling manifested such a diagrammatic organization. Given that 
there are fewer rows (or columns) than there are letters, the format allows informa-
tion to be “chunked” (see Champagne 2016, 32–33) in a way that reduces one’s 
cognitive and mnemonic load. This is why auditory cues were able to direct atten-
tion more efficiently. Importantly, these cognitive and mnemonic benefits occur 
regardless of whether one is looking at some “internal” mental image or some 
“external” worldly image. As Sperling nicely put it: “It is as logical or illogical to 
compute the information contained in a visual image […] as it is to compute the 
information in a visual stimulus” (1960, 21). Following Max Coltheart (1980, 184), 
Block urges us to distinguish between “neural,” “phenomenological,” and “informa-
tional” persistence. However, the shared quality that we find in iconicity skewers all 
these levels.
The expression “iconic memory” was introduced by Ulric Neisser (1967, 20) in 
the same book that coined the expression “cognitive psychology.” However, neither 
Neisser nor his colleagues fully explored what is implied by this idea of storing and 
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accessing information using an image-like quality. Philosophy of signs, which 
makes that exploration its chief business, recognizes icons as qualities that can be 
interpreted but do not have to be. This is exactly what Block needs, insofar as 
“Sperling’s study firmly establishes that unreported letters could have been reported” 
(Prinz 2012, 103). I therefore believe that Block is depriving himself of powerful 
explanatory resources when he rejects the idea that “a ‘visual icon’ persists after the 
stimulus is turned off” (Block 2007, 487).
Block thinks that Sperling experimentally proved what his story about a drilling 
noise could only adumbrate. Strictly speaking, though, Sperling did no such thing. 
All that the subjects’ correct performances can establish pertains to access- 
consciousness. Indeed, on the terms Block has set, the choice seems to be this: 
silently enjoy an experience—or report it and no longer deal with the phenomenal 
side of consciousness. This may seem like an unpalatable disjunction, but it follows 
directly from Block’s (1995a) phenomenality/accessibility distinction. Accordingly, 
any inquiry into consciousness that manages to render that object of study tractable 
by some articulate method of detection risks being charged with avoiding the quali-
tative dimension of conscious experience.
Josh Weisberg notes that, in ordinary philosophical conversations, “‘phenomenal 
consciousness’ just means ‘experience.’ Many people have embraced this sense of 
the term and use it to roughly pick out conscious experience involving sensory qual-
ity” (2011, 438). In this “moderate” gloss, states besides a quality itself are allowed 
to enter the picture. By contrast, in what Weisberg calls the “zealous” gloss, the very 
presence of something besides the quality itself disqualifies the candidate from 
belonging to phenomenal consciousness. What-it’s-like thus becomes “a monadic 
property […] that a state has or lacks independently of its relations to other mental 
states” (Weisberg 2011, 439). Block’s p-consciousness is zealous. Hence, “any 
explanation of phenomenal consciousness in exclusively cognitive, intentional or 
functional terms will fail to capture, without remainder, what is really distinctive 
about phenomenal consciousness” (Weisberg 2011, 438). On those terms, tamper-
ing with the data is inevitable. In an effort to sidestep this methodological challenge, 
Block has recently weakened his stance. Instead of saying, as he once did (Block 
2007, 487), that phenomenal consciousness overflows accessibility, he now prefers 
to say that phenomenal consciousness overflows access. Looking at the Sperling 
experiments, his revised view “does not claim that any of the items in the array are 
cognitively inaccessible, but rather that necessarily most are unaccessed” (Block 
2011, 567).
While a strategic shift from the “inaccessible” to the “unaccessed” blunts the 
force of many critics (like Cohen and Dennett 2011) who “think that a vote for 
overflow is a vote for inaccessible consciousness” (Block 2011, 574), I do not think 
a weakening of access succeeds in sidestepping the difficulties at hand. Block moti-
vates his revised stance with an analogy: while only one lottery ticket wins, “this 
does not show that for any particular contestant the lottery is unwinnable” (Block 
2011, 567). This point is well taken: an “unwon” ticket is not an “unwinnable” 
ticket. In fact, so long as a ticket could have won, the view espoused by Block con-
nects well with the Peircean stance I want to defend. There is, however, an impor-
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tant disanalogy. Sticking with the lottery comparison, scientific observations work 
only with (and establish the existence of) winning tickets. Failure to be manifested 
in access thus makes an experiential ascription superfluous.
When a row-specific retrieval aid was added to Sperling’s experimental design, 
subjects were able to access the previously unused portions of their visual experi-
ences, thereby lending credence to their initial claim about having seen the whole 
scene. Of course, once third-person tasks corroborate first-person reports, it is easy 
to make confident pronouncements about what subjects were conscious of. Yet, 
what Block ostensibly fails to notice is that the very performances which made the 
second Sperling results interesting have to be supposed absent if they are to speak 
in an informative manner about what subjects experienced before they engaged in 
overt identifications. This makes the situation trickier. Block cannot open the fridge 
door and use that as evidence that the lights were on while the door was closed. I 
therefore argue that, if we want to follow Block and get philosophical mileage out 
of the Sperling results, we must employ prescission and suppose the tangible actions 
absent.
Prescission is what happens when, going against the facts, we suppose that some 
portion of a complex phenomenon is absent. This formal abstraction does not pre-
tend to actually separate anything. Still, if we cannot permit it, then the very ingenu-
ity which allows a cognitive scientist to study consciousness will always invite the 
retort that, “[s]ince any report relies on cognitive access, it cannot inform us about 
the presence of an inaccessible conscious representation” (Schlicht 2012, 319fn7). 
This is an abstract worry, and it can only be catered to by abstract means.
So, while many philosophers feel “a pressing need for a methodological approach 
that is capable of separating P[henomenal-consciousness] from A[ccess- 
consciousness] empirically” (Shea 2012, 308), I think that waiting for such an 
empirical separation is forlorn. It is pointless to try to wedge a “real” distinction 
between qualia and their practical effects. Indeed, “[t]here is a simple and funda-
mental reason why all attempts to get at the ‘raw data’ of experience fail: introspec-
tive evidence always arrives already interpreted” (Jack and Shallice 2001, 177). 
This observation accords with the Peircean semiotic claim that all intelligible cogni-
tions are cloaked in a layer of Thirdness. As a result, there is simply no way to test 
what a pre-accessed state is like.
Even so, I believe that prescission can let us indirectly make sense of this idea. 
Let me therefore revisit Sperling’s experiment and give it a new twist. My modified 
version will have three steps. The first step consists in looking at the same stimulus 
of letters that Sperling used. Sperling was more concerned with memory than I am, 
so in contrast with a 50 msec flash, my “slow-motion” version gives one ample time 
to view the display. The only directive one must abide by is to not act on what one 
experiences. One is instructed to stay still, like a Beefeater on duty.
I take it that, already, a subject following these instructions will have changed as 
a result of her causal exposure to the image. It may be possible not to act, but it is 
hardly possible not to react. However, the philosophic quarry is not reflexes, but 
“what it is like” for one to undergo an experience. Is there even such a qualitative 
dimension? Perhaps we can track a subject’s involuntary eye movements (if any) to 
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find out, but it would take an abductive leap to let those minute indices speak to the 
experience of a qualitative state. Extra support seems in order.
Step two of my slow-motion experiment thus requires a subject to perform a 
simple identification task: one must look at the rows and name the letters that one 
sees. Alas, the moment the subject breaks her silence and immobility to act on what 
she experiences, she makes herself amenable to functional description. We are now 
recording her linguistic outputs, not the intrinsic character of her experience(s). 
Step two can detect only access-consciousness.
This is where the third step of my slow-motion experiment comes in. Step one 
required subjects to look at the display of letters, silently, without acting on their 
experience. Step two required subjects to prove their experience of the whole visual 
display by identifying the various items. I take it that, under my slow-motion condi-
tions, normal adults will have no trouble correctly naming all the letters. Having 
now identified all the letters, step three asks subjects to say in what order they 
named these items.
Note that, until we come to this third step, we have no evidence that subjects 
(privately or publically) represented their activity in step two, thinking to them-
selves “I am now reading from left to right.” Step three of my modified Sperling 
experiment thus stands in the same relationship to step two that step two stood to 
step one. Indeed, the choice of word order has the same status that the unexpressed 
quality had: it was something that could have been verbalized or acted upon but was 
not. So, by parity, I argue that, if we are going to say that the visual experiences 
needed the identifications of step two in order to count as conscious, then we also 
have to say that the identifications of step two needed the meta-identification of step 
three in order to count as conscious. Surely this consequence is absurd. Hence, by 
Modus Tollens, I conclude that the visual experiences were consciously present 
prior to their overt identification.
Clearly, from a methodological standpoint, “[i]t is difficult to know exactly what 
is going on in the phenomenology of the subject who is undergoing the Sperling 
experiment, before being asked about the contents of a row” (Bayne and Chalmers 
2003, 36). Block’s (2011) claim that perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive 
access can thus look implausible. Yet, to my mind, it would be equally implausible 
to maintain that our experiences (visual or otherwise) come into being only once 
they are accessed. Ernest Sosa explores the possibility that “[o]ne’s consciousness 
contains experiences that go unnoticed; unnoticed altogether, or at least unnoticed 
as experiences with an intrinsic, experiential character that they nevertheless do 
have” (2003, 276). I do not want to go that far. As I see it, a mental state must even-
tually leave some observable trace if we are ever to infer its presence. I thus have a 
lot of sympathy for the view that “a state’s being conscious consists in one’s being 
in some kind of higher-order mental state that represents that state” (Rosenthal 
2005, 4). In fact, I see no reason why this process could not be open-ended (see 
Champagne 2009, 562–563). Even so, I do not think it follows that, without the 
experience that comes after it, a given experience is nothing.
This section set out to find “something—anything, really—that can be detected 
and confirmed in replicable experiments” (Dennett 2001, 231). Block maintains that 
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Sperling achieved this. But, in order to maintain this, Block has to violate the very 
distinction that he charges others with overlooking. Retro-cue or not, identification 
tasks track access-consciousness, not phenomenal-consciousness. Yet, presumably, 
even if Sperling had not devised ingenious ways of verifying what subjects saw, it 
still would have been true that subjects experienced the whole array of letters. Using 
a prescissive supposition of absence, I have tried to show how we can make sense of 
such a non-accessed experience. Qualitative experience is always tied to action, but 
qualitative experience can be prescinded from action.
3.4  The Stream and Still Pools of Consciousness
Consciousness has long been remarked for its stream-like complexity, one thought 
leading to another. In some disciplines, that stream may be the minimal unit of study 
(Dewey 1896). Semiotic inquiry, however, is neither phenomenology nor psychol-
ogy, so no methodological constraint forbids the semiotician from adulterating this 
baseline of lived experience. In prescinding, we attend to some elements and delib-
erately neglect others (see Deledalle 2000, 5–6; Houser 2010, 95–96; Stjernfelt 
2007, 246–255). In order to reach a lone tone like, say, the smell of a striploin steak, 
a lot of connections need to be supposed absent—including the knowledge that a 
striploin steak is responsible for the smell. Thus, in a way, “qualia are like the 
Cheshire cat’s smile with the cat removed” (Fromm 2009, 261). But, as much as we 
might want to deride this removal, the fact is it can be done. It is incumbent upon us, 
then, to do justice to this unique (if admittedly bizarre) ability.
In reality, qualitative experiences are always caught up in actions, associations, 
significations, and recollections. William James was the first to describe this activity 
as a stream. But, the history of ideas seems to have forgotten that, in the same honest 
spirit, James also observed that,
Like a bird’s life, [the stream of our consciousness] seems to be made of an alternation of 
flights and perchings. The rhythm of language expresses this, where every thought is 
expressed in a sentence, and every sentence closed by a period. The resting-places are usu-
ally occupied by sensorial imaginations of some sort, whose peculiarity is that they can be 
held before the mind for an indefinite time, and contemplated without changing; the places 
of flight are filled with thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for the most part obtain 
between the matters contemplated in the periods of comparative rest. Let us call the resting- 
places the ‘substantive parts,’ and the places of flight the ‘transitive parts,’ of the stream of 
thought. It then appears that the main end of our thinking is at all times the attainment of 
some other substantive part than the one from which we have just been dislodged. 
(James 2007, 243; emphasis in original)
Peirce (1931–58, 8.89) considered this “one of the finest, if not the finest, pas-
sage” in James’ Principles of Psychology. I agree. In my modified Sperling test, we 
have a perching when we just stare at the letters, silently. The action of signs gets 
spurred into flight once we name the letters that we see. We return to a perching, 
though, when we just read them, without additionally noticing what that action feels 
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like. Flight resumes once we are instructed to notice and verbalize this feeling of 
reading.
Using the same terminology as James, David Rosenthal claims that “transitive 
consciousness can occur without intransitive state consciousness” (1997, 737). 
What Rosenthal says is true if it is analogous to the claim that one can drive on the 
freeway without stopping. However, I think that Rosenthal’s claim is false if it is 
taken to mean that one can drive without retaining the ability to stop. As John Locke 
put it, it is not “any more necessary for the soul always to think, than for the body 
always to move” (1825, 54).
Essentially, I am arguing that the claim “An experience must be accessed” is not 
so much wrong as incomplete. Acts of access also have a feel. So, to be accurate, we 
should instead say “An experience must be accessed in/by another experience.” This 
enlarged formulation is better, but it faces a regress that plays no part in our mental 
lives (Champagne 2009, 563). We can quickly halt this regress by switching from 
“must” to a modally weaker “can,” thereby obtaining: “An experience can be 
accessed in/by another experience.” This is the stance that I endorse. It captures 
well, I think, Peirce’s account of semiosis:
Peirce uniformly holds (1) that there is no such thing as a sign in isolation, every sign being 
a constituent of a sequential set of signs, so that apart from membership in this set, a thing 
has no meaning—or is not a sign; and (2) that in the sequential movement of signs thus 
ordered, the meaning of the earlier ones in the series is provided by or constituted by the 
later ones as their interpretants, until a conclusion (logical as a matter of course) is reached. 
Indeed, Peirce adheres so consistently to this view that he says, more than once, that signs, 
as such, form an infinite series, so that no conclusion of reasoning is forever final, being 
inherently open to having its meaning modified by further signs. (Dewey 1946, 88)
A request to name what one sees is a request to produce an interpretation. 
However, prescission allows us to suppose this interpretation absent. Doing so 
results in an experiential quality that plays no function. This quality could be con-
sidered “a nonsemiotic phenomenon, but to Peirce, it is nevertheless semiotic, since 
even if a sign refers only to itself it has the potential of producing an effect in a 
process of semiosis” (Nöth 2003, 14). Interpretation, however, is not incessant, so 
my account of consciousness is not a “process philosophy” (as in Williams 2016).
A subject presumably feels something when a visual stimulus is shown to her. 
Yet, in our quest to verify this, we forget that when a subject confirms what she saw 
(say, by correctly identifying it), she engages in an act which also has distinctive 
feel. We are, for the better part, unreflective creatures (Legg 2003). Whether or not 
one subsequently takes stock of what it feels like, there is clearly something “it is 
like” for one to read letters in the direction that one does. This qualitative character 
may become easier to scientifically track once it is accessed, but I have tried to show 
why it would be a mistake to make such access our philosophical starting point.
3.4 The Stream and Still Pools of Consciousness
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Chapter 4
Enlarging the Menu of Referential Options 
to Include Icons
Abstract In the previous chapter, I looked at why phenomenal-consciousness 
must, by definition, repel all experimental testing. In this chapter, I want to explore 
an important consequence of this, namely “the meaning objection.” This objection 
asks how a qualitative experience with no detectable effects could ever be referred 
to by words or gestures. Bertrand Russell rightly argued that, without knowledge by 
acquaintance, linguistic descriptions can cohere yet fail to refer to anything in the 
world. Because similarity does not turn on proximity, I argue that a Peirce-inspired 
account of iconic reference can overcome this limitation. David Papineau has come 
very close to reconstructing such an account of iconicity, but I think that the linger-
ing flaws in his account can be remedied by explicitly transitioning from Russellian 
philosophy of language to a more inclusive Peircean philosophy of signs.
4.1  The Indexical Phenomenal Concept Strategy
There are many arguments and thought-experiments which attempt to show, with 
various degrees of success, that consciousness has a qualitative dimension. One of 
the most memorable is Frank Jackson’s “knowledge argument” (1982; 1986). 
Jackson invites us to consider a neuroscientist—named Mary—who, upon being 
raised in a strictly black and white setting since birth, is allowed for the first time to 
emerge from her isolated confines into a fully-coloured environment. Jackson’s 
original claim is that, even if Mary had mastered a comprehensive functional 
account of colour prior to this exposure, her new experiences would give her an 
additional insight into “what it’s like” to see a colour like red.
Using a terminology introduced by Bertrand Russell (1910–11), we can say that 
Mary in the cave can muster “descriptions” of colour vision but will lack a more 
intimate “acquaintance” until and unless she undergoes the experiences forbidden 
to her (Bigelow and Pargetter 2004). It is natural, then, to think that what Mary 
gains when she exits her confines is a new ability to indexically point to “this” qual-
ity (Perry 2001, 97, 146).
As promising as this account is, I believe it must fail. I agree that “[s]ome kinds 
of knowledge require distinctive forms of engagement between the knower and the 
known” (Bigelow and Pargetter 2004, 194). Judged by that standard, indexical 
52
devices like “this” indeed bring us closer to their referents than linguistic descrip-
tions can. Alas, “this” can pick out its target in space and time without any knowl-
edge of “what” that target is, as evidenced by a locution like “I have no clue what 
this is.” I therefore think that the standard roster of options is too coarse. According 
to the Peircean theory I defend, there are three ways in which one can know things, 
namely by convention, causality, and similarity.
Peirce offers us a non-psychological analysis of similarity and similarity recog-
nition. “Though Peirce was […] exceptionally knowledgeable in the prior semioti-
cal traditions, his conception of the iconic sign […] was developed neither by 
generalizing from cases and kinds of iconicity he had observed, nor by appropriat-
ing and developing a pre-existing theoretical conception of this sort of meaningful-
ness” (Ransdell 1986, 51). Using iconicity and the prescissive tools developed in the 
previous chapters, I want to argue that knower and known are at their closest when 
they share a quality, and that this is what would have to be involved in successful 
reference to a phenomenal state. In my account, qualia remain linguistically inef-
fable, but icons can nevertheless let one appreciate what “that” is.
My iconic account will thus contrast with versions of the “phenomenal concept 
strategy” that take indexicality to be central. The “phenomenal concept strategy” 
(Stoljar 2005) is an attempt to preserve physicalist commitments while accounting 
for why there appears to be a gap when it comes to explaining the qualitative dimen-
sion of consciousness (Levine 1983). Although there are several variants of this 
strategy currently vying for adoption (see Balog 2009), the general idea is that, 
since we have special concepts to pick out conscious states, whatever difficulties we 
have fitting consciousness into a naturalist picture may owe to the peculiar nature of 
those concepts. The strategy thus caters to those who accept that there is an epis-
temic gap between the material and the phenomenal but who deny an ontological 
gap (see Chalmers 1996, 165–168).
Indexicality is usually taken to be the direct mode of reference whereby language 
comes into contact with whatever it denotes. Indexicality is arguably “one of the 
best known features of Peirce’s theory of signs” (Atkin 2005, 161). In the main-
stream analytic literature, though, indexicality was introduced by John Perry (who 
did not discuss the historical lineage of the term). Perry’s original intent was to chal-
lenge the (Fregean) view that propositions “have a truth-value in an absolute sense, 
as opposed to merely being true for a person or at a time” (1979, 6). The idea of 
indexing meanings to contextual circumstances is less controversial than the idea of 
indexing truth-values (compare Blome-Tillmann 2008 with MacFarlane 2014). In 
philosophy of language though, Perry’s proposal has become a commonplace. We 
use some words like “this” in specific contexts, and these contexts fix what (in the 
world) our words point to (Kim 2010).
Some phenomenal concept strategists use this indexicality to explain problems 
regarding qualia. According to John O’Dea, a subject’s particular spatial-temporal 
location explains the force of thought-experiments like the inverted spectrum 
(Shoemaker 1982). O’Dea argues, for instance, that a disagreement between an 
Earthling and a Martian about what each means by “I am in pain” would be “tanta-
mount to a disagreement over whether Earth is here or Mars is here” (2002, 180). 
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O’Dea therefore surmises that “[t]he irreducibility of sensory terms […] may be 
nothing more than a straightforward consequence of their indexicality” (ibid., 175).
This indexical account strikes a bargain with the skeptic. One can successfully 
refer to, say, the fact that one is now enjoying an experience of green, but the indexi-
cal sign that one uses to achieve this act of public reference cannot reach all the way 
to the quality of the experience (O’Dea 2002, 177). Since qualia are not captured by 
causality and since indexicality works precisely by exploiting causality, qualia are 
not captured by indexicality. This means that the qualitative dimension of con-
sciousness cannot truly affect or be affected by discourse. On the further assump-
tion—mistaken, as I hope to show—that indexicality is our ultimate means of 
reference, the privacy of qualia follows.
If we follow Russell (1910–11) and distinguish knowledge that comes from 
“acquaintance” and knowledge that comes from “description,” we are left in a bind. 
Intrinsic qualities are not describable. By disjunctive syllogism, this ought to make 
those qualities knowable by acquaintance. Alas, acquaintance is not up to the task. 
Therefore, when prompted to convey the intrinsic character of a feeling, the conver-
gence of two persons’ verbal reports and/or behavioural responses remains incon-
clusive. People of course remain free to discuss how they feel, but they cannot really 
discuss how they feel. My goal is to eradicate this second clause.
To use an index, one has to place a sign-vehicle in the vicinity of its object. Such 
vicinity, however, should not be construed too literally. One can point to Alpha 
Centauri in the night sky; but one has to aim at a specific location if one wants to 
aid/elicit a specific interpretation. The fact that spatial coordinates matter in fixing 
the reference shows that, even if distance is not an issue, causal considerations are 
essential to explaining why/how anything can be non-arbitrarily “sensitive” to a 
context (see West 2012).
Upon emerging, Mary will need to use indices to convey the qualitative character 
of what she has just discovered. However, when Mary points to, say, a red rose and 
proclaims that “So this is what was meant by red,” she cannot mean that particular 
flower, then and there. Were this what she meant, one could destroy the colour red 
once and for all simply by burning the flower. In an attempt to surmount this inabil-
ity of indices to convey qualities, some have grafted the (much used but incomplete) 
type/token distinction onto indexicality to yield what Brian Loar (1997, 597) calls a 
“type-demonstrative.” This is supposed to be a context-specific gesture and/or utter-
ance that somehow manages to refer to “That type of sensation” (see Levin 2007, 
88–89). I do not think this finessing succeeds. It makes perfect sense that one should 
be able to point to tokens, since these supply the presence needed for indices to do 
their referential business. But, if “type-demonstratives” were truly possible, one 
could literally see generality. Surely, one can see instances of a law, kind, or habit—
but not the law, kind, or habit itself.
The ability to “see” types is supposedly achieved by “thick” perception (Masrour 
2011). Of course, once an agent realizes that what she perceived was a token of a 
type, she can become convinced that she somehow “saw” the type. That, however, 
would be an embellishment of hindsight. Given that the stream of consciousness 
flows in a linear fashion, one way to test claims about so-called “thickness” would 
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be to require a subject to ascertain—before any other tokens are experienced—
whether there are in fact such other tokens. Clearly, a subject looking at a painting 
cannot tell, just by looking, whether it has ever been copied or mass produced. 
Rather than arguing that kind properties are only sometimes represented in experi-
ence, it seems more judicious to say that, when perceiving a single token, the most 
a subject is perceptually (and intellectually) entitled to answer is that a) it exists and 
b) another token like it could exist. Talk of “recognitional dispositions” (Siegel 
2011, 100) captures this, but conflating the modal strength of (b) with the actuality 
of (a) would constitute a reification.
Loar asserts that “type-demonstratives” are “recognitional concepts” which, 
despite their recognitional status, “need involve no reference to a past instance,” 
such that “[y]ou can forget particular instances and still judge ‘another one of 
those’” (1997, 601). If one can do without past instances, what is the relatum in the 
judgement “another one of those”? That is a bit like saying that a sibling has no 
sibling(s).
These recent attempts to explain qualitative reference are influenced by other 
advancements in our understanding of reference. The standard analysis (from 
Aristotle to Kant to Frege) breaks “This gerbil” down into three components, inso-
far as a particular gets identified as a member or instance of a kind or universal by 
an act of judgement (see Peirce 1931–58, 1.485). It was a tangible advance of 
twentieth- century philosophy of language to stress that, irrespective of how one 
glosses the ontological status of universals or the epistemological workings of 
judgement, context of use would have to be involved in securing reference to a par-
ticular. Capitalizing on the well-deserved reputation of that account, “type- 
demonstratives” (and “thick perceptions”) simply repeat this story to explain 
reference to (or perception of) universality. This implausibly outstretches the 
resources of indexicality. If one wants to refer to Gerbilhood by means of a situated 
sign-vehicle like “This,” then, given the generality of the intended target, there 
should be no reason to prefer one particular gerbil over another. Yet, since in the end 
not all gerbils will be pointed to, it may rightfully be asked: why this one? The only 
sensible answer seems to be because it is in the vicinity of the utterer (needless to 
say, uttering “This” with no gerbils around would not accomplish much). The claim 
that demonstratives pick out tokens is therefore less contentious than the claim that 
demonstratives can somehow pick out types.
Russell held that “It is obvious […] that we are acquainted with such universals 
as white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard, etc., i.e., with qualities which are exem-
plified in sense-data” (1997b, 101). Taking Russell at his word, if one is in contact 
with an “exemplification,” is it not a slide to construe this as contact with a univer-
sal? Russell added: “When we see a white patch, we are acquainted, in the first 
instance, with the particular patch; but by seeing many white patches, we easily 
learn to abstract the whiteness which they all have in common, and in learning to do 
this we are learning to be acquainted with whiteness” (ibid.). Again, if inductive 
generalization is needed to get at the targeted quality, how can this still count as 
acquaintance, which is defined as a “direct” mode of knowledge (Russell 1910–11, 
108)? If one were truly capable of being acquainted with universals, these should 
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simply present themselves to one, with no intervening particular(s). Needless to say, 
a subject-to-type access differs greatly from a (more plausible) subject-to-token-to-
type access. Russell promises us the former but delivers only the latter (for a similar 
criticism, see Chalmers 2003, 233).
The challenges associated with pinpointing exact referents do not alter the fact 
that indexicality works by and on tokens, not types. It may not be obvious what to 
look for upon hearing “Look there!,” but it is obvious that to find out one has to scan 
the nearby environment for a particular object or event. If, say, your friend points to 
a stranger who just walked into a crowded coffee shop, you might conceivably have 
some difficulty pinpointing who your friend intends; but that does not license you to 
roam the whole planet looking for the person she meant. There is plenty of room for 
failed attempts in my account of interpretation (Eco 1988). However, my account 
does not support the skeptical leap from fallibility to impotence (Champagne 
2015b).
Picking out particular instances is by no means a negligible service, since it is 
part of what must happen if one is to grasp a likeness. Yet, if on full consideration 
we realize that thought, comparison, and other deliberate intellectual interventions 
are needed, then these need to figure in the official account. Merely pointing does 
not suffice.
One might reply that it is a matter of coming across the “right” exemplar. After 
all, if—in keeping with Peirce’s account of abduction (Houser 2005)—the initial 
stage of establishing a sign-vehicle’s referent is (and cannot help but be) a surmise, 
then that surmise could benefit from beginner’s luck. If so, then the burden would 
be on the advocate of referential serendipity to explain why, in the vast majority of 
cases, we do not grasp types via a single token. In any event, confirmation that one 
indeed guessed a type right from the get-go can be revealed only by further action/
experience, so one cannot “forget particular instances and still judge ‘another one of 
those’” (Loar 1997, 601).
Ideally, a story of how one refers to the qualitative dimension of consciousness 
should be such that whatever post-emergence Mary does or uses to refer to her novel 
colour experience(s) is not something she could have done or used in her pre- 
emergence condition, otherwise Mary would not need to emerge. Symbols clearly 
do not live up to this demand, since prior to seeing red Mary can competently 
employ the word “red” found in her textbooks (the adjective “competently” is war-
ranted because Mary can undoubtedly draw more red-based inferences than most 
lay persons). Therefore, with a twofold menu of symbols and indices, all hope must 
be placed on the latter option. Interestingly, the indices favoured by many phenom-
enal concept strategists do not fare any better than symbols. Indeed, if one were to 
ask pre-emergence Mary what she means by the word “red,” she could very well 
point to a diagram of the appropriate wavelength and answer “This one now.” Of 
course, we as outsiders are privy to the fact that Mary has brought the context- 
sensitive sign-vehicles “this” and “now” in the vicinity of an object ill-suited to 
truly convey what red “is like.” But—and this is crucial—nothing in the indexical 
account permits us to regard her gesture as a blunder. I thus agree that “in order to 
be successful, the Phenomenal Concept Strategy needs […] to explain how these 
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concepts afford us a rich and substantial grasp of their referents” (Schroer 2010, 
509–510). Icons furnish this substantial grasp.
In contrast with indices, icons work only if (and only because) the qualities 
match. What matters in iconicity is not that the sign-vehicle is near its object but 
rather that the sign-vehicle is like its object. Hence, if nothing in Mary’s room is 
coloured, nothing in that room can be used to refer to colours. To be sure, the con-
fines of pre-emergence Mary are filled with other icons. One pencil, for example, 
might resemble another pencil, and could thus be used to iconically refer to the 
other (and vice versa). Alas, familiarity with office supplies is not what is at stake, 
so emergence from the cave is needed for the relevant colour icons to become pos-
sible. Mary’s eventual exit is therefore doubly enriching: not only does she get to 
experience something new, she also gains access to the various sign-vehicles capa-
ble of conveying the quality at hand. This is because, in iconicity, sign-vehicle and 
object are one and the same.
Iconic reference thus augments the “semantic” axis that is lacking in John 
Searle’s (1980) “Chinese room” thought-experiment. Indeed, it should be noted that 
the distinction between semantics (vehicle-to-object), syntactics (vehicle-to- 
vehicle), and pragmatics (vehicle-to-interpreter) was introduced by Charles Morris 
in his influential 1938 International Encyclopedia of Unified Science paper on 
“Foundations of the Theory of Signs” (reprinted in Morris 1971, 13–71). Morris 
drew a methodological division of labour among those studying facets of a single 
object of study, semiosis (i.e., the full triad of vehicle-to-object-to-interpreter). One 
can prescind the axes discussed by Morris, but one can never divide them in fact.
In order to see how these semiotic ideas can advance current debates in philoso-
phy of mind, we can take a closer look at the argument which led Jackson (2004a; 
2004b) to abandon his previous conclusions. Howard Robinson (2008, 224) recon-
structs Jackson’s rationale as follows:
 1. Reference to any x involves causal influence from x to the referential act.
 2. If x is epiphenomenal then it has no causal influence on anything, so a fortiori, 
not on any referential act.
Therefore,
 3. If x is epiphenomenal then it is something to which we cannot refer.
Therefore,
 4. If qualia are epiphenomenal then they cannot be objects of reference.
 5. Qualia (if they exist) are what we refer to by using our phenomenal concepts.
Therefore,
 6. If qualia exist and are epiphenomenal then they can and cannot be objects of 
reference.
Therefore,
 7. Epiphenomenalism about qualia is incoherent.
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Jackson sides with the Russellian tradition in assuming that true descriptions 
must be reducible to acquaintances. As he puts it, “[o]ur knowledge of the sensory 
side of psychology has a causal source,” such that when making claims all “our 
entitlement comes back to causal impacts of the right kinds” (Jackson 2004a, 418). 
I disagree. I contend that premise (1) is false, since there exists a mode of reference 
which, though not mind-dependent like symbols, does not rest on causality. Hence, 
I think the argument above is valid but unsound.
Premise (1) is pivotal to what has been called the “meaning objection” (Robinson 
2012). Gilberto Gomes conveys this objection well: “But how can we refer to [our 
experience of red] if, by assumption, it cannot have any causal effect on our 
thought?” (2005, 78). My answer is: by means of an icon. Once we incorporate 
iconic reference in our overall picture, the terms of the debate shift: working out the 
logic, (3) and (4) become false, so (6) and (7) no longer follow. Let me therefore 
explore this referential option in greater detail.
4.2  Getting in Touch without Touching
Some philosophers of mind think that “[i]f qualia represent then it is plausible that 
they represent non-conceptually. That is, they do not have language-like structure 
but rather are akin to pictures […]” (Balog 2009, 296). This is true, but the allusion 
to pictures can be limiting. A perfume, for example, is an icon, even though in 
resembling the smell of, say, lavender, it is in no way pictorial. Still, for better or for 
worse, the image has become a paradigmatic exemplar of iconicity. Prinz (2002, 
25–32), for example, speaks of “imagism” in the cognitive sciences. Mental images 
have often been viewed with suspicion, but it is worth noting that even a critic like 
Zenon Pylyshyn is careful to stress that “the existence of the experience of images 
cannot be questioned. Imagery is a pervasive form of experience and is clearly of 
utmost importance to humans. We cannot speak of consciousness without, at the 
same time, implicating the existence of images” (1973, 2).
Peircean semiotics gives us tools to handle such phenomena. The virtue of focus-
ing on the technical notion of icon is that it compels us to bear in mind that these 
signs are defined in virtue of the sort of referential relation they sustain: to bear an 
iconic relation is to guide interpretation by exploiting a qualitative bond that would 
exist regardless of whether another (similar) object or interpretation was present. I 
am applying this idea to debates in philosophy of mind, but there is nothing in the 
concept of iconicity per se which says that it must involve a similarity between a 
mind and a world. Since the similarity is between whatever plays the role of sign- 
vehicle and an object, iconicity can just as easily encompass world-world similari-
ties. One might, for example, take “s” (on this page) to iconically stand for “s” (on 
this page). In fact, I think we should keep this sort of “sideways” confirmation as our 
gold standard when discussing more troublesome issues pertaining to 
consciousness.
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As an icon, a quality can refer to that same quality. Here it is the shared tone—
not the proximity of the tokens—that underwrites an interpretive passage. Peirce 
gave us tools to carefully track in what respect(s) something stands for something 
else to something. The triadic relation is what renders cognition possible, but the 
different parts of this relation are not always equally responsible for the conveyance 
of meaning. An index “is a sign which would, at once, lose the character which 
makes it a sign if its object were removed;” whereas an icon “is a sign which would 
possess the character which renders it significant, even though its object had no 
existence” (Peirce 1931–58, 2.304). Semiotics does not force one to choose between 
these different modes of reference. We can have both, at the same time, yet carefully 
prescind them.
Iconicity exploits the quality of Firstness, indexicality exploits the pairing of 
Secondness, and symbolicity exploits the arbitrary association of Thirdness. Hence, 
the philosopher of signs must always ask: in what respect is something being used 
as a sign? The answer to this question is constantly shifting. For instance, if a lime 
is used to signify a golf ball, then what matters is the shared spherical character. If 
the same lime is used to signify a blade of grass, then what matters is the shared 
green colour. If the lime is used to indicate a location, then what matters is its mate-
rial occurrence in time and space. The taxonomies of philosophy of signs strive to 
clarify all this. Different supports constrain the sort of referential relation(s) that a 
sign can have. Conventional imputations must be re-applicable, so only as a type 
can a sign-vehicle have a symbolic bond to its object. Causation requires particu-
lars, so only as a token can a sign-vehicle have an indexical bond to its object. 
Similarity requires a shared quality, so only as a tone can a sign-vehicle enjoy an 
iconic bond to the quality referred to.
We can use these semiotic distinctions to improve our understanding of con-
scious phenomena. Loar asserts that “[p]henomenal qualities vary in generality: I 
can note that a state of mine has what all smells share, or that it is the smell of new 
mown grass” (1990, 81). Viewed from the standpoint of philosophy of signs, Loar 
glosses over several distinctions. To say that a given quality is shared by other expe-
riences is already to enter into some sort of comparison, and thus to take one quality 
as the (in this case, iconic) sign of another (or others). Also, to say that a smell is a 
smell of something besides that smell (like new mown grass) is to confess that the 
quality at hand has already entered into semiosis (Peirce 1998, 320). Now, there is 
nothing wrong or inherently problematic in noting a similitude between qualities, 
nor is there anything wrong or inherently problematic in the idea of taking a quality 
as the quality “of” a certain thing. What is wrong and problematic is the assumption 
that one can do all this whilst handling the simple quality itself, irrespective of its 
functional role or involvement in relations.
An icon is a sign-vehicle that has its representational power intrinsically, solely 
in virtue of the quality it has/is. A blue thing, for example, will retain an ability to 
relate to similar blue things, even if no other blue tokens actually exist. Its tone is a 
sufficient guarantor of a (realized or unrealized) iconic bond. Peirce drew on the 
views of Duns Scotus in crafting this account (Boler 1963). For Scotus, “this white 
thing can exist without similarity. If another white thing comes into being, then 
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similarity begins to exist in this white thing. Hence, the foundation of the relation 
can exist without the relation” (Weinberg 1965, 101). This may be what Loar was 
trying to express with the claim that “[y]ou can forget particular instances and still 
judge ‘another one of those’” (1997, 601). However, one must not gloss over the 
fact that, when a similar token has not entered the picture, the similarity of the lone 
tone is merely potential (and so cannot allow judgements like “another one of 
those”).
Chalmers is right that Mary is able “to think demonstrative-qualitative thoughts 
in which both a demonstrative and a qualitative concept are deployed” (2004, 186). 
Prescissive analysis allows us to make sense of this double-duty. Consider the fol-
lowing situation:
In reference to its object, this footprint is a perfect icon, although reversed like the image of 
a person looking at himself in a mirror. But it is at the same time the index of a presence on 
the island, and not just any presence […]. The sign in itself has its own existence, an exis-
tence of a non-sign, one might say, just as an ambassador, although representing his coun-
try, is what he is in reference to himself […]. (Deledalle 2000, 105)
If the footprint leads interpretation to a foot in virtue of its similarity with that 
foot, then it is the outline (of either the foot or the imprint) that matters. What per-
mits iconicity is the quality of the sign-vehicle, not its causal impact with an object. 
If, however, a footprint leads interpretation to a foot in virtue of the causal contact 
it had with a foot, then it is the actual soil-foot dyad that matters. As for the word 
“footprint,” nothing but interpretation holds its reference together. The symbol/
index/icon distinction thus marks out three different ways sign-vehicles can be 
linked to their objects. Peirce rightly insisted that these referential relations “are all 
indispensable in all reasoning” (1931–58, 1.369; see his 1998, 10).
Recently though, it has become fashionable among some Peirce scholars to 
exclude similarity from the semiotic repertoire. In at least one instance, Peirce wrote 
that “a great distinguishing property of the icon is that by the direct observation of 
it other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those which suffice to 
determine its construction” (1931–58, 2.279). This asymmetry between construc-
tion and discovery certainly deserves further study, but it seems to have gained an 
uncritical acceptance. In fact, some papers have begun to slide from saying, as 
Peirce cautiously did, that the construction/discovery asymmetry is “a” distinguish-
ing feature of iconicity, to saying that it is “the” distinguishing feature. Chiara 
Ambrosio, for instance, makes it look like Peirce put the construction/discovery 
asymmetry “at the centre of his notion of iconicity” (2014, 263). In so doing, she 
follows Christopher Hookway, who held that “[t]he key of iconicity is not perceived 
resemblance between the sign and what it signifies but rather the possibility of mak-
ing new discoveries about the object of a sign through observing features of the sign 
itself” (2000, 102). Exegetically, this attempt to bypass similarity faces a tall hurdle 
since, as Chevalier (2015, 45) points out, Peirce used the term “icon” and “likeness” 
interchangeably. I do not want to veer into an exegetical dispute, so let me give 
tangible reasons to reject the construction/discovery view and retain the similarity 
view.
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Suppose I use a smart phone to text you the following letter: M. Then, one min-
ute later, I text you this letter: R. I instruct you to write all of these letters down as 
they come. Thus, keeping pace, you eventually receive and transcribe the following 
sequence: A, N, D, M, R, S, D, U, R, and so on. After a while, you realize that, 
unbeknownst to you, you are constructing the novel Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s 
Stone. Now, a book is a symbol, if anything is. Yet, the sequence of letters fully 
satisfies the definition of an icon suggested by the construction/discovery view, 
since by the direct observation of it other truths concerning its object can be discov-
ered than those which suffice to determine its construction. You can learn about the 
exciting adventures of the students at Hogwarts, discover idiosyncratic tidbits about 
their personalities, and so on—just by assembling a list of typographical 
characters.
Consider this other counter-example. I have just said that a blue tone is an icon 
of any blue tone. Yet, taking the construction/discovery view at face-value, it may be 
asked: what “more” can one possibly learn from the observation of a simple blue 
tone? To say, for example, that blue is the colour of oceans, or that blue is a peaceful 
colour, is to import an external piece of information that is not itself present in that 
colour. As thinking agents with past experiences, we are privy to collateral data, so 
we can always let blue stand for more. Yet, strictly speaking, nothing more than blue 
can be learned by observing solely that lone quality. Hookway is clear that “a sign 
resembles its object if, and only if, study of the sign can yield new information 
about the object” (2000, 102). Although the similarity between blue and blue is 
arguably a paradigmatic exemplar of iconicity, it fails to fit this construction/discov-
ery demand.
I submit that a tenable definition of iconicity ought to have excluded my first 
counter-example about the string of letters and included my second counter- example 
about the simple colour blue. What Peirce said about the potential for discovery 
might be applicable to diagrams, but it would be a mistake to abandon the similarity- 
based view of iconicity.
Philosophers have often been squeamish about countenancing similarities, so it 
is predictable that Peirceans trying to conform to mainstream expectations should 
jump at the opportunity to switch to a definition that spares them from endorsing 
what is, in some circles, an embarrassment. Despite helping herself to the term 
“icon” and purporting to develop “A General Theory of Signs,” Ruth Millikan 
(1984, 83–158) does everything she can to avoid countenancing real similarities. 
Likewise, despite his interest in the varieties of reference, Gareth Evans refuses to 
acknowledge mind-independent similarities as a possible channel. Evans accepts 
that one thing could resemble another only “if it strikes people as like that other 
thing” (2002, 292). Analyses of similarity “anchored in the reactions they occasion 
in people” (Evans 2002, 294) have been amply explored—even by semioticians like 
Charles Morris (1971), Millikan’s teacher. However, such behavioural approaches 
leave unanswered (or rather unasked) why these reactions occur in the first place.
Looking back, it is distressing to see how early iconicity got discarded, and how 
thin the grounds of that dismissal really were. One stock complaint is that pictures 
are misleading. “Of course, pictures may be misleading. But, so may sentences” 
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(Moktefi and Shin 2013, v). Another complaint, initially voiced by Nelson Goodman 
(1976, 38), is that everything is in some way similar to everything else. This, on the 
face of it, is untrue. Clearly, I am more like you than I am like a cloud of helium. Of 
course, one could add a host of stipulations to play up the similarities and narrow 
the difference(s), but then the stipulations would account for the (stretched) sense of 
sameness. In any event, even if it could be shown that everything can resemble 
everything, that would still be insufficient to discard similarities from the semiotic 
repertoire. After all, every material thing is (by transitivity) currently in some sort of 
causal interaction with everything else, but we hardly dismiss causality on that 
account (for a stepwise rebuttal of Goodman’s grievances, see Stjernfelt 1999).
Frederik Stjernfelt contends that similarity is not a defining feature of iconicity, 
since “[s]imilarity is generally symmetrical: if a is similar to b, then b is also similar 
to a; while sign-relations are generally asymmetrical: if a signifies b, it does not 
follow that b signifies a” (2007, 49). It is true that similarity is symmetrical. It is also 
true that, in any triadic sign, interpretation will impose an asymmetrical sense of 
direction going from sign-vehicle to object. However, it is important to stress that 
this asymmetry is beholden to interpretation, not to the sign-vehicle or object. Since 
the overlaying of a means-end order on qualities that are otherwise identical can just 
as easily be turned the other way around, every object iconically referred to by a 
sign-vehicle is at the same time a potential sign-vehicle in the opposite direction. 
This is obscured by the twin facts that there is no reason to prefer one quality over 
the other, yet an interpretant will always privilege one sense of direction in a given 
instance. To the extent the sign-relation truly latched on to a real similarity between 
a and b, nothing in principle would have barred the reverse from happening, letting 
b do the “standing for.” This means that, if an ordinary person looks like a famous 
movie star, then it is as legitimate to find that the famous movie star looks like the 
ordinary person (for each seesaw on this biconditional, a new interpretant is 
spawned).
Resemblance is mind-dependent in the sense that there must be an organism with 
an appropriate sensory system to deem one experience to be similar to another expe-
rience. The Peircean account that I promote has plenty of room for the effects which 
icons can have on such organisms. Still, my account regards those interpretants as 
effects, not causes, of underlying similarities. They come Third. For example, it is 
imperative to the evolutionary success of camouflage that the likeness between, say, 
an insect and a leaf, be truly mind-independent and not merely a wilful association 
(Maran 2003; Sebeok 1976, 1440–1441). Even in the absence of intention and cau-
sality, interpretation—which in semiotics is not the sole preserve of humans (Sebeok 
2003)—can capitalize on the shared quality to let one thing stand for another.
Because an icon presupposes nothing but its own quality, its referential power “is 
not necessarily dependent upon its ever actually determining an Interpretant, nor 
even upon its actually having an Object” (Peirce 1998, 273). Consequently, the only 
way to eliminate the iconic potential of a tone is to eliminate that tone itself. Short 
of doing so, the ability to be linked to similar things always lies in wait, in germinal 
form, simply because any quality would resemble whatever would be like it. Of 
course, the mere talk of “another” tone would entail that we are no longer dealing 
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with tones but with tokens, since juxtaposition or comparison presupposes numeri-
cal plurality. Still, when two tokens are related in virtue of their shared quality, it is 
the underlying tone they share that matters, not those particular tokens. Therefore, 
to understand iconicity, one has to prescind. Doing so reveals the icon to be an idle 
sign, something that “can only be a fragment of a completer sign” (Peirce 1998, 
306).
The meaning objection rightfully asks “how can we refer to [our experience of 
red] if, by assumption, it cannot have any causal effect on our thought?” (Gomes 
2005, 78). My suggestion has been that, because iconic signs ride on tones that are 
prior to numerically distinct tokens, they can get in touch with their objects without 
touching them.
4.3  How Low can we Go?
The Ancient Greek atomists were arguably the first to maintain that anything com-
plex can be decomposed into simpler parts. Essentially, they drew on the following 
inference rule: P and Q, therefore P. The atomists deployed this inference in meta-
physics, but Leibniz later saw that it is applicable to any domain, philosophy of 
mind included (Blamauer 2011). The logical implication of simplicity by complex-
ity is so compelling that even an eliminativist like Paul Churchland must grant it:
[T]he bulk of one’s sensational life is characterized, not by simplicity, but by an extraordi-
nary and ever-changing complexity. Listening to a conversation, looking around a flower 
garden, tasting a braised-lamb stew, smelling the aromas in a wood-working shop—our 
sensations in such cases display intricacies that are amazing. And not always obvious. A 
young child may not appreciate that the distinctive taste of her first ice-cream cone resolves 
itself into sensations of sweetness, creaminess, and strawberry. And it may take her awhile 
to learn that such decompositions are both common and useful to keep track of. For the 
complexities we encounter are indeed composed, quite often, of simpler elements or consti-
tuting dimensions. In time, we do learn many of those simpler dimensions. A dinner-table 
conversation contains my brother’s unique voice as an identifiable element; the complex 
flower-garden displays the striking orange of a typical poppy blossom; the lamb stew dis-
plays the distinctive taste of thyme, sprinkled into the mix at the outset; and the smell of 
yellow cedar stands out from the other smells in the wood shop, at least to a seasoned car-
penter. Each of these particular qualitative features of one’s inner phenomenological life is 
certainly a simpler dimension of a more complex whole. (Churchland 2011, 32–33)
If we begin (as I believe we must) with a premise of complexity and grant (as I 
believe we should) that anything complex can be decomposed, then we are led to 
conclude that, in principle, such decomposition would have to bottom out at some 
point. So, in prescissively analyzing consciousness, how low can we go? With 
Peirce, I would say: as low as Firstness.
The first removals can be regarded as “real” in Scotus’ sense. For example, 
“[w]hen I see the red book and hear the bird singing, there seems to be no good 
reason to deny that I could have a visually identical experience without hearing the 
bird singing, and so on” (Bayne and Chalmers 2003, 43). One way of separating 
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these visual and auditory experiences is to close one’s eyes or use ear plugs. 
However, if we want to decompose the complexity of conscious life into simpler 
and simpler parts, then eventually only a “formal” distinction will do.
In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Bertrand Russell wrote that “[t]he sim-
plest imaginable facts are those which consist in the possession of a quality by some 
particular thing. Such facts, say, as ‘This is white’” (1998, 59). Typically, when one 
says “This is white,” one tries to identify/locate a white thing. Now, a white thing 
can be located only if it is amid non-white things. One of those non-white things 
must be the agent doing the pointing. Thus, pointing presupposes at least two rela-
tions: a relation to other things and a relation to an agent. This already involves a 
certain level of complexity. Hence, I do not think Russell was quite right when he 
said that “This is white” is the lowest one can go.
The sign-vehicle “This” is not white; in fact, here it is black (and, if spoken, it 
has no colour at all). Hence, in order to successfully use “This” as a sign of white 
things, one has to bring a token of “This” near a token white thing so that interpreta-
tion can relate the two. Russell may be right that “This is white” is the simplest fact 
imaginable, but I see no reason why factuality should be the stopping point of our 
analysis. As David Pears explains, Russell thought that “when we find that we can-
not push the analysis of words any further, we can plant a flag recording the discov-
ery of genuine logical atoms” (in Russell 1998, 5). When one does Peircean 
philosophy of signs, one can plant a flag further.
Peirce and Russell never met (Nubiola 1996, 283). Russell would later write that 
“I am—I confess to my shame—an illustration of the undue neglect from which 
Peirce has suffered in Europe” (foreword to Feibleman 1946, xv). Whatever their 
differences, Peirce and Russell both agreed that whatever is complex is composed 
of simples. “[N]o analysis,” Peirce writes, “whether in logic, in chemistry, or in any 
other science, is satisfactory, unless it be thorough, that is, unless it separates the 
compound into components each entirely homogeneous in itself, and therefore free 
from the smallest admixture of any of the others” (1931–58, 4.548). Discussing 
qualia, Dennett remarks that “[s]ince they are ‘simple’ or ‘homogeneous’ there is 
nothing to get hold of when trying to describe such a property to one unacquainted 
with the particular instance in question” (1988, 385). Dennett finds this ineffability 
repugnant. The possibility that language cannot convey everything is, for him, 
unthinkable. I disagree (in fact, the belief that language cannot convey everything is 
arguably the defining belief of a philosopher of signs).
Because mainstream philosophy of language resorts only to indices, it will 
always have to contend with a minimal duality or Secondeness between pointer and 
pointed. Peirce’s philosophy of signs countenances such indices, but it also col-
lapses the duality of indexicality to reach an iconic merger. Unfortunately, with a 
few exceptions (like Giardino and Greenberg 2015), philosophy of mind is currently 
blind to this portion of the semiotic spectrum. Consider David Papineau. In the 
course of his investigations of consciousness, Papineau writes that “[a] first thought 
might be that perceptual concepts refer in virtue of the fact that exercises of them 
resemble their referents,” and then immediately adds “I assume that this suggestion 
does not need to be taken seriously” (2002, 111). Why not? As an heir to Russell’s 
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(1910–11) acquaintance/description distinction, Papineau assumes that our knowl-
edge of the world derives from two (and only two) channels. Since I think Peirce is 
right to countenance similarity-based reference, I do not share Papineau’s 
dismissal.
Ironically, no one working within a Russellian framework has come closer than 
Papineau to independently reconstructing an account of iconicity. Papineau quali-
fies as a phenomenal concept strategist, since he holds that the apparent distinctness 
of qualia is an artifact of the concepts we use to refer to them. Thus, like me, 
“Papineau diagnoses the apparent threats to physicalism posed by the phenomena of 
consciousness by locating the source of anti-physicalist intuitions in features of our 
thinking rather than in non-physical features of reality” (Crane 2005, 155).
According to Papineau, when a subject undergoes novel experiences, her “brain 
is lastingly altered in certain ways” (2003, 359). The alteration results in the acqui-
sition of a “stored sensory template.” Papineau uses this to explain what happens to 
Mary in the knowledge argument. The template that Mary stores can allow her 
“imaginatively to recreate and introspectively to reidentify an experience she could 
previously think about only in a third-person way” (ibid.). If Papineau is right that 
“the introspective identification of some experience requires that it is compared 
with some model or template stored in the brain,” then “it would scarcely be surpris-
ing that we should need an original version of the experience in order to form the 
template for such comparisons” (ibid., 358–359). So far, I agree with all of this. Yet, 
Papineau stops short of acknowledging that the “comparison” at hand is similarity- 
based. This undermines his account. I therefore want to rid his account of the linger-
ing Russellian assumptions that hold it back.
Using Russellian materials, Papineau (2002, 116–121) originally built what he 
called the “quotational-indexical” account of phenomenal concepts. However, he 
eventually came to think that indexicality imposes too strong a constraint on when 
and where phenomenal concepts can be exercised. Papineau’s defection is reminis-
cent of Jackson’s, as both were led to ponder the troublesome intersection of demon-
strative reference and epiphenomenalism. The indexical sign relation at work in 
demonstratives turns on physical presence. One has to be suitably “near” something 
in order to refer to it by pointing. Likewise, something quoted must be present in 
order for the mentioning device to do its work. “Linguistic quotation marks, after 
all, are a species of demonstrative construction: a use of quotation marks will refer 
to that word, whatever it is, that happens to be made salient by being placed within 
the quotation marks” (Papineau 2007, 121). This will do in most circumstances. 
But, since qualia are not physically present in any straightforward manner, the anal-
ogy with quotation seems to bring little aid.
Led by these considerations, Papineau eventually rebuilt his account so that 
nothing turns on the actual presence of what is referred to. His recent work still 
retains the idea that phenomenal concepts involve the very quality referred to. This 
is the cornerstone of my account. However, the standard Russellian distinctions—
specifically the type/token and description/acquaintance bipartitions—doom 
Papineau’s efforts to failure.
4 Enlarging the Menu of Referential Options to Include Icons
65
Consider first the type/token bipartition. Clearly, any concept wedded solely to a 
particular token is bound to be severely limited in its use. After all, the taste of the 
ice cream one ate on the occasion of one’s seventh birthday—if treated as a token—
is a taste found in no other ice cream. The Peircean semiotician will of course notice 
that what is relevant in discussing the taste of ice cream is a tone; but a theorist 
unable to call on this crucial notion will recoil to her only remaining option when 
rejecting tokens as inappropriate. Predictably, then, Papineau wonders: “Can phe-
nomenal concepts pick out experiential particulars as well as types?” (2007, 123). 
This question brings us back to the dead-end discussed earlier. Types cannot impact 
one’s sensory organs, only tokens of types can; so any theory which hopes to account 
for phenomenal consciousness by invoking perceptual encounters with types is 
surely ill-fated.
To be sure, we do say, as Peirce [1931–58, 4.537] pointed out, that there is but one word 
“the” in the English language. But this is no more to be taken au pied de lettre than is the 
statement that there is only one poisonous lizard in the continental United States […]. There 
is not one lizard which is the “type-lizard,” and many other lizards which are the token 
lizards. Likewise, there is not one word which is the type, and many other words which are 
the tokens. (Willard 1983, 287)
If philosophers of mind have been led by their recent discussion of phenomenal 
concepts to conclude that one can somehow “see” the type-lizard, then something 
has gone wrong along the way.
Using the full resources of the type/token/tone tripartition discussed in Chap. 3, 
one does not “reencounter” a type (Papineau 2007, 123); rather, a type is what per-
mits one to encounter tokens of the same tone.
To further illustrate how a limited menu of options strong-arms Papineau into 
adopting unsatisfactory conclusions, consider the acquaintance/description biparti-
tion. Knowledge by description can be detached from its worldly site of origin and 
communicated second-hand. Descriptions can therefore work just fine even though 
the object described is absent. Knowledge by acquaintance, by contrast, requires the 
actual presence of its object. In order to count as knowledge, in absentia discourse 
must eventually connect with in praesentia reference. Indeed, the whole point of 
Jacksons’ knowledge argument is that mere description is insufficient; at least when 
it comes to conveying the content of experiential feels. Papineau accepts this, since 
by his lights “[i]t seems clear that the preemergence Mary does lack some concepts 
of color experiences” (2007, 111). Papineau is thus in a bind. Either he maintains 
that qualia can be referred to by description—which is what the knowledge argu-
ment denies; or he maintains that qualia can be referred to causally—which is dif-
ficult to make sense of in the case of qualia. Like Papineau, discussants who rely on 
Russellian notions bounce between these two options to no avail. I submit that, to 
dismount this seesaw, one needs to add the Peircean concept of iconic reference.
The employment of one yellow object to signify another yellow object by means 
of their yellowness (and not, say, their proximity to one another) does not permit 
one to dissociate questions pertaining to “the medium and the message” (to echo 
McLuhan), since these admit of a univocal answer, to wit, “yellow” (see Champagne 
2015a, 537–539). As William Seager writes: “What can be called ‘immediate 
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 consciousness’ just has the peculiar reflexive property of allowing an appreciation 
of both the information being conveyed and the mode of conveyance” (1999, 93). 
Given this overlap, the quality which acts as a sign-vehicle cannot be omitted—on 
pain of omitting the very passage that makes that quality play a semiotic role in the 
first place. This explains why “[m]any phenomenal kinds can be referred to only 
through the content shared by experiences of the kind at issue” (Nida-Rümelin 
2008, 310).
The icon is capable of “bringing its interpreter face to face with the very charac-
ter signified” (Peirce 1998, 307). Echoing this, Papineau writes that “phenomenal 
concepts are too close to their referents for it to seem possible that those same con-
cepts could refer to something else,” since “the referent seems to be part of the 
concept itself” (2007, 132). Of course, given that an icon refers to a quality by being 
that very quality, this suggestion that the referent is “part of” the concept is not at all 
fanciful. Nonetheless, because Papineau lacks the notional resources to properly 
express this idea, he undermines his own conclusions. Tim Crane, for instance, 
complains that:
[I]t seems to me entirely incredible that when one thinks about, say, pain, one must, as a 
necessary part of that very act of thinking, have an experience which in any way resembles 
pain. When the narrator of E. M. Forster’s Where Angels Fear to Tread says that ‘physical 
pain is almost too terrible to bear,’ he is clearly intending to talk about pain in the phenom-
enal sense, pain as a feeling, an event in the stream of consciousness. In any normal sense 
of “phenomenal,” then—any sense that relates it to its etymology and its traditional philo-
sophical meaning—he is employing the phenomenal concept of pain. But in order to under-
stand this remark, and therefore grasp the concepts which it expresses, I do not think I need 
to undergo, as a part of that very understanding, an experience which is in any sense painful. 
Yet this is what Papineau seems to be saying. (Crane 2005, 156)
Armed with the full symbol/index/icon taxonomy, we can come to Papineau’s 
defence. All parties agree that describing something exclusively by symbols is a 
non-starter. Russell would be the first to agree. After all, “Russell was as aware as 
anyone else that not everything can be thought of by description, on pain of the 
whole system of identification failing to be tied down to a unique set of objects 
[…]” (Evans 2002, 45). Hence, tracking the inferential relations among words is not 
enough (Champagne 2016). The knowledge argument brings this out in a particu-
larly memorable way. While sequestered in her cave from birth, Mary could have 
been taught by unscrupulous experimenters to take Dungeons and Dragons seri-
ously and thereby make coherent functional responses about “ghouls” and “trolls.” 
Hence, given that on one level “pain” is a symbol like any other, there is surely 
something right in Crane’s claim that this lexical concept does not have to be pain-
ful. Yet, if one is to truly comprehend what that word refers to, then whatever quality 
one will have retained from such token episodes will itself be related to pain states 
by being able to indexically spot a similar state (if and when it presents itself) and 
have an iconic sense of “what” the quality is.
The second conjunct here is crucial, since it distinguishes the fine-grained appre-
ciation of qualities that iconicity (via prescission) permits. The concept of pain can 
indexically refer to past experience(s), but at some point that concept will have to 
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share the experiential quality itself, on pain of having no real clue what that feeling 
is like. In other words, if one asks the narrator of Forster’s book “What is pain?,” 
that narrator is free to answer “What I experienced last Friday;” and when asked 
what was experienced last Friday, he can in turn answer “What I experienced the 
Monday before”—and so on. I have no quarrel with any of this. Yet, if the person 
really possesses the relevant phenomenal concept, it cannot be anaphora all the way. 
Signs are not memes (Kilpinen 2008).
Peircean semiotics arranges icons, indices, and symbols in an ordinal fashion, 
such that the more developed grades of reference subsume the lesser ones but not 
vice versa (Peirce 1998, 9). Interestingly, this triadic pecking order is confirmed by 
empirical data. Consider the icon “IIIIII” and the symbol “6,” which have a common 
referent but relate to it in different ways, the former non-conventionally, the latter 
conventionally. If symbolic reference could depart completely from iconicity, as 
Crane’s criticism suggests, then one would expect the interpretation of Arabic 
numerals like “6” to be untainted by whatever cognitive and mnemonic limits 
plague its iconic counterpart “IIIIII.” However, studies have shown that subjects 
asked to pick the largest among pairs of symbols like “4 versus 9” demonstrate a lag 
in their response times akin to figuring out “IIII versus IIIIIIIII.” “These results 
strongly suggest that the process used in judgements of differences in magnitude 
between numerals is the same as, or analogous to, the process involved in judge-
ments of inequality for physical continua” (Moyer and Landauer 1967, 1520; for 
more recent studies, see Carey 2009, 117–156).
Now, if there is evidence that a symbol such as “6”—a quantitative concept not 
exactly known for its poetic connotations—is in some way IIIIII-like, why should it 
be absurd to agree with Papineau that “[e]ven if imaginings of pains don’t really 
hurt, they can share some of the phenomenal unpleasantness of real pains” (2002, 
174)? One could also look to scientific and phenomenological studies which sug-
gest that mere contemplation of a word or phrase primes the body for a host of 
motor and affective responses, such that reading “pain” is in some sense experienc-
ing a trace of the relevant feeling (Gallagher 2006; Shapiro 2011, 70–113; Thompson 
2007). So, if a novel would be written by a congenitally blind autistic literary savant 
who has no sense of fine grained emotion concepts, my Peircean semiotic theory 
predicts that, to the extent it would be considered a good novel by readers, this 
author would have relied on informant(s) who enjoyed the relevant experiences 
(these informants would then be the analogues of programmers who feed instruc-
tions and symbols in a Turing machine).
The interesting question is not whether concepts need to always resemble the 
things they refer to; there is a clear sense in which they do not (to that extent, 
Crane’s criticism of Papineau is trivially right). The interesting question is whether 
mastery of symbols and indices alone could ever suffice to secure reference to the 
“feel” of experiences. After all, from a developmental perspective, iconic compe-
tence is often (and perhaps always) the gateway to symbolic competence. It is 
doubtful anyone ever mastered “6” without first mastering “IIIIII” (Resnik 1982, 
98). Some biologists conversant with semiotic theory (e.g., Kull 2009; Deacon 
1997) believe that this holds on the evolutionary ladder as well. Holistically drawing 
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inferences along a symbol-to-symbol axis certainly remains possible (especially by 
machines that have never known otherwise). It is also possible for one not to feel a 
hint of pain when one reads or writes the word “pain.” But, if one never does—any-
where, anytime, under any circumstance—one can hardly lay claim to what the 
word means.
Declan Smithies (2011, 22–25) argues that, unless a subject is phenomenally 
conscious of the object(s) of her demonstratives, she cannot rationally defend her 
claims when challenged. If challenged, it may be okay for Mary to refer to whatever 
her textbooks told her. But it is not okay for the authors of those textbooks to have 
never enjoyed the relevant icon(s). I thus agree with Peirce that “every indirect 
method of communicating an idea must depend for its establishment upon the use 
of an icon” (1931–58, 2.278).
This point can be put another way. Suppose that a subject were to possess a given 
colour concept solely in virtue of having been told about its relations to darker and 
lighter colours. Being told, say, that amethyst is midway between purple and pink 
could conceivably be informative to someone who has experienced purple and pink. 
If so, then that person’s concept of amethyst would amount to a rule (involving 
several relata), and the unfamiliar quality sandwiched between purple and pink 
would become akin to a conclusion that can be inferred once one knows the relevant 
premises. Since the rule applies to a spectrum that is ordered, there is a temptation 
to dismiss the need to experience the midway quality itself (e.g., Churchland 1992, 
102–110). Yet, that spectrum actually vindicates qualia. The colours sandwiching 
an unfamiliar shade remain unproblematic only provided that one does not slide the 
very sandwiching relation to either side. Without an iconic access to qualia though, 
one has to (constantly) make that slide. The premises adduced to secure a supposed 
inference of the quality therefore turn out to be insecure conclusions of their own, 
leading to a regress. This explains why “[o]ne cannot give an informative answer 
about seeing orange to the congenitally blind” (Pitt 2004, 31).
David Rosenthal believes that “[w]e cannot acquiesce in the unhelpful thought 
that we all know the qualitative state when we see it” (2005, 196). Why not? 
Rosenthal reasons, quite rightly, that if experiential familiarity with a quality is 
needed, then “[t]hat would amount to picking the phenomenon in purely ostensive 
terms, which leaves too much open for us to tell whether we can explain the phe-
nomenon in a way that makes it intelligible” (ibid.). I differ from Rosenthal in being 
open to the possibility that, when we move past the range of symbolic description, 
we move past the range of intelligibility. Language is like a tour guide who can 
show you around Prague. No matter how good the guide, you still need to tour 
Prague.
On a common sense level, most of us grasp that when a dictionary defines a 
colour by citing other colours, its accomplishment is partial. The Jacksonian 
insight—present in Russell and developed by recent phenomenal concept strate-
gists—is that symbols without indices are empty. Peircean semiotics takes this 
insight further by holding that indices without icons are empty. Papineau heeds the 
moral regarding the insufficiency of descriptions, adds to it a novel recognition of 
acquaintance’s insufficiency with respect to qualities, and then tries to construct a 
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model that could remedy this. The success of his positive suggestions is partial, but 
his desiderata are on target. In a coloured world, iconicity trumps indexicality as a 
more plausible way to explain reference to phenomenal experience(s).
4.4  Focusing on What Matters
I do not think that, before her exposure, Mary could use her exhaustive neurophysio-
logical premises to draw a conclusion about the qualitative feel of a colour. Yet, even 
if we allow that Mary could somehow transmute her knowledge of quantities like 
wavelengths into a knowledge of colour tones (following the suggestion in Dennett 
1991, 399–401), she would still have to pick out the right tokens to prove her mastery 
of colour concepts to her peers. Therefore, the question of reference does not go away 
(especially for the “heterophenomenology” championed by Dennett).
When Mary exits her black and white confines, the world provides her with the 
exemplars needed to prompt and convey the relevant experiences. So, suppose that, 
coming face to face with a red thing for the first time, she utters “This is what red 
looks like.” On my analysis, her sentence involves symbolic, indexical, and iconic 
reference. The symbolic component is most obvious in the linguistic association 
that makes “red” stand for red. The indexical component, roughly captured by 
“this,” tracks the things that prompt the qualitative experiences she wants to elicit in 
others (Chemero 2006, 64). These symbolic and indexical components are rela-
tively well understood. However, the iconic component of Mary’s utterance, roughly 
captured by “looks like,” is far less understood. Even so, there is a growing sense 
that, without some sort of qualitative conveyance, Mary’s demonstrative appeal will 
not fully succeed. I am trying to clarify this last step.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that the linguistic and gestural signs emit-
ted by people are available to you, but that their minds are hidden. As Edmond 
Wright (2008) points out, mutual trust can quickly seal this divide. Instead of cast-
ing me as zombie for whom “all is dark inside” (Chalmers 1996, 96), you can decide 
to believe what I say when I report experiencing a colour. My prescissive analysis 
cannot eliminate this need for mutual trust, because focusing on a specific quality is 
a voluntary act. Of course, in order to verify whether convergence on a shared qual-
ity has been achieved, we have to start talking and gesturing again. Indeed, “when I 
describe this consciousness as the idea of a quality in itself, I merely, by the laws of 
speech, am forced to seize upon the character of separateness in order to let another 
person know what sort of consciousness I have in view” (Peirce 1931–58, 6.230). 
But, when the showing and telling is done right, subjects can genuinely appreciate 
what it’s like for each other to enjoy a given phenomenal experience.
Seen in this light, symbols and indices are devices that fine-tune the coupling of 
two people’s experiences. The better the fine-tuning, the less the epistemic risk. 
Papineau (2002, 66–67) doubts that an indexical construction like “This feeling” 
can select a specific quality in the manifold stream of consciousness. But, in a suf-
ficiently impoverished setting, there is not much there to be wrong about. It would 
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be gratuitous, for instance, for two people to stand in the vast white expanse of the 
science-fiction movie THX 1138 and doubt that the other person is experiencing 
white too. The people in that setting would appreciate their shared experience by 
looking outward, not inward, so an account of qualitative experience does not nec-
essarily have to depend on introspection (Delaney 1979).
Coming close to this account, Papineau writes that the “characteristic feature [of 
phenomenal thoughts] is that the conscious referent itself is involved in the vehicle 
of thought” (2006, 104). This unique feature of icons is brought out by the much- 
discussed transparency argument (Harman 1990; Tye 2002). Usually, in the trans-
parency argument, one is told to pick a thing in one’s surroundings and to 
“concentrate as hard as you can, not on the colours of the objects, but on the quality 
of your experience of those colours” (Carruthers 2000, 123). Yet, if one truly fol-
lows those instructions and “concentrates” on a colour, one can no longer contrast 
that quality with whatever other colour(s) delimit(s) it. So, unless one wishes to 
explicitly defend gestaltist commitments, the usual set-up is worded somewhat 
carelessly.
Despite changes in terminology, the terms of the current debate are essentially 
those captured in Searle (1983, 59): either a vehicle intervenes, in which case it 
blocks access to the object; or access to the object is achieved, in which case no 
vehicle intervened (Kind 2010). In my view, what the transparency argument estab-
lishes is that one would be impotent to tell whether the qualitative experience one 
undergoes is “internal” or “external” to one. Indeed, under the stringent exclusion-
ary conditions just outlined, it would be just as reasonable to interpret a coloured 
expanse as an opaque screen as it is to interpret it as some physical object transpar-
ently present before one (Ransdell 1979). What deserves endorsement, then, is not 
one of these two glosses, but an agnostic mid-way, since both options are equally 
viable (until and unless further experience is allowed to enter the picture).
Take the example of a blue tone. As Peirce pointed out, there is nothing in this 
quality that mandates the existence of another quality. Speaking strictly as a logi-
cian, Peirce wrote that “[t]o suppose […] that there is a flow of time, or any degree 
of vividness, be it high or low, seems to me quite as uncalled for as to suppose that 
there is freedom of the press or a magnetic field” (1931–58, 1.305). Hence, strange 
as it may seem, “it is conceivable, or supposable, that the quality of blue should 
usurp the whole mind […]” (Peirce 1992, 290). Peirce insists that this supposition 
of absence can be performed around any quality. In what is perhaps the most radical 
move of his diagrammatic logic, Peirce removed the rim of a Euler circle (Deledalle 
2000, 15). He explained his approach as follows: “We must begin by getting dia-
grammatic notions of signs from which we strip away, at first, all reference to the 
mind; and after we have made those ideas just as distinct as our notion of a prime 
number or of an oval line, we may then consider, if need be, what are the peculiar 
characteristics of a mental sign […]” (quoted in Colapietro 1989, 44). What, Peirce 
asked, remains of a Euler circle once its boundary is gone and its area spreads out 
without obstruction? The answer, Peirce held, is Firstness: a qualitative expanse that 
awaits further specification.
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William Seager notes that “[o]ne of the core intuitions about intrinsic properties 
is that they are the properties that things have ‘in themselves,’ the properties that 
something would retain even if it was the only thing in the universe” (2006, 141). If 
we consider blue as “the only thing in the universe,” it can hardly be called a “thing” 
anymore. That is why it is best characterized as a tone, not a token. It cannot be 
counted.
The blank sheet at the base of Peirce’s diagrammatic logic is so basic that it 
applies to philosophy of mind. As James notes, when considering a white paper 
without any contrasts, there is “no ‘pointing,’ but rather an all-round embracing of 
the paper by the thought” (1975, 31). Firstness is the canvass of all communication 
and cognition. It is also the bare minimum that arguing parties must accept if their 
disagreement is ever to be resolved (see Peirce 1931–58, 4.431; as well as Pietarinen 
2006, 60). Clearly, everything that is asserted can be asserted; everything that is 
thought can be thought. Thus, however bizarre it may seem, we have no basis for 
denying this modal pre-condition, because “[t]hat which underlies a phenomenon 
and determines it, thereby is, itself, in a measure, a phenomenon” (Peirce 1998, 2).
Since the unbounded expanse of Firstness is a ground that merely awaits sign- 
action, it cannot be communicated. Hence, if we want to be consistent, we have to 
concede that describing Firstness is, by definition, impossible:
Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his 
eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own exis-
tence,—that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, 
vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false 
to it. (Peirce 1992, 248)
Wittgenstein (2002, 187) suggested that some of our most problematic intu-
itions—and deepest mystical sentiments—stem from our ability to conceive of a 
bounded whole. Interestingly, Keltner and Haidt (2003, 303–304) have identified 
the two main traits of religious awe as vastness and the need to mentally accom-
modate that vastness. If we are dealing with a quality deprived of all relational 
contrasts, we get vastness, but the need for accommodation cannot be met. Peircean 
Firstness can thus inspire theological speculations (see Slater 2016). Strictly 
 speaking though, no religious tenets follow from a commitment to Firstness. I may 
not be able to put into words the taste of pickled relish, but I do have to put a token 
spoonful of that condiment in a mouth to iconically convey what tone I mean. 
Hence, “[t]he ineffable is not something mystical or mysterious; it is merely that 
which evades description. It evades description, but it pervades experience” (Short 
2006, 171).
Of course, every sheet of paper that I have ever encountered had a rim. So, judged 
by induction, what Peirce says about Firstness is false. Yet, if one goes in the oppo-
site direction, by deduction, the claim that such complex facts can be prescissively 
decomposed seems to me undeniable. The subsumption of simplicity in complexity 
shows that, if an articulate musical symphony is possible, then so must be an “eter-
nally sounding and unvarying railway whistle” (Peirce 1931–58, 1.305). However, 
because “[p]rescission is not a reciprocal process” (Peirce 1992, 3), one cannot infer 
a musical symphony from a simple sound.
4.4 Focusing on What Matters
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Whereas Peircean iconicity engulfs the quality it refers to, Russellian acquain-
tance always keeps its object at bay. Peirce originated indices (see Atkin 2005; 
Sebeok 1990, 21), but Russell reworked the original notion, calling those signs 
“egocentric particulars” (Russell 1997a, 108–115). It was from Russell, not Peirce, 
that Perry got indexicality. Given the egocentricity, indices came to be seen as lin-
guistic devices “about where one is, when it is, and who one is” (Perry 1979, 5). The 
monadic merger at play in iconicity was thus eclipsed by the assumption that such 
Russell-style demonstratives are “the mother and father of all information-based 
thoughts” (Evans 2002, 145).
A symptomatic statement can help us appreciate the scope of the missed oppor-
tunities. Chalmers matches my negative claim that what is involved in phenomenal 
knowledge is not an index. He writes: “Mary’s thought involves attributing a certain 
substantive qualitative nature to an object that is identified demonstratively. The 
concept R—her qualitative concept of the sort of experience in question—is not a 
demonstrative concept at all […]” (Chalmers 2004, 185). However, Chalmers does 
not match my positive claim that what is involved is an icon. The closest he comes 
to reference by shared quality is when he invents a “direct phenomenal concept” 
(Chalmers 2010, 267). Pausing to take stock of what he has gleaned from his delib-
erations, Chalmers writes: “All this is to say that there is something intrinsically 
epistemic about experience. To have an experience is automatically to stand in some 
sort of intimate epistemic relation to the experience […]” (1996, 196–197). So far 
so good. Yet, Chalmers immediately adds: “[…]—a relation that we might call 
‘acquaintance’” (ibid., 197). Here, Chalmers takes a wrong turn. By using the 
Russellian label “acquaintance” and speaking of a “relation,” Chalmers (2010, 283–
291) inadvertently introduces a hiatus or gap between knower and known.
Galen Strawson takes the same wrong turn as Chalmers. Strawson comes close 
to iconicity when he observes that, in perceptual experience, “the having is the 
knowing” (2015, 219). Yet, Strawson immediately calls this “knowledge ‘by 
acquaintance’” (ibid.). That is not what acquaintance is. Today’s philosophers of 
mind want to capture a gap-free appreciation of qualitative content, but the original 
textual source could hardly be clearer: “I wish to preserve the dualism of subject and 
object in my terminology” (Russell 1910–11, 109). Paul Coates and Sam Coleman 
(2015, 5) are thus correct to identify the involvement of a two-term relation as a 
founding idea of the analytic tradition. This dualism has sometimes come under 
attack, but it has never been successfully replaced, so the notion of acquaintance 
resurfaces in the very attempts to correct it (see for example the “acquaintance rela-
tionalism” of Dorsch 2016). Eventually, one grows tired of the epicycles.
The point of switching to a Peircean paradigm is to explicitly make room for 
one-term relations from the start, under the rubric of Firstness. Strawson tries to 
achieve this with “presentation” (2015, 223). It has been tried before (see Gamble 
1997). However, Russell made it clear that “the word acquaintance is designed to 
emphasize, more than the word presentation, the relational character of the fact with 
which we are concerned” (1910–11, 109). To say that A is “related to” B is to for-
ever nudge B away from A, or at any rate ensure that A is never B (in the most 
demanding sense of “is”). Chalmers is simply working out a consequence of this 
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when he asserts that “experiences are not red in the same sense in which apples are 
red. Phenomenal redness (a property of experiences or of subjects of experience) is 
a different property from external redness (a property of external objects)” (2010, 
254). Although Chalmers thinks that “both are respectable properties in their own 
right” (2010, 254), his assumptions nevertheless leave him with two tokens to jux-
tapose: one “in here,” the other “out there.”
Presumably, one comes to know a token “out there” by means of a token “in 
here.” Yet, no matter how alike those tokens are, the thin space of numerical distinct-
ness between them is enough to cast doubt that one truly has referred to the quality 
in question. Chalmers is therefore right that a predicament like absent or inverted 
qualia “is occasionally found distasteful, but it is a natural consequence of the 
indexicality of the concept” employed to express phenomenal qualities (Chalmers 
1996, 205).
Although indexicality has its place in Peircean semiotics, that framework also 
countenances an ideal case where what is signifying and what is signified are one 
and the same. The distinctions that let us appreciate qualia are prescissive, so I have 
no wish to deny that, “[w]hen Mary says, ‘So this is what it is like!’, what she refers 
to will almost certainly be a physical property of a physical event” (Bigelow and 
Pargetter 2006, 377). Such physical presence would suddenly matter if, say, Mary 
were to use a red rose to indicate to her colleagues that she passed by the laboratory 
while they were gone. Indices, however, do not exhaust the referential repertoire, so 
a red rose can fulfil roles that turn on its intrinsic quality. Deliberate focus on such 
a quality does not erase the fact that a token is needed to see a tone—particulars 
must impinge upon our senses. But, given that similarity is not proximity, it is mis-
leading to claim in an unqualified way that “Reference to any x involves causal 
influence from x to the referential act” (Robinson 2008, 224).
Focusing on what matters (tone) does not always mean focusing on matter 
(tokens). This is why Peirce said that a quality “cannot actually act as a sign until it 
is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign” 
(Peirce 1998, 291). In short, careful study of the conditions for the possibility of 
sign-action reveals a ground level where similarity becomes so pronounced that 
“[i]t is an affair of suchness only” (ibid., 163). When prescinding all the way to 
uncorrupted iconicity, we make ourselves unable to ascertain what is “inner” and 
what is “outer.” This means that, contrary to the view expressed by Chalmers, if one 
looks solely at a quality, experiences are red in the same sense in which apples are 
red. Let me now explore the consequences of this.
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Chapter 5
Seeing Things as They Are
Abstract In the previous chapter, I added similarity-based signs or icons to the 
standard menu of referential options. In this chapter, I want to explore the ramifica-
tions of this addition for perception. Peirce saw good reason to push his prescissive 
analysis of iconicity down to a single quality. I thus contrast his account with that of 
John Poinsot, a medieval philosopher who held that a sign always retains a slight 
distinction between the object it signifies and the vehicle that does the signifying. 
Because iconic merger gives us a way to vindicate ordinary perception, I favour 
Peirce’s stance. The resulting view goes against the claim, put forward by John 
Locke, that the “secondary” qualities we experience are mere figments. I therefore 
do my best to undermine that Lockean worldview. Although some philosophers 
believe that putting qualities back into the world results in panpsychism, I try to find 
a less far-fetched way to express this.
5.1  Peirce’s Merger Versus Poinsot’s Buffer
A sign is composed of a sign-vehicle, an object, and an interpretation. All the parts 
of this triad are needed for the sign to refer. Even so, those three parts hang together 
in a specific ordinal arrangement, so it is by supposing some of them absent that we 
arrive at the symbol/index/icon distinction.
For the symbol, if one deletes the interpretation, then the sign as a whole can no 
longer refer, since interpretation is all that binds the sign-vehicle and the object 
together (the “deletion” here is simply a prescissive supposition of one thing with-
out another). For the index, if one deletes the interpretation, then the sign-vehicle 
and the object will remain factually connected, so one needs to delete the object as 
well in order to extinguish the link that sustains the reference. For the icon, the 
interpretation and the object can both be deleted and still the sign-vehicle retains its 
power to refer, because the sign-vehicle’s very quality is what ensures its iconic 
ability.
I want to focus on iconicity, not because it is somehow more important than the 
other modes of reference, but because its unique character is at the root of many 
confusions regarding conscious experience. Since an icon stands for its object in 
virtue of (inherently) resembling that object, it gives rise to a tension. We can 
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 imagine, at one extreme, a situation where the relata at hand resemble each other so 
completely that they are in fact one and the same. This is problematic because, in 
such a case, it would make little sense to speak of a “resemblance.”
Twin constraints thus seem to govern iconic representation. On the one hand, the 
relata at hand cannot be so dissimilar that they are radically alien from each other. 
Generalizing this, we arrive at Sir William Hamilton’s law of homogeneity, which 
states that “things most unlike must in some respects be like” (Runes 1980, 129). If 
two (or more) objects are seen to be similar, then the extreme case of such an experi-
ence would be that of a complete likeness, merging two things into one. This leads 
to a concomitant constraint, which is that a given similarity cannot be so pronounced 
that it effectively collapses the relation between the tokens. Minimally, a split or 
hiatus must intervene for an iconic bond to be put to use. Accordingly, Hamilton’s 
law of homogeneity must be coupled with the law of heterogeneity, which states 
that “things the most homogeneous [or] similar […] must in certain respects be 
heterogeneous [or] dissimilar” (Runes 1980, 126). Sign-vehicle and object must 
therefore  remain distinct, otherwise they will melt into an undifferentiated unity 
(indices and symbols are spared this fate, insofar as causal interaction and conven-
tional association both ensure the required rupture).
The following may help to illustrate what is at stake. I am in this room right now. 
Yet, those surroundings are nevertheless not “in” my mind. The scene I am enjoying 
from a first-person perspective is therefore, in some sense, a surrogate or stand-in 
for the genuine article. I want to hold on to this truth. Nevertheless, I am not trapped 
in some sort of theatre and, so far as I can tell, the experiential display before me is 
an accurate representation of its object. At the very least, whatever speculative wor-
ries might cause me to doubt this would have to be imported from somewhere else. 
Indeed, if I abide by phenomenological honesty, I have to grant that the experiences 
I am enjoying are enough “like” their objects to license my confidence that those 
episodes are a sign of worldly things in a richer and more demanding way than my 
mere imputation. I do not take the initiative to bind a first-person spectacle with an 
extra-mental reality. On the contrary, the perceptual signs are motivated in such a 
way that I do not, by my very act of judgement, bring the likeness into being, but I 
merely add an explicit grasp to a mind-independent relation that was already there. 
However, I do not want this to mean that because I have a given thing before me, I 
own it outright. I don’t—and my non-inferential access to it, no matter how thor-
ough and convincing, must never erase that fact. The worldly thing escapes my 
grasp and gaze by the fact that it is not me. Short-lived episodes of surprise remind 
me of this (Champagne 2015).
In his Tractatus de Signis, the medieval philosopher of signs John Poinsot explic-
itly considers this tension between sameness and difference in iconicity. Poinsot’s 
Thomistic tradition held that, unless we make our concepts the targets of higher- 
order reflection, those concepts will efface themselves in regular experience 
(Dalcourt 1994, 6; Furton 1997, 72, 121). This is because the sign-vehicles spawned 
by the mind do not work like the sign-vehicles crafted by the hand. “The squeak is 
physical sound, and the written word is ink on paper. Their signifying function is 
incidental to their physical being. But a concept does nothing but signify” (Wild 
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1947, 226). Yet, if one agrees with this account, it becomes difficult to justify the 
contribution of a concept in the first place. Hence, in the course of his inquiry into 
“what conditions are required for something to be a sign” (Poinsot 2013, 218), 
Poinsot comes to the conclusion that:
[T]he more a representation is one with the thing represented, the better and more effica-
cious is the representation. Yet no matter how perfect, a concept in us does not attain to 
identity with the represented, because it never attains to this, that it represents itself, but 
[always rather] another than itself, because it always functions as something vicarious in 
respect of an object; it always retains a distinction, therefore, between the thing signified 
and itself signifying. (Poinsot 2013, 228)
Voicing the caveat that such differentiation does not apply to divine revelation (ibid., 
233), Poinsot contends that, in all other instances of semiotic mediation, iconic like-
ness is never complete—and this, as a matter of principle.
Essentially, Poinsot wants to taint similarity so that a can never stand for a, since 
the shortcut of simply contemplating a would annul the “standing for” relation. Call 
this “Poinsot’s buffer.” It requires that “a sign must be more known and more mani-
fest than the significate in the representing, so that in being and in knowable ratio-
nale it is dissimilar and [unequal or] subsidiary to that significate” (2013, 217; the 
square brackets are by the translator). Going over this sentence carefully, the three 
criteria adopted by Poinsot are that, compared to its object, the sign-vehicle must be 
(1) more known (manifestius), (2) subordinate or less perfect (inferius), and (3) 
 dissimilar (dissimile).
Although “the criterion that the sign be more known than the signified is clearly 
what troubles John [Poinsot]” (Furton 1995, 126), I can see why criterion (1) would 
hold. The “subordination” in (2) seems to be a corollary of (1). However, I think 
criterion (3) about minimal dissimilarity ultimately undermines Poinsot’s realist 
aspirations. Let me explain why.
Given that human minds can roam across particular locations, Poinsot reasoned 
that sense impressions, which last only so long, must supply information that sur-
vives brief acts of delivery (see Marmo 1987, 117). Indeed, “the sense, by means of 
the bodily organs, receives a precise impression or image of the sensible qualities, 
which is impressed directly on the organs” (Pellerey 1989, 87). This is reminiscent 
of David Papineau’s claim that, when a subject undergoes novel experiences, her 
brain acquires a “stored sensory template” (2003, 359). The moment this happens, 
the mental content at hand becomes a sign of the thing(s) that spawned it. Because 
the transmission of contents across the various faculties (Fodor 1983) is thereafter 
sustained by forces which we would today describe in a neuroscientific idiom, there 
is a temptation to understand all cognitive processes solely in terms of efficient 
causation. In the Thomistic account, though, “[t]he sequence of signs from sensible 
reality to abstract concepts is founded on the validity of the Similitude and on the 
necessity of the cause-effect relation” affecting our sense organs and brain (Pellerey 
1989, 103). Indexicality and iconicity both have a role to play in this account.
Following Aristotle (1993, 42–43), we can use an analogy with a seal of wax to 
explain how the contents acquired by sensation involve both an iconic and indexical 
component. The hard seal and malleable substance must at some point collide, so in 
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that respect one can be taken as the index of the other. Still, the wax, once impressed, 
is an icon of the convex seal and can therefore continue to stand for that object even 
when detached from its original causal encounter (see Poinsot 2013, 254–255).
Medieval philosophers used this analogy with wax to solve what Peter King 
(1994) calls “the problem of transduction.” A transducer is “a stimulus-bound com-
ponent” that is “data-driven by its environment” (Pylyshyn 1984, 154). An every-
day example of a transducer would be a microphone, which turns sound waves into 
electrical currents (a loudspeaker essentially does the same, in reverse). What is so 
philosophically interesting about such a device is that, despite the obvious differ-
ence between sound waves and electrical currents, something is preserved. Indeed, 
it is this preservation that prompts us to describe the electricity, not just as a current, 
but as an electrical signal.
Importantly, induction lets information flow without any symbolic processing. 
For instance, the taste receptors that cover the tongue are activated by purely chemi-
cal means. Chemical receptor sites are more sophisticated than a malleable wax 
surface or a microphone. Even so, transducers are “computationally primitive in the 
sense that their internal operation is not considered a rule-governed computation; 
they are simply performed, or, ‘instantiated,’ by properties of the biological sub-
strate in a manner not requiring the postulation of internal representations” 
(Pylyshyn 1984, 154). There is no homunculus in the tongue who somehow “trans-
lates” chemical structures into tastes (to evoke Searle 1980). This explains why 
devices like microphones or loudspeakers break down far less often than computer 
hard drives.
Despite this lack of translation (or interpretation generally), we have to counte-
nance something that is passed along in the causal encounter, otherwise we would 
reduce sensation to nothing more than a brute impact between two things. Indeed, if 
two incorruptible slabs of marble were to strike each other without making any 
scratch and then resume their previous positions, the short-lived event would not 
allow for transduction. Aristotle therefore had good reason to pick wax as his exam-
ple. There might be varying degrees of fidelity in the information that is passed 
along. But, if the signet-ring has, say, an S-shape on it, then transduction ensures 
that the wax will take on, if not an identical S shape, then at least an S-like shape.
One consequence of this iconic fidelity is that, when a transducer is functioning 
properly, one can reliably infer its inputs merely by knowing its outputs. However, 
in keeping with the idea that icons and indices survive the deletion of interpretants, 
inferences are not what hold together transduction. For instance, one can tell, merely 
by considering a microphone’s electrical signal, whether a person was singing softly 
or loudly. But, crucially, one’s ability to make this inference is not what converts 
specific rates of airwaves into matching rates of electrons. The inferences thus pig-
gyback on a non-inferential process.
There is no denying that, like the seal pressed on the wax (or the wax pressed on 
the seal?), our experience of the world involves impacts of sorts. To that extent, 
sensation is indexical. Poinsot has no problem with this. However, iconicity gives 
him pause, because an icon that would be too pronounced would fail to be a sign. 
Yet, if the stand-ins that result from situated impacts can also link minds to the 
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world in virtue of their very quality, why would anyone committed to realism refuse 
this?
I think that what prompts Poinsot to add his dissimile clause is Aquinas’ thesis 
that “[a]lthough it is necessary for the truth of cognition that the cognition answer 
to the thing known, still it is not necessary that the mode of the thing known be the 
same as the mode of its cognition” (Summa Contra Gentiles; translated by 
Rasmussen 1994, 417). A default recommendation to tease these two elements apart 
can certainly benefit inquiry in most instances. The problem, however, is that in 
iconicity what we know is precisely how we came to know it.
Peircean semiotics allows us to make sense of this. Peirce did not know of 
Poinsot’s writings, but he knew the medieval philosophical literature quite well 
(Boler 2004; Beuchot and Deely 1995; Tiercelin 2006). Indeed, “[w]hatever agree-
ment we find between Peirce and Poinsot is based upon them independently discov-
ering the same things about the nature of thought-signs” (Maroosis 2003, 157–158). 
Poinsot and Peirce thus partake (from afar) in a common semiotic project. “If C. S. 
Peirce can be said to give us a chemistry of […] sign compounds, John Poinsot, 
suitably revised, gives us the basic physical laws of motion that bring sign, object, 
and mind into relation” (Murphy 1994, 569).
Peirce agrees with Poinsot that, since a sign stands for something else, “one and 
the same thing never represents itself; for this identity cancels the rationale of a 
sign” (Poinsot 2013, 234). In fact, in manuscripts that have only recently been pub-
lished, Peirce contemplates the same problem addressed by Poinsot—and comes 
near to giving the same answer: “If it were in all respects a perfect icon it would be 
indistinguishable from and for all intents and purposes the very same thing as its 
Object. It thus seems to be of the very essence of an icon that it should not be perfect 
[…]” (Peirce 2015a, 658). Interestingly though, Peirce differs from Poinsot by mak-
ing room for a complete merger in what he called “Firstness,” which is the state one 
gets when one subtracts a relation between relata so as to obtain only a lone relatum 
(the term “relatum” thus becoming a misnomer). As a logician, Peirce (1998, 186–
194) accepts that the triadic relations involved in semiosis must subsume simpler 
(dyadic and monadic) ones—even if this means that, below a certain point, there 
cannot properly be a sign (Santaella 2003, 49–50).
The disagreement between these major historical figures, then, turns on whether 
semiotic theory should countenance such a state of unbroken unity, or whether it 
should make division-into-two the most basic situation attainable. Poinsot thinks 
that, in analyzing the sign, we should stop at two things, before a merger between 
sign-vehicle and object is reached. Peirce thinks that we should push our analysis all 
the way down to one, where there is a merger. I favour Peirce’s stance.
Although Peirce develops a distinct phenomenology, the notion of the “phenom-
enal” suggests a “phenomenalism” which he, as a scientific realist, found repugnant 
(see Ransdell 1978). Qualia, in his system, do not occlude the world. On the con-
trary, because they have an inalienable iconic power, qualia can reveal the world. I 
thus believe that, properly handled, Peirce’s account can demystify Aristotle’s claim 
that, when things go well, “knowledge is identical with its object” (1993, 60).
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There is more at stake here than individual knowledge. In Chap. 4, I argued that 
two people in a vast white expanse can use prescission properly to experience the 
same colour tone. If, however, our semiotic constitution is such that we can approxi-
mate but never fully match a given quality, then we can never use this quality to 
fully share our state(s) of mind (see O’Dea 2002, 177). We may use indices to 
ensure that our behaviours and utterances co-vary, but trying to achieve genuine 
empathy and agreement  by jointly attending to evidence becomes an inherently 
flawed aspiration. This would be a major concession.
Now, a standard approach to truth sees it as consisting of truth-bearers on one 
side, truth-makers on the other side, and a truth-relation between the two. Whatever 
“truth” we get in iconic reference reminds us not to take this model for granted, 
since in our most proximate experiential dealings with objects, truth-bearer and 
truth-maker are one. Indeed, correspondence theories of truth can involve either 
“correlation” or “congruence” (see Kirkham 1997, 119–120). Congruence uses 
similarity, but correlation does not require that the veridical correspondence involve 
any kind of isomorphism between truth-bearer and truth-maker. Poinsot espouses 
correspondence as correlation, whereas Peirce thinks that correlation can subsume 
congruence.
Peirce’s argument could be put like this. If any two objects X and Y are similar 
in some respect, then X should possess that “respect” all on its own. Hence, were Y 
to vanish, X would retain the feature that made a comparison by similarity possible. 
Obviously, this applies to Y too. Yet, when we focus only on the relevant quality, we 
make ourselves unable to ascertain whether it is X or Y that is the quality’s bearer. 
Hence, at the proper level of analysis, whatever makes Y and X similar to each other 
is indifferent to where it is found. This means that one should not worry about 
(much less accuse theorists of) conflating physical presence and cognitive presence 
(Levine 2007, 163) since, at the proper level of analysis, there is simply nothing to 
“conflate.”
This may be what Peirce’s friend William James had in mind when he noted that, 
approached from a certain perspective, “the sensation as ‘sign’ and the sensation as 
‘object’ coalesce into one, and there is no contrast between them” (2007, 243). Like 
the empty Sheet of Assertion of Peirce’s diagrammatic logic (Peirce 2015b, 900), 
James invites us to consider a white sheet of paper and note that, looking only at that 
unbounded expanse of colour, “[t]he thought-stuff and the thing-stuff are here indis-
tinguishably the same in nature […]” (1975, 31). In the current philosophy of mind 
literature, Matjaž Potrč defends something similar when he argues that conscious 
experience presupposes an “original intertwinedness” of subject and object (2008, 
110–111). I believe a tenable account of consciousness should countenance such an 
iconic bond.
The basic idea motivating Poinsot’s buffer remains correct: lack of difference 
does indeed rob the minimal relation (and sense of direction) that allows us to prop-
erly call something a sign. But, as a logician specialized in cataloguing relations, 
Peirce recognized that the complex triadic relations involved in semiosis subsume 
simpler (dyadic and monadic) ones. Hence, there should be no logical obstacle to 
supposing some parts of the sign absent.
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Most of the confusion regarding phenomenal qualia in philosophy of mind stems 
from the fact that such abstract deletions can be carried past the point of numerical 
distinctness. In the most impoverished state, signification (and thus cognition) van-
ishes. A quality would stand for anything like it, but that potential lies dormant if all 
we have before us is the quality itself. In that regard, icons are transparent and 
opaque, depending on how we view the situation. This vacillating semiotic/non- 
semiotic status is rendered soluble by keeping track of how many things one is 
countenancing in a given analysis. The Peircean category of Firstness is meant to 
remind us that, with one sign-vehicle in complete isolation, there can be no 
sign-action.
When, for whatever reason, the stream of consciousness which associates one 
thought to another ceases and is submerged in a unique thought, the referential 
potency inherent in that paused qualitative state cannot be actualized. To actually 
refer, something else must enter the picture. Peirce writes that “in contemplating a 
painting, there is a moment when we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, 
the distinction of the real and the copy disappears […]. At that moment we are con-
templating an icon” (1931–58, 3.362). This is the state I am in when I transparently 
take my experience to be what is experienced, when I partake of my environment so 
completely that I lose it and myself.
Of course, aside from pharmaceutically-induced vegetative states, such a qualita-
tive merger of “I” and “it” is rarely consummated; otherwise, as Poinsot put it, this 
“cancels the rationale” of the sign (2013, 234). Still, Peirce is distinguished from 
Poinsot in making allowances for this possibility. Indeed, Peirce concludes that, in 
theory, pure “[i]cons are so completely substituted for their objects as hardly to be 
distinguished from them” (1931–58, 3.362). In short, careful study of the conditions 
for the possibility of signification reveals a ground-level where similarity becomes 
so pronounced that it eradicates that with which the quality is similar. Putting these 
results in the technical terms used earlier, we could say that while actual sign-action 
is indeed constrained by Hamilton’s twin laws of homogeneity and heterogeneity, 
such actual semiosis logically implies a possible semiosis free from the constraint 
of heterogeneity.
Poinsot holds that “a sign must be dissimilar [to its significate], […] otherwise, 
if it is equally manifest, there is no reason for this to be a sign of one thing rather 
than a sign of some other thing […]” (2013, 218; the square brackets are by the 
translator). If, however, the ground of any experience is likeness to the point of 
complete merger, then when one subtracts the divide between sign-vehicle and 
object, one obtains a communion between knower and known that is as close as 
close can be (Ransdell 1979).
Do Poinsot and Peirce really differ on this point? John Deely suggests that the 
Latin term of idolum that we find in Poinsot is analogous to the contemporary 
Peircean notion of icon (Deely 1982, 115; see also his footnote in Poinsot 2013, 
241). However, since Poinsot’s system does not contain anything analogous to 
Peirce’s category of Firstness, I am not entirely convinced that their respective texts 
support the agreement that Deely and others (e.g., Maroosis 2003, 160) look for. I 
think the closest Poinsot comes to a pure icon in his Tractatus de Signis is when he 
5.1 Peirce’s Merger Versus Poinsot’s Buffer
86
mentions (only once) a similitudo virtualis (Poinsot 2013, 258), which is presum-
ably the modally prior “principle whence arises a formal similitude and formal 
awareness” (ibid., 258; emphasis in original). However, the term “virtual” will not 
be helpful until it is unpacked into something more tangible. The Peircean analysis 
does just that: to be an icon is to enjoy a monadic relation with an object, which is 
to say no relation at all.
Poinsot, as I mentioned, exempted a privileged subset of cases from his buffer. 
Specifically, he held that “the Divine Word is excluded from the rationale of sign” 
(2013, 233) because it supposedly “attains to identity with the represented divine 
essence” (ibid., 228). Lifting the buffer was intended to spare scriptures and sacra-
ments from being mere symbols. Interestingly, Joseph Ransdell (2003, 229–231) 
speculated that the present discomforts regarding iconicity might be a hold-over of 
religious controversies. Are there any religious implications in the idea of iconicity? 
Mark Johnston (1992) proposed the term “revelation” to capture our direct appre-
ciation of qualities like colours. That choice of word certainly courts non-secular 
readings. However, all that Johnston wants to convey is that “[t]he intrinsic nature 
of canary yellow is fully revealed by a standard visual experience as [sic] of a canary 
yellow thing” (1992, 223). Surely this is not far-fetched.
Of course, on the prescissive analysis I have championed, focusing on a yellow 
quality at the expense of all relations is by no means a “standard” activity. To get 
there, one must artificially trim away quite a bit of lived experience. Still, given that 
the qualitative unity we find in iconic signs logically underpins the human cognitive 
situation as a whole, I have endeavoured to account for it in a way that does not veer 
into philosophical (much less theological) extravagance.
I should underscore just how close Poinsot’s semiotic hugs the asymptotic limit 
of complete likeness. He acknowledges that “in intentional or representative exis-
tence the formal sign is said to make one thing with the object, not only as do those 
things which coincide in one common rationale, but rather because it totally con-
tains and represents the numerically same being that is in another” (2013, 233–234). 
But, he immediately adds: “this fact itself supposes that the representing and the 
represented are distinct […]” (ibid., 234). If Poinsot’s buffer is in place, then strictly 
speaking his secular philosophy of signs does not contain any icons, only symbols 
and indices. Very similar indices perhaps, but indices nonetheless.
I think that, by preserving a minimal qualitative dissimilarity between mind and 
world, Poinsot deprives the semiotician’s quiver of a useful arrow. One of the tenets 
of Poinsot’s account is that, insofar as it acts as a sign, a concept “as such does not 
stand in need of some scheme, linguistic or otherwise, to relate it to reality” 
(Rasmussen 1994, 410). I agree. However, I side with Peirce in holding that this is 
because, on some level, a sign-vehicle just is its object. A lot of things fall into place 
once we realize this. Indeed,
We may understand Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment in Peircean semiotic 
terms as an attempt to place the full burden of representing reality onto indexical signs. This 
leads philosophers with realist sympathies to feel they need to ask a raft of questions of the 
form: “Does term X [e.g. ethical or aesthetic predicates, number-terms…] denote a real 
object?” If we recall that indexical signs pick out sign-independent particulars, it often 
seems hard to answer “yes” to this question for key terms in manifestly important human 
discourses […]. (Legg 2013, 16)
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Qualia are not captured by indexical signs, so they are a casualty of this assumption. 
I think, though, that “any project of explanation that applies to consciousness the 
empirical methodology of the experimental sciences risks falsifying or omitting 
entirely the interpretive kind of access that we have to our own consciousness […]” 
(Livingston 2004, 229). Enlarging the menu of referential options to include icons 
is one way of avoiding this omission.
Icons are ideal informational transducers because they involve no transduction; 
“[a]nd this means that philosophers do not have the task of explaining how we get 
from our experience to its external object” (Hookway 2007, 68). This lets us reject 
the view, expressed by Bertrand Russell, that “[t]he starry heaven that we know in 
visual sensation is inside us” whereas “[t]he external starry heaven that we believe 
in is inferred” (2015, 57). We can see things as they are.
Interestingly, a similar conclusion is currently being reached in analytic discus-
sions. In a statement that comes very close to iconicity, Papineau observes that “in 
phenomenal thought the conscious referent seems to be present in the thinking 
itself, without any veil between subject and object” (2006, 104–105). One notable 
consequence of this is that “[w]hat it’s like to focus phenomenally on your visual 
experience of the bird is no different from what it’s like to see the bird” (Papineau 
2007, 124). I could not agree more. However, the Russellian in Papineau soon wakes 
up, so he discards these results out of some prior conviction that “[p]henomenal 
thoughts do not have any magical power to reach out and grasp their objects trans-
parently” (Papineau 2006, 105).
I do not detect any magic here. Papineau’s incredulity arises only on the assump-
tion that “[p]henomenal thoughts, just like any other intentional states, gain their 
referential powers from causal and historical relations” (2006, 105). If there is any 
moral that I hope to impart in this book, it is that not all modes of reference conform 
to this causal model.
5.2  Un-Lockeing a Coloured World
The pure icon discussed in the previous section is a theoretical ideal—the asymptote 
of a likeness bereft of any alterity (qualitative and numerical). It nevertheless gives 
us a way of picturing knowledge at its best. Error is possible. But, on the view I 
advocate, “there is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or 
generally the sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing that can be the case. 
When one thinks truly, what one thinks is what is the case” (McDowell 1996, 27; 
see Dodd 1995). Schooling in philosophy can make this direct realism look san-
guine, but in truth it brings thinking back to where we started. Indeed, “[a]sk a child 
where the green of the lawn is and he will point out the lawn […] not to the eye or 
head of the viewer” (Stroud-Drinkwater 1994, 347; see Kelley 1988; Allen 2016).
Peirce’s iconic merger can vindicate this common sense view. However, “the 
most popular opinion, at any rate among color scientists, may well be the view that 
nothing is colored—at least not physical objects in the perceiver’s environment, like 
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tomatoes” (Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 3). It seems that, somewhere along the way, 
inquiry has strayed from what Wilfrid Sellars (1991, 1–40) called the “manifest 
image.”
This distrust of qualitative experience owes much to John Locke. Locke invented 
the word semiotics (Deely 2003), but he also invented the inverted spectrum (Locke 
1825, 279–280) and, according to some (e.g., Balibar 2013), he invented conscious-
ness too. Now, John Deely has repeatedly warned that Locke is an ambivalent his-
torical figure, since there is an “antinomy between the actual point of view adopted 
at the beginning for the Essay as a whole and the possible point of view proposed at 
its conclusion” (1990, 114; see also Deely 1994). Let me therefore focus on one 
salient tension between empiricism and philosophy of signs, namely Locke’s demo-
tion of qualities like colours, smells, and tastes to a “secondary” status.
Locke claimed that solidity, extension, figure, motion, rest, and number “really 
exist in the [physical] bodies themselves;” but he held that feelings like sweet, blue, 
and warm “have no resemblance of them at all” (1825, 76). This division follows 
from the view that anything real must, at bottom, be composed of “atomicules [that] 
all alike act mechanically upon one another according to one fixed law of force” 
(Peirce 1998, 186). Such causal events are held to have a basis in fact, “[b]ut as for 
Qualities, they are supposed to be in consciousness merely, with nothing in the real 
thing to correspond to them […]” (ibid., 187). Locke’s account of consciousness 
requires a fair bit of reconstruction (Weinberg 2016). Still, if Locke is right that 
many of the qualities we experience are suspect, then that does not bode well for 
iconicity, since that mode of reference employs colours and smells just as easily as 
it employs shapes. Since I do not regard any experiential quality as suspect, I want 
to reinstate the experiences expelled by Locke’s account. To do that, I will use his-
torical criticisms and philosophical arguments. Let me begin with the historical 
criticisms.
Locke cordoned off experiential qualities because, no matter how obvious they 
may seem to us, they were not mentioned by the physicists of his time. Like W. V. 
O. Quine (1966, 151), who proclaimed that “philosophy of science is philosophy 
enough,” Locke held that “it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer 
in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way 
to knowledge” (1825, x–xi). Yet, Locke never actually argued for this deferral. That 
the scientific theories of his time were thriving was presumably enough to motivate 
Locke’s meta-philosophical stance. Surely, if one is going to assign philosophy a 
subordinate role, the demotion requires some justification.
Be that as it may, the Lockean vision of “a world made out of ultimate little 
things and collisions amongst them” (Ladyman et al. 2007, 23) continues to figure 
prominently in philosophy of mind. Frank Jackson, for example, claims that all our 
knowledge of the mind “comes back to causal impacts of the right kinds” (2004, 
418). Yet, if everything the mind knows comes by way of collisions between two 
things (i.e., Secondness), then it follows that qualities considered apart from all 
other things (i.e., Firstness) will appear suspect. I do not want to let go of the idea 
that perception involves at least two things (usually a perceiving subject and a per-
ceived object). Still, I am trying to call attention to another possibility, where seeing 
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something is being one with that thing. If the vocabulary of “being one with” seems 
strange or high flown, then that just goes to show how much revisionist work is 
needed.
Peirce was aware that many follow Locke in taking physics as their metaphysics. 
As he notes, “[Henri] Poincaré would have us write down the equations of hydrody-
namics and stop there” (Peirce 1998, 187). Like Locke, Peirce admired natural sci-
ence. Unlike Locke though, Peirce believed that natural science needs to countenance 
formal causes alongside efficient causes. For Locke, it is “manifestly by impulse” 
that ideas are produced in us (1825, 75). For Peirce, this is not at all obvious. In what 
has been described as his most “scholastic” passage (Deely 2009, 268), Peirce wrote 
that “[t]hat which is communicated from Object through the Sign to the Interpretant 
is a Form” (Peirce 1998, 544n22). Causality may be central to perception, but it is 
not the only way that minds can be tethered to the world.
Medieval philosophers distinguished three senses of sameness, “namely, identity 
(sameness in substance), equality (sameness in quantity), and similarity (sameness 
in quality)” (King 1994, 131n12). Locke knew of this scholastic account (see 
Jacovides 1999, 463), but he clearly distrusted sameness in quality. So, whereas I 
stress the centrality of iconicity in uniting mind and world, Locke introduced his 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities “so we may not think (as per-
haps usually is done) that [our ideas] are exactly the images and resemblances of 
something inherent in the subject; most of those of sensation being in the mind no 
more the likeness of something existing without us […]” (1825, 74). However, 
Locke never tells us why we need to be saved from the supposedly quite wrong 
belief in mind-world likeness. Since, by his own admission, Locke cannot get 
behind the appearances to check how things really are, one is left wondering what 
licenses his confidence about a lack of similarity. One cannot infer from the premise 
that “most” ideas do not resemble external things to a conclusion that none resemble 
them.
Locke did not make this fallacious inference outright, since he granted that some 
of our ideas get to enjoy such a resemblance. Indeed, “[w]hatever Locke means by 
‘resemblance,’ the relation is one of the two ways that he believes that ideas can 
represent external objects. The other way is by brute causal connection” (Jacovides 
2007, 107). This looks like the enlarged semiotic repertoire that I defend in this 
book. The only problem, though, is that Locke lets only “primary” qualities enjoy a 
resemblance to their objects. So, if one takes the idea yellow triangle, one can trust 
that the triangularity resembles something out there, but the yellowness is met with 
distrust.
Locke likely got this distrust of “secondary” qualities from Galileo (see Aho 
2014, 94–97). However, Galileo’s distinction is arguably a reinvention of the scho-
lastic distinction between “common” and “proper” sensibles. We rarely use that 
medieval jargon today, but it is worth revisiting. Proper sensibles (like the taste of 
chocolate) can be detected by one sense alone, whereas common sensibles (like the 
rectangular shape of a chocolate bar) can be detected by more than one sense (in the 
case of rectangles, by sight and touch). It is important to underscore, however, that 
this scholastic distinction does not entail any skepticism. Proper sensibles can be 
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verified, they just cannot be cross-verified by other senses. Hence, scholastic think-
ers used the possibility of redundancy to sort experiences, but there was never any 
question that we experience the full range of experiences, tastes and colours 
included.
As the notion of common sensibles shows, different senses can sometimes over-
lap in what they tell us. However, it is unclear to me why a message coming from 
one source should be deemed less reliable or trustworthy than a message coming 
from two (or more) sources. If a cunning devil can fool each sense, then surely it can 
fool two (or more) senses working in tandem. Despite this, Locke followed Galileo 
in adopting the primary/secondary distinction in its sceptical variant. Locke cer-
tainly wasn’t a fan of the religious establishment that placed Galileo under house 
arrest. Compared to the predictive power achieved by the new generation of “natural 
philosophers,” the proper sensibles countenanced by scholastic philosophy seemed 
to accomplish nothing. He may have been right. Even so, I do not think that Locke’s 
philosophical response was appropriate.
As a physicist and astronomer trying to predict the motion of bodies, Galileo did 
not have much use for qualities that cannot be quantified. Despite his admiration of 
Galileo, Locke was never quite comfortable with the idea that everything is ulti-
mately mathematical in nature. As an empiricist Locke held that exposure to things 
is needed in a way that no amount of theoretical insight can supersede. In a passage 
that anticipates Jackson’s (1982; 1986) knowledge argument, Locke writes that “if 
a child were kept in a place where he never saw any other but black and white, till 
he were a man, he would have no more ideas of scarlet or green, than he that from 
his childhood never tasted an oyster, or a pine-apple, has of those particular rel-
ishes” (Locke 1825, 52–53). As healthy adults, we are unlike Locke’s secluded child 
or Jackson’s secluded neuroscientist in that we have been flooded with many differ-
ent (and many similar) experiential qualities. It is too late to put ourselves in a state 
of qualitative deprivation; were we to succeed in doctoring the right kind of isola-
tion, the sudden drop or lack would be noticed—which is precisely what Locke’s 
child and Jackson’s neuroscientist are not supposed to notice. As philosophers, 
though, it seems we can disown all that the world has taught us and call into ques-
tion the very existence of our conscious experience. Or at least vast swaths of it.
Locke’s colourless worldview fit nicely with the Newtonian physics that he 
admired, but it burdened him with explaining why/how secondary qualities emerge 
from (or are epiphenomenally attached to) the primary ones. Locke gave a story 
about tiny “corpuscles” hitting the sense organs, but that story never successfully 
got past the fact that “matter, incogitative matter and motion, whatever changes it 
might produce of figure and bulk, could never produce thought” (1825, 477). 
Working out the consequences of his starting assumptions, Locke was forced to 
conclude that conscious experience of qualities like colours may accompany mate-
rial events “merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator” (Locke 1825, 
403–404).
Locke’s deistic scaffold eventually withered, but his sense of mystery did not. By 
the nineteenth century, we find T. H. Huxley writing that conscious experience of 
qualities like colour is “as unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin when 
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Aladdin rubbed his lamp in the story […]” (1866, 193). In the late 1980s, Colin 
McGinn turned this mystery into a bona fide stance of philosophy—“mysterianism”—
when he revamped Huxley’s phrase and wondered “[h]ow can technicolour phe-
nomenology arise from soggy grey matter?” (1989, 349).
What is the likeliest explanation for this lack of explanation? That the world 
contains some weird discontinuity which makes our own minds seem out of place—
or that we have taken on a fundamentally mistaken worldview? Nagel is probably 
right that “almost everyone in our secular culture has been browbeaten into regard-
ing the reductive research program as sacrosanct, on the ground that anything else 
would not be science” (2012, 7). Indeed, many philosophers see themselves as 
“defending the hegemony of modern matter against the mysteries of mental sub-
stance and of mind/matter interaction” (Crane and Mellor 1990, 186). Yet, this cam-
paign to rid philosophy of mind of mysteries ends up generating even greater 
mysteries.
Some hold that qualitative experiences emerge at a certain level of complexity 
(Carruthers 2000, 237–238; Deacon 2011, 530–531; Rosenthal 2010). I do not find 
such accounts plausible. The edifice being erected has no qualitative ingredient in it, 
but once we reach an upper floor, qualities appear—somehow. While I am hesitant 
to endorse the panpsychism recently resurrected by David Chalmers (2015) and 
Galen Strawson (2006), I agree with them that, if we want to explain the qualitative 
dimension of consciousness in a non-miraculous way, we must weave experiential 
properties into the fabric of reality. I therefore endorse the following statement:
Panpsychism rests upon a fairly strong version of the principle of sufficient reason, which 
it applies across the board, metaphysically as well as epistemologically. Unlike emer-
gentism, panpsychism doesn’t tolerate metaphysical discontinuities—it insists that high- 
level entities issue from bottom-level entities. Unlike physicalism, panpsychism doesn’t 
tolerate epistemological discontinuities—it insists that high-level entities issue intelligibly 
from bottom-level entities. (Lewtas 2013, 40)
Interestingly, if we go to the original source, we find that the famous quote by 
Huxley actually takes consciousness to be “as unaccountable as the appearance of 
the Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp in the story, or as any other ultimate fact of 
nature” (1866, 193; emphasis added). Like the passage where Peirce (1931–58, vol. 
4.537) explicitly says that a tone “can neither be called a Type nor a Token,” the final 
portion of Huxley’s passage is often left out (see for example Bayne 2004, 361). 
This omission once again undercuts possible solutions, since Huxley’s full claim 
hints at two responses: magical emergence—or simply countenancing conscious-
ness alongside the other primitive facts of nature. I prefer the latter response.
I am not alone. As Pär Sundström reports, “[a] number of philosophers have 
argued that Galileo was wrong […] in taking the qualities we experience in physical 
things to be properties of the mind” (2007, 128). Backers of this Galilean reversal 
include (but are not limited to) Byrne and Hilbert (2003), Harman (1990), Hilbert 
(1987), and Tye (1995, 2000). Everyone seems to be gravitating toward a shared 
conclusion by independent reasons/reasoning. Still, the emerging consensus seems 
to be that “the only plausible way that a Materialist can deal with the secondary 
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qualities is completely to reverse the whole programme started by Galileo, a pro-
gramme that has persisted for so long” (Armstrong 1999, 124).
Locke thought that if persons “should really have different ideas, I do not see 
how they could discourse or argue one with another” (1825, 109). I agree with John 
Deely that the moment Peirce and others took this seriously and began “to think that 
their experience of communication […] as a proper starting point of philosophy, the 
remaining days of classical modern thought were numbered” (2001, 539). 
Semiotics—the project hinted at by Locke—turns out to be the best paradigm for 
undermining Locke.
5.3  The Argument from Subjective Variation
When subjects discuss a “secondary” quality like the taste of cilantro, they are 
engaged in an act of interpretation. Hence, a lot of what Donald Davidson has writ-
ten about “triangulation” (2001, 212–220) is applicable. The three tips of the trian-
gle are two persons and one object under discussion (in this case, a sprig of cilantro). 
Using language, interlocutors are trying to agree about what they intend. Philosophy 
of signs and philosophy of language are natural allies here. But, if my earlier chap-
ters are right, then such an exercise in triangulation will never succeed in fully 
capturing qualia unless the passage from conventional signs (symbols) to causal 
signs (indices) culminates with qualitative signs (icons).
In order for interlocutors to whittle discourse down to an iconic point, a lot of 
situated pointing and charitable chatting may have to occur. Beyond a certain point, 
though, nothing more can be said (Wittgenstein 2002, 189). As I see it, misgivings 
about “secondary” qualities rest on the assumption that, when the exercise becomes 
silent, the exercise has failed. I see no reason to draw that conclusion. In my account, 
“[t]he verbal argument is at most only stage setting; the heart of the drama is the 
invocation of experience and, indeed, the attempt to register accurately the felt force 
of relevant experience” (Colapietro 2010, 11).
I do not want to downplay the complexity of a communicative exercise or the 
rarity of a full agreement. Many of the difficulties that accompany triangulation 
stem from the fact that, when people discuss the taste of cilantro, they are not just 
making claims about cilantro, but also about cilantro-insofar-as-it-interacts-with-
sense-organs-here-now. The taste reported is therefore, implicitly, a report about the 
functioning of our bodies and our position in the world (O’Dea 2002). A full descrip-
tion of what one claims when one says that “This cilantro sprig is bitter” would thus 
have to include facts about the temperature of one’s mouth, allergies one may have, 
one’s blood sugar levels, the number and distribution of receptor cells on one’s 
tongue, psychological priming effects one may be biased by (e.g., being told right 
before “Wait until you taste how bitter this is…”), or whatever else might affect how 
one experiences things. No one—least of all Locke—has experimentally controlled 
for all these variables. I thus find it hasty to conclude that, because there can be 
disagreements between persons, tastes are subjective.
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Interestingly, when it comes to other features, we do not jump to this subjectivist 
conclusion. Consider the fact that a small child cannot lift me but a strong adult can. 
Clearly, it would be erroneous to drop the relations involved and hold that I some-
how have two clashing predicates, “liftable” and “unliftable,” and that since I cannot 
be the site of both predicates, debates about my liftability are a matter of personal 
preference. Likewise, a sprig of cilantro might taste very differently to two people, 
but that is no reason to squeeze two mutually-exclusive qualities into one poor herb 
so as to infer that its distinctive flavour cannot possibly be “out there.”
If I am right, then triangulation, pursued with enough care, can eventually result 
in genuine agreement. This is, after all, the optimistic asymptote that we chase when 
we try to convey “primary” qualities. An engineer trying to communicate a complex 
shape to another person does not stop at the first sign of a misalignment between 
speaker and hearer. Likewise,
We do not universally agree in our judgments about what is red or salty. But when there is 
disagreement, we do not blithely continue to maintain our own views without hesitation. 
The fact that others report seeing red where you saw green, or tasting saltiness where you 
tasted none, makes you less confident in your own color or flavor judgments. It makes you 
suspect that the lighting is funny, or that you are ill or under the influence of a drug, or that 
your perceptual equipment is defective (as it is in color-blind people). To insist without 
further investigation that your own judgment is right, and that the other’s is wrong, would 
be rash and unwarranted. (MacFarlane 2014, 5)
It is normal that scientific practitioners seeking consensus should limit themselves 
to observations that they can talk about with consistent inter-subjective agreement. 
But, a disciplinary predilection for communicability does not mean that incommu-
nicable experiences merit ontological or epistemological demotion.
In my account, minds can eventually converge/merge by employing symbols, 
indices, and icons. The unique semiotic service rendered by each kind of sign can-
not be replaced. It may be that “[c]urrent perceptual science, even when it deals with 
qualitative aspects of experience, almost exclusively explains them in terms of the 
stimulus quantitatively understood as a collection of objective measurements” 
(Albertazzi 2012, 9). However, the scholastic one-channel/multi-channel distinction 
neither entails nor mandates privileging common sensibles—any more than “This 
cloth can be washed by only one machine” entails or mandates “This cloth cannot 
be washed.”
Of course, eliminative materialists (e.g., Churchland 1996, 207) argue that, if 
one truly understands the relevant physics and neuroscience, one will see that a 
quality like red is in fact a wave length. Alas, my experience of colour persists—
despite all the science courses I have taken. Faced with this indispensability, one can 
hold that “our perceptual experience is incurably infected with illusion” (Shoemaker 
1994, 296)—or one can try to tell a story that rescues the experiences from being 
systematically confabulated. In this book, I work on the second option.
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5.4  Colours and the Soggy Grey Brain
I have been trying to remedy scruples about colour qualia using historical scholar-
ship and philosophical arguments. Could science help to vindicate our experience of 
qualities like colour? A common reflex nowadays is to look to the brain for (all the) 
answers. The crudest form of investigation would therefore be to crack open a skull 
to see what is in there. Interestingly, researchers have done just that.
The brains of macaque monkeys were injected with a chemical compound that 
has the property of reacting with activated brain regions. Like the famous brain-
washing scene from the movie A Clockwork Orange, the monkeys’ gaze was fixed 
so that they had to stare directly at a grid-like image. After about 30 minutes, the 
deoxyglucose stains set, allowing researchers to detect which portions of the brain 
were activated by the visual stimulus. A tissue section of the macaque striate cortex 
was surgically removed and flat-mounted for examination. The results obtained 
were astounding, revealing a sort of imprinting of the grid (see the figure repro-
duced in Tootell et al. 1982, 902). “Like pictures, adjacent neural populations in 
these areas corresponds [sic] to adjacent boundaries or surface points in the objects 
they represent” (Prinz 2002, 31). Nelson Goodman (1976) may have been led by his 
love of abstract art to philosophically repudiate resemblance, but the results obtained 
by Tootell et al. (1982) clearly show a portion of the world tattooing its likeness on 
a portion of the brain.
Considered as an index, it matters that the grid-like pattern travelled (via trans-
duction) from the external visual stimulus to the cortex. Given the direction of cause 
and effect, we naturally take the brain imprint to be a sign of its stimulus. If, how-
ever, we consider the grid patterns as icons of each other, there is no order of prior-
ity. Indeed, these two patterns will resemble each other, even when no further 
thought (by us or the monkey) represents them as doing so. This shows that, “[e]ven 
before having a fully functional semiotic consciousness, our body is not mere pre- 
semiotic matter, but a highly complex semiotic system, endowed with […] the 
capacity to make subtle distinctions and respond in competent and meaningful ways 
to salient environmental stimuli” (Violi 2007, 84). Localized calluses on hands or 
feet could have shown us this already, but since we are more likely to credit the 
brain with knowing, discovering a trace of the world on that soggy grey organ is 
more reassuring.
In order for a brain-owning organism to cope with its environment, the growth of 
signs which ensues from its primitive bodily engagement must eventually switch to 
some sort of symbolic encoding. The claim of Peircean semiotics, though, is that the 
chain of signs does not begin with symbols. Thomas Sebeok and Marcel Danesi 
(2000, 11) call this the dimensionality principle: iconicity precedes indexicality, and 
indexicality precedes symbolicity. Minds tied to the world by the dimensionality 
principle do not face any problem grounding their symbols (Harnad 2002).
In keeping with the dimensionality principle, the sequence of cognition does 
seem to begin with icons. Trivially, the outer-most layer of the eye (where we put 
contact lenses) reflects whatever it is exposed to. Anyone who has cheated at poker 
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by seeing cards on a player’s eye balls has been acquainted with this informational 
coupling. These icons can be useful to outsiders, but they are of little use to the 
subject who owns the eyes. So, moving further inside the body, anatomy teaches us 
that the inner wall of the eye has a light-sensitive membrane. Here again, thanks to 
photoreceptors, iconic patterns are being preserved. If, for instance, the top half of 
a shown image is darker than the bottom half, this relation will be maintained on the 
membrane, albeit in a reversed fashion. Because this permutation is simple, we have 
access to the “code” that allows us to go from one body of data to the other. If you 
show a biologist a stimulated retina, she will have little difficulty reverse engineer-
ing what the stimulus was. However, as we move deeper, along the optic nerve to 
the visual cortex and beyond, more elaborate encoding occurs. By the time we get 
to the brain, the link tying neurons to the world is overwhelmingly complex, like 
trying to read an unknown language.
The results obtained by Tootell et al. (1982) nevertheless prove that an iconic 
relation is being preserved past the retina. The discovery of imprinted patterns on 
the striate cortex thus reduces the epistemic risk of our inferences about conscious-
ness. Now, these results are not the norm, since most of the information stored in a 
brain bears little or no resemblance to the objects and events which shaped it. Still, 
rationality demands that we give weight to similarity relations. If, say, I show you a 
picture of man with a red stain on his shirt, you are more entitled to infer that he 
spilled his glass if the colour of his wine is red than if it is white. Likewise, the 
match in quality that we find in a monkey’s brain adds some security to our infer-
ences about that monkey’s conscious experience. Judged by the standard of deduc-
tion, these inferences remain inconclusive. But, all other things being equal, 
co-variations with a matching quality are more secure than co-variations alone.
Assuming that the experiment in question could be replicated in humans with the 
same results, switching back and forth between similar patterns should diminish our 
doubts that the subject did in fact experience the image it was shown. However, this 
added sense of security only goes half the distance. Indeed, the grid-like chemical 
stains count only as a “primary quality” in Locke’s sense. Somewhere along the 
way, “secondary qualities” like colours have been lost.
The researchers I am discussing did not bother to track if and to what extent the 
colour(s) of their stimulus might have also been conveyed alongside shapes. 
Discovering that there is “a systematic relationship between ocular dominance 
strips and cortical magnification” (Tootell et al. 1982, 902) is worth writing about, 
but apart from incidental colouring by chemical stains, we know in advance of any 
experiment that the brain is and will remain a grey and soggy thing. Yet, as a phi-
losopher I want to ask: would the “technicolour phenomenology” (McGinn 1989, 
349) of our experiential lives seem less mysterious if we could find colours in the 
brain?
Let me toy with that possibility and see what it can teach us. Imagine that a 
gland, dubbed “the chameleonic gland” by its discoverers, was found somewhere in 
the brain, near (and suitably connected to) regions known to be responsible for 
vision. Under surgical conditions, we could observe this gland acting like a chame-
leon by becoming, say, red, whenever the subject was shown a red stimulus (and so 
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on for the rest of the visible colour spectrum). Unlike Descartes’ pineal gland, there 
would be no disconnect: the stimulus would be red, the brain would be red, and the 
subject would report seeing red. Since correlation is the abductive gateway to causal 
inference, the robust match in colours would increase our confidence that the qual-
ity at hand is shared all the way to first-person experience.
As we have seen, going back and forth between similar grid-like shapes increases 
our confidence that a subject consciously saw the shape in question. From a rational 
standpoint, then, the same increase in confidence would apply if we could go back 
and forth between two similar colours. Yet, when it comes to shapes, I know of no 
one who is willing to say that, had researchers not gathered evidence of a grid-like 
shape in the striate cortex, the ontological standing of shapes would have been sus-
pect. Even before the scientific discovery of shapes in the striate cortex, our ordi-
nary experience of shapes sufficed to justify our belief that shapes exist in the world. 
By parity, I argue that we need not wait for a discovery of colours in the brain to 
believe that colours exist in the world.
For many, this suggestion engenders a recoil. Taking “primary” qualities like 
shapes at face-value is respectable, but treating “secondary” qualities like colours 
the same way is “naive” realism. I am trying to deconstruct the double-standard that 
prompts this recoil. A healthier reflex is to ask: what would convince an eliminative 
materialist that colour qualia exist? The chameleonic gland is my closest answer. 
Yet, the more we contemplate this “smoking gun” proof of qualia, the more we see 
that such a revolutionary finding would be somewhat banal. After all, staring down 
at a red gland in an open skull is not that different from staring down at a red straw-
berry in an open basket. My claim, then, is that unless we consider the boundaries 
of the skull to be paramount, evidence for the existence of colour qualia is available 
right now.
A growing number of philosophers agree. Joining their rank, I have considered 
two cases—one real, the other fictional—of the brain resembling its environment. 
From a rational standpoint, inferences about conscious experiences are more secure 
when they proceed from an iconic and indexical bond than when they proceed from 
an indexical bond alone. This is what makes deoxyglucose imprints interesting: the 
farther in we detect icons, the farther away we push the skeptic. However, we did 
not start believing in shapes only in 1982, when Roger Tootell and his colleagues 
published their findings. So, if shapes-in-the-brain were not needed to believe in 
shapes-in-the-world, then colours-in-the-brain are not needed to believe in colours- 
in- the-world (now).
On the non-Lockean worldview that I am trying to recapture, the colours of our 
shared surroundings are no more mysterious than the shapes of those surroundings. 
One can, if one wishes, try to reconstruct colour experience with the materials of a 
colourless world. But, seeing how the very thing sought is excluded from the start, 
I think that such an endeavour is doomed to fail. The culprit is not experiential quali-
ties, but rather the disenchanted vision of the world that makes such qualities seem 
out of place. If toying with the chameleonic gland can disabuse us of that world-
view, then that will have justified the device.
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Chapter 6
Informational Flow Implies Informational 
Pause
Abstract In the previous chapter, I tried to keep ordinary colour perception from 
being philosophically dismissed. In this chapter, I want to argue that countenancing 
such qualities at a fundamental level is more promising than waiting for those quali-
ties to emerge at higher levels of complexity. Although complex patterns are crucial 
to the deployment of neuroscientific and psychological explanations, prescission 
allows us to artificially decompose those patterns into simple qualities which, owing 
to their radical isolation from all relations, elude all scientific scrutiny. I argue that, 
so long as humans have this ability to prescind, worries about phenomenal con-
sciousness will resurface. I thus try to demystify our powers of prescission by exam-
ining the Game of Life setting. Philosophers of mind like Daniel Dennett have used 
this setting to explain intentional explanation, but I think it can also be used to 
explain how we arrive at the idea of qualia.
6.1  Informational Flow
When it comes time for Chalmers to produce a positive account in The Conscious 
Mind, he turns to information theory for inspiration. I too am drawn to the “strangely 
beautiful conception” of the world “as pure informational flux, […] a world of prim-
itive differences, and of causal and dynamic relations among those differences” 
(Chalmers 1996, 303). Yet, because a tenable philosophy of mind must countenance 
more than just differences, I agree with Søren Brier that if Chalmers is to success-
fully deploy a concept of information that is “beyond functionalism and computa-
tionalism,” he will need “to add Peirce’s semiotic philosophy to his theory” (Brier 
2008, 38). Let me therefore venture such an addition.
Semiosis is crucial to an information-based account of the mind, because semio-
sis is how information flows. The neuroscientist Bernard Baars writes that “[i]f we 
could zoom in on one individual neuron […] we would see the nerve cell communi-
cating frantically to its neighbors about one thousand times per second […]” (1997, 
18, emphasis added). Frederik Stjernfelt (in Emmeche et al. 2008, 7) observes that, 
promissory notes aside, such appeals to “communication” are never reduced or 
eliminated. A philosopher of signs would argue that such reductions or eliminations 
are never carried out because, fundamentally, the action of signs is a genuine part of 
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reality. If, say, neuron A impinges directly on neuron B, and neuron B impinges 
directly on neuron C, then no matter how we unpack the impingement, we cannot 
credit these two events with any kind of informational transfer unless neuron C is 
affected in a way that makes it relate to neuron A through the intermediary of neu-
ron B.  This is what Peirce meant by semiosis, namely “an action, or influence, 
which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and 
its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions 
between pairs” (1998, 411).
Fred Dretske (1981) has done a great job of showing how this flow of informa-
tion can be used to craft a persuasive account of the mind. Unfortunately, Dretske 
(1995) also thinks we should try to “naturalize” the mind in a way that makes the 
idea of qualitative experience dubious (see Bailey 2005). I do not see why this incre-
dulity should follow. To illustrate why I think this, I want to use a cybernetic setting 
called the Game of Life.
The Game of Life is not a “game” at all, but rather a self-organizing system 
invented in the 1960s by the mathematician John Conway (see Poundstone 1985, 
24). It consists of a primitive set of axioms or “rules” deployed on a two- dimensional 
grid of cells. In the grid, any given cell will have eight neighbouring cells. Depending 
on how many of those neighbouring cells are “on” or “off,” the cell at the center will 
be either on or off (normally rendered as black or white). If, for example, two neigh-
bours are on, the center cell will maintain its status (as either on or off) in the next 
generation or time-slice. Other rules apply to other states. As these rules are succes-
sively implemented, the dots begin to have a life of their own. Indeed, viewers look-
ing at the Game of Life can eventually run a rough and ready “zoology” of the 
patterns. For instance, one can tell that a pattern of dots that looks like a “glider” is 
about to fall prey to an incoming “eater” (Poundstone 1985, 40).
Although most of these patterns eventually degrade, patterns in a sufficiently 
complex version of the Game of Life might end up reproducing themselves in an 
“autopoietic” manner (see the criteria in Thompson 2007, 101–103). For all I know, 
a pattern might even develop “an interest in conserving its own structure” (Brier 
2008, 259; see Champagne 2011). More modestly, we can follow Don Ross and 
consider a pattern real if it is “projectible [sic] under at least one physically possible 
perspective” and the pattern “cannot be tracked unless the encoding is recovered 
from the perspective in question” (2000, 161).
I am not the first to be impressed with the patterns that emerge in the Game of 
Life. Gregg Rosenberg (2004) refers to them a lot, as does Daniel Dennett (1991b). 
Dennett emphasizes how categorizing the morphological types of the Game of Life 
gives one some measure of predictive power. According to him, folk psychology 
works because it latches onto such real patterns. Looking at the behaviour of 
humans, Dennett argued that, although everything is made of matter, ascribing 
motives and beliefs is an objective strategy, in that we can robustly gauge whether it 
renders its predictive service. As he put it: “The decision to adopt the intentional 
stance is free, but the facts about the success or failure of the stance, were one to 
adopt it, are perfectly objective” (Dennett 1987, 24). Predicting the behaviour of a 
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toddler is admittedly harder than predicting the behaviour of a coarsely pixelated 
glider. Still, in either case, the predictions work because they discern real patterns.
This account allows for two perspectives. There is, on the one hand, a base level 
where all that one countenances are the cell pixels themselves, considered as imma-
nent particulars. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between this perspec-
tive’s representations and the discrete cells that are either on or off, the 
information-theoretic depiction is appropriately called a “bit-map” (literally, a “map 
of binary digits”). Such a map robustly charts an area with a degree of accuracy 
proportionate to the number of divided squares. Given an exhaustive statement of 
the initial conditions of the game—that is, of the (finite) rules and starting positions 
of the (finite) pieces on the grid—one could in principle deduce (in Laplace-like 
fashion) the various positions these will occupy on the board as the discrete volleys 
of moves are repeatedly implemented. The inferential process underwriting such a 
systematic forecast would be completely monotonic or truth-preserving: working 
with a bit-map is informationally onerous, but assuming that the governing laws do 
not change midway, it yields a predictive output that is as secure as its input.
The inferential dynamic at work is radically different, however, when one adopts 
the intentional stance. Indeed, if one ascends to a higher-level perspective where 
creature-like actors can be discerned on the playing field, one does so at the price of 
turning to an inductive rationale that has a far less mechanical character. Dennett is 
forthright about the fact that a concession along these lines needs to be made in 
order to have access to intentional explanation. Whereas an exhaustive account of 
the pixels’ dispersion on the grid is a robust affair, moving away from a bit-map and 
limning “abstracta” (Dennett 1991b, 28) like “eaters” involves a generalization 
from particulars which effectively soils the truth-preservation with informational 
noise. This allows one to draw predictions only “sketchily and riskily” (Dennett 
1991b, 40). A considerable boon of yielding to such induction, however, is that it 
provides one with assorted heuristics that are unavailable when one countenances 
only the pixels themselves.
To bring out the difference between these two perspectives, we might imagine 
having to text message another person’s demeanour and location with a mobile 
phone. If one were to take the bit-map route and catalogue the position and velocity 
of all the person’s constituent particles, this would make for a lengthy message (and 
run a costly bill). In information-theoretic parlance, the message would have greater 
entropy. But, if one were to type something along the lines of “So and so is sitting 
in such and such a room doing this or that,” one would thereby spare oneself a lot of 
bits (not to mention a lot of money). Thanks to this, the configuration of all the rel-
evant neurons in a given brain state need not be exhaustively recounted to get a 
sense of what the subject is thinking/feeling. Neuroscientific explanation is not 
impotent, but in comparison with the intentional stance, it makes a very long detour.
In principle, the informational compressibility involved in folk psychology—no 
matter how cognitively cost-effective—should be insufficient to sway a materialist 
into countenancing things (like “eaters” or “angry people”) whose ontology is, at 
root, “more” than merely material. A materialist would try to enumerate the indi-
vidual pixels of the Game of Life which a third party espousing the intentional 
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stance has the liberty to coalesce and taxonomize. True, “posing fanciful interpreta-
tions” (Dennett 1991b, 41) spares one the tedious task of having to describe the 
domain in question one atomic unit at a time, but a materialist might reply that a 
token-only approach is the surest way to ensure that one’s account hugs the meta-
physical makeup of the world as closely as possible. What sets materialism apart 
from the intentional stance, then, is that it does not give any weight to consider-
ations of cognitive economy. If ease of use mattered as much as matter, materialism 
would not have to wait for a completed neuroscience to tell it what anger really is.
Informational compression is asymmetrical in that it can result in a loss of data 
(especially if the domain represented is disorderly). Going back to the example just 
used, from an exhaustive account of another person’s material makeup and spatial 
location, one can infer “who” and “where” (colloquially) they are; but from simply 
being told that “So and so is sitting in such and such a room doing this or that,” one 
cannot determine the person’s exact spatial coordinates. That is the price to pay for 
engaging in intentional talk: we save time precisely because we cut corners. The 
downside is that there is just no way to unpack all the observational consequences 
of a given intentional statement, so in this respect the idiom will always fall short of 
a “complete” scientific account. I want to argue, however, that informational com-
pression is something no science can do without.
Bit-mapping the world is a chimerical aspiration. To take an example from 
astronomy, we do not exhaustively chart the path and constitution of celestial bod-
ies, pile up the ensuing records in some museum vault, and call that knowledge. 
Rather, “[t]he positions of the planets in the solar system over some interval consti-
tute a compressible data set, because Newton’s laws […] supply the necessary algo-
rithm to achieve the compression” (Davies 1990, 63). This informational 
compression is required at small scales too. Even talk of particles is shorthand for 
talk of patterns. As Peirce rightly noted,
The existence of things consists in their regular behaviour. If an atom had no regular attrac-
tions and repulsions, if its mass was at one instant nothing, at another a ton, at another a 
negative quantity, if its motion instead of being continuous, consisted in a series of leaps 
from one place to another without passing through any intervening places, and if there were 
no definite relations between its different positions, velocities and directions of displace-
ment, if it were at one time in one place and at another time in a dozen, such a disjointed 
plurality of phenomena would not make up any existing thing. (Peirce 1992, 278)
According to Peirce, “substances” are in fact “constituted by regularities” (ibid.). 
As far as explanations go, the antics of one’s conspecifics are no different. People 
do things in a patterned way, and it is the business of psychology and cognitive sci-
ence to discern those patterns in order to predict what people will do next.
To miss a pattern that is potentially visible is surely to miss relations that truly 
exist in the world. Observers nevertheless privilege some patterns over others 
because they bring their aims, queries, and practical interests to bear on the transac-
tion (Peschard 2010). Using an example from Henry James, we can say that making 
out a complex figure in a Persian carpet is a joint effort, the subject selecting one 
shape among others, the object ensuring that this selection is not confabulated. 
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Hence, in this account, “any act of interpretation is a dialectic between […] initia-
tive on the part of the interpreter and contextual pressure” (Eco 1990, 21).
6.2  Informational Pause
The informational account I have just sketched uses patterns to explain familiar 
things and events like tables, frogs, jealousy, good jokes, and economic recessions. 
Is this enough? Don Ross thinks so. In fact, he believes that “reality is composed of 
real patterns all the way down” (Ross 2000, 160; emphasis in original). I want to 
part ways with Ross here because, if patterns are complex and complexity subsumes 
simplicity, then those patterns must subsume simple qualities. To see this, we can 
look again at the Game of Life setting and make the following observations:
 1. It is complex.
 2. There is no such thing as a neighbourless cell pixel.
Now, consider what happens when we add the following claim:
 3. Complexity subsumes simplicity.
I hold these three claims to be true. Yet, their conjunction can create a tension 
because, in principle, claims (1) and (3) allow for the supposition of a neighbourless 
cell pixel—even though claim (2) states that, factually, there is no such thing. So 
long as humans are capable of realizing this, the worries that generate the “hard 
problem” of consciousness will persist. By inserting a formal distinction in the sub-
sumption of (3), prescission lets us see how the conjunction of these claims can be 
consistent.
Like the Game of Life, the field of human experience conjoins complexity and 
simplicity. However, Bertrand Russell held that science has nothing to say about 
simple qualities (Holman 2008, 50–51). To arrive at this view, Russell implicitly 
relied on a premise which, following Stathis Psillos (2009, 126), we may call the 
“Helmholtz-Weyl” principle. It states that “we are justified, when different percep-
tions offer themselves to us, to infer that the underlying real conditions are differ-
ent” (quoted by Weyl 1963, 26). This principle grafts itself nicely onto other 
Russellian tenets. As we saw in Chap. 4, Russell (1998, 59) thought that observa-
tional episodes conveyed by nondescript demonstratives like “This is white” supply 
us with “knowledge by acquaintance.” Although we can attempt to convey by osten-
sion what is happening when we enjoy first-person episodes, these empirical points 
of contact, Russell held, are by their nature private and ineffable. This does not bode 
well for objective third-person knowledge. Not to worry, one does not have to wait 
long to depart from this, since “[t]he next simplest [facts] would be those in which 
you have a relation between two facts, such as: ‘This is to the left of that’” (Russell 
1998, 59). The moment we bring two or more relata into relation, we leave the 




This is where the move from different perceptions to different causes does its 
work. On this view, a three-part sequence like lemon/apple/lemon will bear the 
same relational configuration as the three-part sequence avocado/banana/avocado—
even if one person tastes avocado flavours where another tastes lemon. “Two rela-
tions P, Q are said to be ‘similar’ if there is a one-one relation between the terms of 
their fields, which is such that, whenever two terms have the relation P, their cor-
relates have the relation Q, and vice versa” (Russell 1954, 249). In the previous 
example, avocado-tastes mapped onto lemon-tastes, and apple-tastes onto banana- 
tastes. Likewise, “[a] book spelt phonetically is similar to the sounds produced 
when it is read aloud” (Russell 1954, 249), since the structure binding the printed 
characters can be monotonically correlated with the structure binding the spoken 
sounds (ibid., 400). Hence, so long as variations in experience attest to variations in 
whatever is impinging on the sense organs, the Helmholtz-Weyl principle licenses 
the inference of a common structure. “In this mathematical view, structure is a 
domain of similarity and difference, which, like color for the blind, has no substance 
of its own” (Lidov 1999, 128).
Moritz Schlick, the leader of the Vienna Circle, was influenced by Russell’s anal-
ysis. In a series of lectures titled “Form and Content,” Schlick argued that “in order 
for understanding actually to occur, it would be necessary for the ‘structure’ or 
‘form’ of linguistic signs to be ‘filled in’ with ‘content’ drawn from individual expe-
rience” and that this filling in is what “allows empirical propositions ultimately to 
be justified by experience” (Livingston 2013, 82). Schlick therefore held that quali-
ties would have to be included in a full account because, “if we are to have a science 
of some domain of reality instead of a mere hypothetical-deductive system, then our 
symbols must stand for real content” and not “mere structure” (1979, 331). As a 
result, Schlick’s stance on Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument would be that “one 
can learn the meaning of the words ‘joy’ or ‘green’ only by being joyful or seeing 
green” (ibid., 321).
What is it like to sip a cappuccino? Using prescission, tone, and iconicity, 
Peircean philosophy of signs can demystify the fact that, “If you got to ask, you 
ain’t never gonna get to know” (Louis Armstrong, quoted in Block 1978, 281). 
However, because they were using Russellian tools instead of Peircan tools, 
Schlick’s analytic colleagues were unsure what to make of this “inexpressibility of 
content” (1979, 300). Rudolf Carnap, for instance, allowed “indicator signs” 
(Kennzeichungen) to track things, but the question of “what” those indices track did 
not concern him. Quoting Henri Poincaré approvingly, Carnap held that “only the 
relations between the sensations have an objective value” (2003, 30). Russell also 
conceded that the qualitative contents which hang together in a given structure fall 
outside the ambit of testability and inter-subjective verification. According to 
Russell, when two systems of relations are isomorphic, “the only difference must lie 
in just that essence of individuality which always eludes words and baffles descrip-
tion […]” (Russell 1950, 61).
Wittgenstein agreed with Russell, Schlick, and Carnap that linguistic structures 
leave something out. Logical analysis can push all the way to single qualities, but 
Wittgenstein (2002, 189) was more open than his colleagues about the need to shut 
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up when we get to that point. In so doing, Wittgenstein allied himself with “numer-
ous arguments for humility about the intrinsic nature of our world” (Majeed 2013, 
259). Even so, by intimating iconicity, “the early Wittgenstein saw further than 
many of his contemporaries here, drawing his famous distinction between what can 
be ‘said’ and what can only be ‘shown’” (Legg 2008, 214).
As these stances show, the early analytic tradition struggled with the same themes 
and issues that currently animate philosophical debates about consciousness. It is 
bizarre, then, to see Paul Churchland dismissing arguments that decompose com-
plex relations into qualitative simplicity as “lack[ing] integrity even by the stan-
dards of purely analytic philosophy” (2011, 18). If Churchland wants to say that the 
function/quality distinction is bogus, then he must explain why so many brilliant 
thinkers have been (and continue to be) drawn to it.
Philosophers are not the only ones to have sensed that functional descriptions fail 
to tell the whole story. The British astronomer Sir Arthur Eddington noted that the 
knowledge we have of particles comes from, “like everything else in physics, a 
schedule of pointer readings [on instrument dials]” (quoted in Strawson 2006, 10). 
These patterns of pointer readings permit an indexical tracking of whatever causally 
interacts with a given instrument, but the question of what this tracked object is 
remains unaddressed. Ned Block illustrates this with a clever argument. He begins 
by noting that particles are individuated in physics by “having certain lawlike rela-
tions to certain other physical properties” (Block 1978, 302). Relations like these 
allow scientists to pick out “dual particles” like protons and anti-protons. Such par-
ticles are said to be “dual” because their relations are identical. Physicists neverthe-
less distinguish between the two kinds of particles because, when they are combined, 
they annihilate each other. So, even though “physics characterizes its basic entities 
only extrinsically, in terms of their relations to other entities” (Chalmers 2010, 27), 
the assumption that particles possess intrinsic natures is all that prevents what we 
call protons from being called anti-protons and vice versa (Block 1978, 302).
Some philosophers of science (notably Worrall 1989) have claimed that focusing 
on what a thing “does” and staying mum on what a thing “is” allows us to find theo-
retical continuities that survive paradigm shifts. The silence called for by this “struc-
tural realism” offends some conceptions of science (Psillos 2009). However, I think 
that, in philosophy of mind, a satisfactory account should leave us able to distin-
guish lemon/apple/lemon from avocado/banana/avocado.
How should we understand the intrinsic qualities of things apart from the sundry 
relations they entertain? For Eddington, the answer rests on an inference to the best 
explanation: manifestly, conscious experience lets us appreciate what qualities are. 
Since we have no other or better way to apprehend the intrinsic character of a thing, 
“it seems rather silly to prefer to attach [a schedule of pointer readings] to some-
thing of a so-called ‘concrete’ nature inconsistent with thought, and then to wonder 
where the thought comes from” (quoted in Strawson 2006, 10). This is similar to 
Schlick (1979, 296), who said that we must “fill-in” structure with qualia. True, if 
we consider a quality in a way that abstracts away all relations, we are left with 
something that “is irrelevant to science” (Russell 1950, 61). It takes an added 
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 premise of scientism, however, to infer that irrelevance to science means irrelevance 
to our lives.
Strawson does not endorse scientism, and neither do I. In contrast with Strawson, 
though, I do not think that the simple qualities obtained by prescission entail any 
kind of panpsychism. Although it is common to assume that “whatever does not 
belong to the structure […] is, in the final analysis, subjective” (Carnap 2003, 29), 
this is a Lockean assumption that I reject. Like Peirce, I believe that, when we arrive 
at a quality by stripping away all  relations (e.g., patterns, structures, functional 
roles, etc.), we are no longer entitled to locate that quality in the mind since, in 
principle, there should be no way to tell. Eddington and Strawson think that  physical 
science “allows that among such intrinsic properties could be phenomenal 
 properties” (Holman 2008, 53). I agree with Eddington and Strawson that we can 
have a direct appreciation of such qualities, but I see no reason why this direct 
appreciation should require introspection. Iconicity is a sign-theoretic way to evince 
a direct appreciation of qualities without foundering into any kind of world-wide 
psychologism.
The individual cells in the Game of Life are not empty. Acknowledging this is, I 
think, more sensible than compounding pattern upon pattern in the hope that quali-
tative experiences will eventually emerge. Hence, “[i]n Peirce’s semiotics, every-
thing in nature is a potential sign. […] The implication of this is that qualia, and ‘the 
inner life’ are potentially there from the beginning. […] The point is that organisms 
and their nervous systems do not create mind and qualia” (Brier 2008, 99). This 
account squares with our actual experience. Discussing consciousness, the semioti-
cian David Lidov writes:
What, [Dennett] asks, was the taste of beer the first time you tasted it, before you learned to 
like it? He seems to think that it had no specific taste, no qualia. Dennett’s understanding 
seems to be that what we mistook for taste was really a frustrated urge to spit the stuff out. 
Such a disposition may well have been part of the experience, but I also remember a taste. 
(Lidov 1999, 117)
According to my philosophy of signs, Lidov is not blundering when he thinks 
that the beer was bitter. Responses to beer may create a pattern, but the quality that 
those patterned responses respond to can be isolated using prescission.
6.3  Can a Pragmatist Accept this?
I have just told a story about how experiential qualities can be supposed apart from 
their detectable influence on other things. Can a pragmatist committed to tangible 
effects accept this? I don’t see why not. As the “Ur-pragmatist” (McDermid 2008, 
2), Peirce did say, quite rightly, that if we want to make our ideas clear(er), then we 
should look downstream to their actual and future effects (Peirce 1992, 132). Yet, 
there is a tendency to overlook that this pragmatist recommendation is nested in a 
conditional: if you want clarity, then you should do this and that. I see no 
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reason—and, to my knowledge, Peirce gave no reason—why anyone should feel 
obliged, in the strict deontological sense, to pursue intellectual clarity, come what 
may. Rather, that pursuit, which finds its maximal expression in collective scientific 
inquiry, seems to be one among many.
In “The Fixation of Belief” (1992, 109–123), Peirce uses a series of foils to pro-
gressively build up to the view that he finally wants us to endorse. One method of 
settling opinion is presented charitably, then a flaw is detected, which leads to the 
development of a better method, followed by another flaw, and so on—until we 
reach the fourth and final method, that of science. By pooling our results and keep-
ing our judgements open to revision, the scientific method lets us turn our fallible 
shortcomings into learning opportunities. Of course, it is normal to think that, if you 
are offered various options and you know which is best, then you should pick that 
best one. So, predictably, when Peirce offers us three “grades of clearness” culmi-
nating in his pragmatic maxim (1992, 132), we naturally assume that the other two 
were there mainly to rhetorically set the stage. However, the moment we do this, we 
walk away from the possibility of something not defined by its causal or inferential 
role(s).
William James was ready to relax the demands of scientific inquiry whenever 
following those demands would result in increased personal suffering. John Dewey 
expressed similar humanistic concerns while putting greater emphasis on collective 
benefit as the bottom line. Yet, in their rush to be branded as naturalists, many prag-
matists have lost sight of the fact that not everything is appropriately gauged by its 
current or anticipated practicality. To borrow an example favoured by Ned Block, 
“there are features of the experience of orgasm that don’t represent anything” (1995, 
34). So, when you enjoy one of those, your aim cannot possibly be the end of 
inquiry. I therefore believe pragmatism becomes more plausible when it makes 
room for inefficiency—in the double sense of a respite from technological progress 
and an escape from efficient causation.
In the philosophical literature on concepts, it is common to ask whether concepts 
are structured or unstructured (Margolis and Laurence 1999, 4–5). Whether or not it 
is appropriate to call it a concept (see Prinz 2007), the simple quality reached by 
prescissive abstraction is clearly unstructured. Language requires structure (think of 
grammar, for instance). Hence, there is not much one can say about a quale. Even 
so, these tones are not completely useless, insofar as their very quality can prompt/
support at least one anticipation, namely that something else like it might show up 
again in our stream of consciousness.
This free inference that iconicity affords is as epistemically weak as it gets—we 
might even  call it “the platitudinous affordance.” Derk Pereboom (2011) has 
explored the possibility that one might represent qualitative natures that the objects 
of those representations do not in fact have. That is certainly a possibility. However, 
while one can doubt whether a hypothesis is true, one can hardly doubt that a 
hypothesis is a hypothesis. The stream of consciousness suggests that something 
might hold, but the lack of a tangible verdict muddles the distinction between verid-
ical and illusory experience, such that “the sorting out of which-is-which is a prob-
lem rather than a given” (Deely 2003, 188). That is why, in actual (i.e., unpaused) 
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semiosis, we have to act in order to perceive (Clark 2013). So, while Peirce’s prag-
matism shows “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1992, 124–141), his philosophy of 
signs shows why our ideas need to be made clear in the first place.
6.4  Classifying the Peircean Stance
Admittedly, the semiotic account of consciousness that I have been developing in 
this book does not fit well within the popular rivalry between (materialist) monism 
and dualism. Taking that rivalry for granted, Chalmers (2010, 111–137) has pro-
posed a six-fold division of metaphysical stances. His first trio of views (A to C) 
shares a commitment to materialism. Type-A materialism denies that we face any 
explanatory gap when it comes to the mind. Type-B materialism accepts the exis-
tence of such a gap in knowledge, but denies that it reflects an ontological gap. 
Type-C materialism admits that there is presently an epistemic gap, but holds that it 
will eventually be closed. Pausing mid-way, then, Daniel Dennett (1991a) would be 
an advocate of type-A, Brian Loar (1997) of type-B, and Paul Churchland (1981) of 
type-C.
The metaphysical stances of Chalmers’ second trio (D to F) all countenance 
more than matter. Type-D dualism holds that the mind not only exists, but is caus-
ally efficacious as well. Type-E epiphenomenalism grants the separate existence of 
the mind, but denies its causal efficacy. Finally, type-F countenances the mind as a 
fundamental ingredient, but locates it at such a basic level that even matter can be 
said to be minded (or proto-minded). Popper and Eccles (1981) argue for type-D, 
Frank Jackson (1982) once defended type-E, and Galen Strawson (2006) currently 
advocates type-F.
Let us take a closer look at type-F views. A position falls under the “panpsychist” 
genus when it attempts to side-step the problem of emergence by making conscious-
ness or mind a basic metaphysical ingredient. As the subtitle to his book The 
Conscious Mind attests, Chalmers is in search of a “fundamental” theory of con-
sciousness, where fundamental features are those that “cannot be explained in terms 
of more basic features” (1996, 126). In his sequel, The Character of Consciousness, 
Chalmers expresses his conviction that “in some ways the type-F view is the most 
appealing” (2010, 138).
In much the same spirit as the yearly Toward a Science of Consciousness confer-
ences (often held in Tuscon), semioticians are currently trying to craft a worldview 
in which meaning does not seem out of place (Deely 1994, 2001; Santaella 2009). 
In October 2008, the Semiotic Society of America devoted its first ever session to 
discussing the possible existence of sign-action in the inorganic realm. For reasons 
that I outline in Champagne (2013), I do not think this project has yet succeeded. I 
nevertheless agree with panpsychists that countenancing qualities as primitive is 
“less daunting than articulating a comprehensible theory of radical emergence of 
mind from utterly mindless matter” (Skrbina 2006, 156). Our shared argument, in 
effect, is this:
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 1. It is undeniable that we experience qualities.
 2. Qualities do not figure in a materialist ontology.
Therefore,
 3. Either a materialist ontology is mistaken, or a materialist ontology must give an 
account of how our experience of qualities emerges from matter.
 4. Nothing comes from nothing.
Therefore (in light of all of the above claims),
 5. It is impossible to give an account of how our experience of qualities emerges 
from matter.
Therefore (in light of premises 3 and 5),
 6. A materialist ontology is mistaken.
Therefore,
 7. Qualities need to figure in an ontology.
This is my formulation, but the line of reasoning that it captures is not new; it was 
stated, for example, by Nagel (1979, 181). For the most part, I consider this argu-
ment to be sound. Where I differ, though, is that I do not think that accepting the 
conclusion (7) also entails accepting panpsychism, which we might graft as a sup-
plementary conclusion (8). As such, I am trying to give a plausible alternative story 
for those who find the argument above persuasive yet who recoil from the prospect 
of scattering mind everywhere.
One could presumably object to the argument in a couple of spots. One could, for 
example, reject its starting claim that we experience qualities. After all, if we do not 
even experience qualities, then the fact that qualities do not figure in a materialist 
ontology (premise 2) does not pose much of a problem. However, I accept premise 
(1), because I agree with Strawson that a “[f]ull recognition of the reality of experi-
ence […] is the obligatory starting point for any remotely realistic (indeed any non- 
self- defeating) theory of what there is” (2006, 4). Premise (5) might also be 
weakened to something like “No account of the emergence of qualia from matter 
has thus far been successful.” Instead of betting that science will (one day) vindicate 
eliminativism (Churchland 1981), one could bet that science will (one day) vindi-
cate emergentism (Park 2013 does just that). This would conceivably leave room for 
optimism, thereby blocking the deductive inference to claim (6). However, I accept 
premise (5) in an undiluted form, because I think the burden is on whoever holds it 
to be false to show why it is not true.
Panpsychism certainly has a respectable historical pedigree. David Skrbina 
points out that “many of our greatest thinkers and philosophers have held to some 
version of panpsychism” (2006, 152) and he includes Peirce in that list. There is 
textual justification for this inclusion. Peirce wrote, for example, that “matter is 
effete mind, inveterate habits becoming laws” (1992, 293). Yet, in another place, he 
also wrote that the “universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively 
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of signs” (Peirce 1998, 394). That is not exactly panpsychism. Since every triadic 
sign has an element of Firstness, and since nothing in Firstness specifies whether it 
is mental or material, it might be more appropriate to call Peirce’s commitment 
“panqualityism” (Chalmers 2015, 270–274; Coleman 2015). I nevertheless want to 
forgo that label, since panqualityism would constitute only one third of a semiotic 
universe. As a result, “[h]owever tempted Peirce may have been by a panpsychist 
approach to semiotic, […] such a position is rendered impossible by his own prin-
ciples of semiosis” (Kruse 1990, 222).
Panpsychists can certainly find support for their view in some Peircean passages 
(Skrbina 2005, 152–155). However, my sense is that most philosophers of mind who 
turn to panpsychism are not so much interested in panpsychism, but rather in the 
idea of putting qualities back into the world—panpsychism just happens to be the 
only stance they know that does this (see Goff 2017). This may explain why the 
“psyche” portion of the stance is often weakened to such an extent that it is barely 
recognizable as mind. Given this weakening, there seems to be little sense in con-
sidering a stance like panqualityism to be a species of the genus panpsychism. What 
could be the common trait here? Surely the “pan” is not sufficient for membership 
in that genus. If it were, then materialism would have to also be included, since 
materialism, rigorously stated, is really panmaterialism.
Firstness is fundamental, so it can make Peircean semiotics look like a type-F 
view. However, because Peircean semiotics also countenances Secondness and 
Thirdness, the stance does not fit well in Chalmers’ classification. Like Chalmers, 
Peirce (1998, 179–195) also classified metaphysical positions, depending on which 
of his three categories they are ontologically committed to. Exhausting the combi-
nations left him with seven possible options. Here are Peirce’s (somewhat anti-
quated) labels:
 – Nihilism or Idealistic Sensualism, which grants reality to Firstness only.
 – Strict Individualism, which grants the reality of Secondness only.
 – Hegelianism, which grants the reality of Thirdness only.
 – Cartesianism, which grants the reality of Secondness and Thirdness.
 – Berkeleyanism, which grants the reality of Firstness and Thirdness.
 – Ordinary Nominalism, which grants the reality of Firstness and Secondness.
And, finally,
 – “The metaphysics that recognizes all the categories” (Peirce 1998, 180).
Because the three categories of semiotic analysis are cardinal and not ordinal, I 
wish Peirce had said “…recognizes all the categories and their ordinal arrange-
ment.” At any rate, I find his classification more helpful. A triple-layer account 
inspired by Peirce—coupled with a better understanding of our prescissive powers 
to asymmetrically suppose some of those layers absent—can inspire an ontology 
well-suited for those suspicious of the claim that reality comprises something non- 
structural (see Champagne 2015).
If iconicity can let us see the world as it is and if what we see includes qualities 
like colours (as I argued in Chap. 5), then we have good reason to think that the 
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world includes qualities like colours. However (as I argued in Chap. 3), we have no 
reason whatsoever to think that such qualities can be conceived apart from our pre-
scissive intervention. We must therefore conjoin two seemingly contradictory the-
ses: 1) prescission is something we (humans) do, and 2) it is not up to us (humans) 
what results when prescission is properly carried out. Since the first thesis speaks to 
mind-dependence and the second thesis speaks to mind-independence, their con-
junction can seem unstable because, usually, something is considered real only 
when it is mind-independent. It would of course simplify matters if the interpreta-
tions and objects of signs could really be absent, not just supposed absent. I think, 
though, that we have much to gain from getting used to this nuance.
Some complex patterns are pattern-grasping. When these pattern-grasping pat-
terns are human creatures, what “emerges” is not a qualitative dimension that other 
things lack, but a unique power to isolate the individual qualities that comprise pat-
terns. Wedging formal distinctions into semiosis gives us, not just relations (Bains 
2006), but relations and relata. The relations need relata, but the relata do not need 
relations. Indeed, “[i]t is frequently the case, that, while A cannot be prescinded 
from B, B can be prescinded from A” (Peirce 1992, 3). This asymmetry means that 
we will never be able to give a scientific description of the intrinsic qualities that fall 
under Firstness. But, that is simply because no Game of Life (and no language 
game) can occur with just one cell (or just one quality).
Of course, nothing I have said in this book shows that qualia can be encountered 
apart from their practical effects. Asking for an example of qualitative Firstness 
unaccompanied by its indexical and symbolic means of detection would be tanta-
mount to “asking a flashlight in a dark room to search around for something that 
does not have any light shining upon it” (Jaynes 2000, 23). Yet, as inseparable as 
phenomenal qualia and their practical effects are, I do not see what can stop rational 
animals from inserting a formal distinction between the two, nor do I see why such 
a prescissive power should be taken to threaten the normal conduct and valued 
standing of experimental science. A better understanding of our ability to contem-
plate unrelated qualities can nevertheless explain why we humans can “form the 
idea of phenomena that we do not know how to detect” (Nagel 1986, 24).
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Abstract Six chapters ago, I argued that philosophical worries about the qualita-
tive dimension of consciousness should not be taken so seriously that they trigger a 
scientific search for qualia, but neither should those worries be belittled or dis-
missed. Throughout the book, I drew on the ideas of C. S. Peirce—specifically his 
ideas about prescission, tone, and iconicity—to articulate why/how those philo-
sophical worries about consciousness  make sense. In this concluding chapter, I 
summarize the resulting stance by clarifying what it can and cannot do. Philosophy 
of signs can show that the idea of qualia is licensed by reason. However, it cannot 
promise to capture such qualia by scientific means. Although artificially inspecting 
the incipient substructure of sign-action is in many ways a useless ability, it satisfies 
a distinctively human sense of curiosity and wonder.
It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be 
tracked by science. Recently, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems 
from the special nature of the concepts that we use to refer to our conscious states. 
I have drawn on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop 
a new take on this strategy. Daniel Dennett is right that “‘qualia’ is a bit of philoso-
phers’ jargon” (1998, 141). However, with some exceptions (Crane 2000; Livingston 
2004), few have bothered to retrace where that jargon came from. Retracing those 
origins brings us to C. S. Peirce—and to an entire conceptual apparatus that makes 
qualia seem far more sensible.
I therefore started by saying that, if we could see how this book’s two opening 
quotes by Peirce are consistent, we would make progress in philosophy of mind. Let 
us now take stock of what we have done and see if/how those two claims interlock.
The first quote is, in essence, a slogan for a strong functionalist program. It 
demands that explanations of the mind start with an input that enters “at the gate of 
perception” and end with an output that exists “at the gate of purposive action” 
(Peirce 1998, 241). The goal is to construct a plausible theory of what happens in 
between. Yet, no matter what such a theory might look like, it seems destined to 
relate states. This involvement of relations would be benign, were it not for the fact 
that a prevalent construal glosses consciousness as having a non-relational element 
to it. Raw feels have an intrinsic quality, irrespective of the objects or behaviours 
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they are associated with. This is expressed in the second epigraph, which says that 
each qualitative state “is in itself what it is for itself, without reference to any other” 
(Peirce 1931–58, 6.224). A tension thus ensues. The functional program calls for an 
explanation of mental facts in terms of relations, but at least one dimension of our 
conscious lives seems to involve simple experiential qualities conceived apart from 
any relation(s).
Qualia are not supposed to enter into any kind of relation with the world or other 
mental states, otherwise they could in principle be detected, either through their 
causal efficacy or their participation in inferences. So, if one accepts both opening 
quotes, one will run into trouble, because the moment an organism acts on the basis 
of a feeling, this will generate a worry that we are studying that feeling’s discernible 
effects, not the quality of the feeling itself.
How are we to make sense of this? The key, I suggest, is to see how humans can 
insert distinctions between features that are always bound. So, on my diagnosis, 
zombie-style arguments proceed too quickly—or, at any rate, they do not pay suf-
ficient philosophical attention to a crucial step. Those arguments ask us to delete 
qualia from an organism, but when we look more carefully at just what a quale is, 
we see that this notion involves a deletion of its own. I have made this prior removal 
of relations my main focus. David Chalmers speaks of “the double life of mental 
terms” (1996, 16) and emphasizes that while “[o]ur everyday concept of pain pre-
sumably combines the two [concepts of phenomenal pain and psychological pain] 
in some subtle weighed combination, […] for philosophical discussion things are 
clearer if we keep them separate” (ibid., 17). What might “keeping separate” mean 
here?
Clearly, it is not a matter of physically isolating one from the other, like severing 
the corpus callosum. Is the distinction then just mere word-play? On a superficial 
level, “feeling” and “doing” are certainly different words. However, the suggestion 
by Chalmers and others is that those words “cover different phenomena, both of 
which are quite real” (ibid., 11). Since we are dealing with something more substan-
tive than a plurality of words (Block 2000, 133) yet less palpable than an outright 
physical separation, I have argued that we are confronted with what Scotus called a 
“formal distinction.”
A formal distinction lies between a “distinction of reason” and a “real distinc-
tion.” A distinction of reason “is completely dependent upon the mind” (Jordan 
1984, 44), whereas “things are really distinct if they are separable, that is, if they can 
exist one without the other” (ibid., 45). We can use this distinction of distinctions to 
disambiguate important puzzles about phenomenal consciousness. Block (1995) 
treats the distinction between access and phenomenon as a “real” distinction in 
Scotus’ sense. However, I submit that, if we want to separate qualities from the 
responses they elicit, such a real distinction is not open to us. To look for 
p- consciousness without a-consciousness is like looking for the smile without the 
Cheshire cat. But, even if the world does not permit us to encounter a quality in 
isolation, a formal distinction allows us to consider any quality “in its own suchness, 
while we disregard the connections” to anything else (Peirce 1931–58, 1.424).
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Chalmers remarks that “[t]he clearest cases of direct phenomenal concepts arise 
when a subject attends to the quality of an experience and forms a concept wholly 
based on the attention to the quality” (2010, 267). Once we enlist the resources of 
prescissive abstraction, we can better articulate this idea of a concept wholly based 
on attention to a quality.
Some philosophers have argued that, since we employ a special class of concepts 
when discussing conscious states, a better understanding of those concepts will 
show that “the disturbing effect of the explanatory gap arises from an illusion […]” 
(Loar 1999, 103). I agree that our understanding of qualia is wedded to our concep-
tual apparatus, but I do not see why this should make our idea of qualia illusory. 
Appeals to conceivability have come under attack (Yablo 1993), especially in phi-
losophy of mind (e.g., Hill and McLaughlin 1999; Sommers 2002), so some may be 
uncomfortable with the idea that qualia are not (and could never be) encountered 
were it not for our abstract intervention. We might therefore want to distinguish 
“supposing” and “conceiving.” In any event, I readily accept that qualia cannot be 
separated from functional involvement (Cohen and Dennett 2011; Churchland 
2011). I nevertheless agree with Peirce that weaker grades of separation can be 
made. To be sure, if we reify what we prescind, our analysis will be mishandled in 
a way that generates insoluble problems. Still, by employing prescission, the idea of 
qualia can be rendered sensible.
Sydney Shoemaker provides us with a nice example of what makes prescission 
possible:
If I perceive a French tricolor, I perceive a rectangle made of three horizontal stripes, of red, 
white, and blue. This involves experiences of those individual stripes. There seems a good 
sense in which I could have had the experience I had of any of those stripes without having 
the experiences of the others. (Shoemaker 2003, 65; emphasis added)
The French flag is a conjunction of three colours (in fact, the striped flag has a rect-
angular border, so there may be even more contrasts). We can make a real distinc-
tion by cutting out a given conjunct with scissors, but only a formal distinction 
allows us to truly arrive at a lone tone. Deleting all relations means deleting all 
comparisons. So, once there, there is no telling which flag a colour might be a part 
of.
Such a qualitative state is not (and could never be) encountered in actual experi-
ence, so it is, as Peirce (1998, 294) says, “a mere logical possibility.” But, prescis-
sive analysis is enough to show that philosophers of mind who believe in qualia are 
not discussing something entirely groundless. In the paper that propelled the con-
temporary debates over the “explanatory gap,” Joseph Levine mentions how John 
Locke thought that even if “simple ideas go with their respective corpuscular con-
figurations because God chose to so attach them […] imagination will pry them 
apart” (1983, 359). If one drops the allusion to God, this begins to look like my 
account.
Because philosophy of signs is broader than philosophy of language, it adds 
something genuinely novel to the debates. Iconicity in particular lets us have a direct 
appreciation—or “revelation”—of qualities. By contrast, acquaintance always 
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keeps its object at bay. Now, consider that “appearance” just means “whatever 
appears.” Combining these notions leads current philosophers of mind into asking 
questions like: are we acquainted with our appearances? Philip Goff (2015, 124) 
feels that, to answer yes, he must posit what he calls “real acquaintance.” Strawson 
does the same with his “real direct realism” (2015). Yet, given that acquaintance 
involves Secondness, it is only a matter of time before someone takes these propos-
als and asks: since real acquaintance is just how things appear, are we really 
acquainted with that? I prefer to sidestep this perpetual nudging away by working 
from a paradigm that explicitly includes Firstness in its basic commitments. I also 
jump to a less populated but sturdier branch in the tree of philosophy. What results 
is, I think, more plausible. At minimum, Peirce’s semiotic analysis does justice to a 
fundamental truth: the idea of a relatum without a relation makes sense, but the idea 
of a relation without relata does not. So long as humans are capable of realizing 
this—and of performing the prescissive deletion which this asymmetry permits—
worries about the intrinsic character of experience will persist, perhaps under differ-
ent guises.
Block (2002) acknowledges that an endorsement of qualia does not fit well with 
scientific naturalism. Yet, catering to naturalism, he feels compelled to postulate a 
separate “module” in the brain that researchers would subsequently have to vindi-
cate. The account I have developed does not make promises it cannot keep. In the 
story I am telling, prescission suffices to establish that a tone is subsumed in a token. 
However one wants to describe this analysis, Peirce was probably right when he 
characterized semiotics as “the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs” 
(1931–58, 2.227).
Firstness is not mind, but it is not matter either. It is simply a quality, robbed of 
any relation(s) with anything else. This neutrality or indifference may seem conten-
tious, but I think it can be verified using any nearby quality, like the colour of a 
blank sheet of paper. As Levine notes, when studying such an experience, “[w]ho 
can tell whether its ultimate ontological status is material or immaterial merely by 
means of having it?” (2001, 128). So, whereas some philosophers liken qualia to 
“ectoplasm” (e.g., Ladyman et al. 2007, 39–40; Majeed 2013, 254–255), I do not 
think the idea of a pure quality is beyond the pale.
Dennett (1991), by contrast, believes that the idea of qualia is nothing but an 
unfounded “meme” that has gone viral. Of course, some memes are more useful 
than others. So, for a time, Dennett (1987) sought to recuperate the instrumentalist 
benefits of discourse about “minded” creatures. However, because the phenomenal 
qualia at the center of recent consciousness debates could never increase our predic-
tive success of a creature’s behaviour (Ross 2005), Dennett (2006) eventually 
became a vocal opponent of qualia. If, like Dennett, one expects every aspect of the 
mind to meet Darwinian standards of increased fitness, then folding semiosis onto 
itself so as to inspect its incipient substructure may well be a useless ability. I do not 
want to go on the record as saying this, because I suspect that the intrinsic qualities 
which generate the hard problem of consciousness also enable diagrammatic rea-
soning, which is surely a useful tool (see Champagne 2016). Even so, because only 
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sapient creatures notice (and question) their sentience, the main boon of prescissive 
abstraction may be that it satisfies a sense of curiosity and wonder.
People like Francisco Varela (1996) advocate a combination of third-person sci-
ence and first-person phenomenology, scientists explaining the functional side and 
phenomenologists explaining the qualitative side. I advocate a combination of third- 
person science and third-person philosophy, scientists explaining everything and 
philosophers explaining the persistent sense that this is not enough. I think this 
philosophical analysis renders a worthwhile service. Nevertheless, since under-
standing the root cause of our perplexity regarding qualia offers no obvious techno-
logical applications, I am comfortable with the possibility that, in the end, my 
account of consciousness “leaves everything as it is” (Wittgenstein 2001, 42).
One of the things that my semiotic account leaves intact is the self. In the current 
literature on consciousness, it is sometimes thought that any theory which takes the 
conscious mind to be comprised of qualities must face a “combination problem” 
(James 2007, 158–162; Seager 1995, 280–281). The worry, in essence, is that since 
a self is unified, and since no intrinsic quality entails another, it is a mystery that/
how a qualitative mind-stuff could ever yield a self. Some, like Strawson (1999, 
100) have simply replaced unity with many little selves. This, to my mind, just 
makes him face many little combination problems. Unfortunately, proposals that 
aim for genuine unity have gotten even more bizarre (e.g., Coleman 2012; 
Cunningham 2013; Seager 2010). Fortunately, my account does not need these 
solutions, because it does not face a combination problem to begin with. Indeed, I 
have been insisting throughout this book that we never actually split the stream of 
sign-action into parts. Rather, we prescind. This requires us, at each step, to keep in 
mind that the starting point that we are analyzing is in fact bound. I never really took 
my consciousness apart, so I do not have to piece it back together.
Philosophers of signs can certainly tell an informative story about how humans 
construct, sustain, and reshape their self-concept and personal identity (for a prom-
ising outline, see Colapietro 1989). But, an account that explicitly uses prescission 
is not burdened with combining basic experiential qualities into something that 
looks psychologically plausible, because plausible human experience—the sort I 
am intimately familiar with and ardently care to enrich—has been there all along.
The stream of consciousness streams because of the action of signs. Although 
this action of signs is always triadic, humans can conceive—and so request an 
account of—the intrinsic, non-relational, nature of any experience, because we are 
the sorts of beings for whom that idea makes sense. It makes sense because com-
plexity implies simplicity. Triadic signs thus subsume brute collisions and simple 
qualities that are not articulate (and cannot be articulated) linguistically. However, 
given that qualitative simplicity does not entail complexity (or any other kind of 
relation, save latent similarity), this asymmetry can act like a fishhook, letting us 
reach ineffable Firstness but preventing us from going back to Thirdness, where 
cognition, discourse, and science are possible. If this book has helped to show how/
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 How Peircean Semiotics Combines Phenomenal Qualia and Practical Eff ects 
 It is oft en thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked 
by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems 
not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts 
used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of 
philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy.   
 Th e term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – its etymology 
is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders 
Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten 
ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few 
know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel 
of an experience. Since pragmatic verifi cation and qualia are now seen as confl icting 
commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he 
could) have it both ways. Th e key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert 
distinctions between features that are always bound.  
 Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, 
but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has 
until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows 
how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in 
philosophy forward. 
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